Tax-Transfer Systems in Europe: Between Efficiency, Redistribution and Stabilization by Neumann, Dirk
Tax-Transfer Systems in Europe:
Between Efficiency, Redistribution and Stabilization
Inauguraldissertation
zur
Erlangung des Doktorgrades
der
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakulta¨t
der
Universita¨t zu Ko¨ln
2013
vorgelegt
von
Dipl.-Volksw. Dirk Neumann
aus Bergisch Gladbach (Nordrhein-Westfalen)
Referent: Prof. Dr. Clemens Fuest
Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Felix Bierbrauer
Tag der Promotion: 30. Juli 2013
Acknowledgements
This thesis contains work that I started as a doctoral fellow at the Cologne Grad-
uate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences (CGS), University of
Cologne, and that I continued as a Resident Research Affiliate at the Institute for
the Study of Labor (IZA). I am grateful for the scholarship that I received from
CGS, granted by the German federal state North Rhine-Westphalia. I thank all
my colleagues at CGS and IZA for many interesting discussions and the support-
ive and friendly working environment at both places. I am grateful to Clemens
Fuest for the supervision of my thesis even though he left Cologne and became
Research Director at the Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation in 2008.
I very much appreciated to work with him on the essay presented in Chapter 5 of
this thesis. I also thank Felix Bierbrauer, Professor for Public Economics at the
University of Cologne since 2011, who kindly agreed to co-supervise my thesis. I
am very much indebted to Andreas Peichl for his constant support and motivation
throughout my time as a doctoral student as well as for the inspiring and friendly
collaboration on several joint projects. Special thanks go to my colleagues and
coauthors Olivier Bargain, Mathias Dolls, Nico Pestel and Sebastian Siegloch with
whom I worked on several projects, too, which was always a great pleasure. I
am also indepted to Andre´ Decoster who invited me to the Center for Economic
Studies, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven from December 2010 until May 2011 to
work together on the essay presented in Chapter 3 of this thesis. I enjoyed my stay
there a lot and appreciate the ongoing exchange since then. Not least, I would like
to thank Franc¸ois Maniquet for his trust and support while giving me the oppor-
tunity to finish my thesis at the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics
(CORE) at the Universite´ catholique de Louvain (UCL), after having started a
new position there. Finally, I am grateful to my family and friends for their sup-
port, encouragement and understanding.
Cologne, July 2013
iContents
List of Figures iv
List of Tables vi
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation and key questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Methodology: counterfactual simulations and labor supply estimation 6
1.3 Summary of results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2 Tax-benefit revealed social preferences 11
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 Optimal tax model and its inversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4 Empirical implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.5 Labor supply estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.5.1 Empirical model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.5.2 Labor supply elasticities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.6 Revealed social inequality aversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.6.1 Baseline results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.6.2 Sensitivity analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.8 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.8.1 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.8.2 Standard and Saez elasticities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
CONTENTS ii
3 Welfare, labor supply and heterogeneous preferences 40
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.2 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.3 Theoretical framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.4 Empirical approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.5.1 Estimated preference heterogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.5.2 Cross-country welfare rankings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.5.3 Assessing the differences in welfare rankings . . . . . . . . . 67
3.5.4 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.6 Concluding discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.7 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4 Equality of opportunity and redistribution 79
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.2 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.2.1 Conceptual framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.2.2 The GO index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.2.3 Parametric estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.3 Empirical strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.3.1 The EU-SILC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.3.2 Income concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.3.3 Individual circumstances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.4 Empirical analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.4.1 Inequality of opportunity in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.4.2 EOp and redistribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.5 Discussion of results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5 Economic effects of a European tax-benefit system and fiscal equal-
ization mechanism 108
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.2 Related literature and conceptual framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
iii CONTENTS
5.2.1 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.2.2 What is a ‘fiscal union’? Simulation scenarios . . . . . . . . 115
5.2.3 Conceptual framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.3 Empirical strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.3.1 EUROMOD: model and database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.3.2 Tax-benefit scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.3.3 Descriptive information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
5.4 Economic effects of a European tax-transfer system . . . . . . . . . 130
5.4.1 Changes in disposable income and labor supply . . . . . . . 131
5.4.2 Effects on welfare and inequality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5.4.3 Political feasibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
5.4.4 Automatic fiscal stabilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
5.5 Economic effects of a European fiscal equalization mechanism . . . 143
5.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
5.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
5.8 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
5.8.1 Descriptive data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
5.8.2 Income changes without behavioral adjustments . . . . . . . 153
5.8.3 Behavioral adjustment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6 Benefiting from a European fiscal union? Redistribution vs. sta-
bilization 159
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
6.2 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
6.3 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
6.3.1 Concept of a ‘fiscal union’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
6.3.2 The value of moving to a ‘fiscal union’ . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
6.3.3 Decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
6.4 Data and empirical implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
6.4.1 EU-SILC and EUROMOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
6.4.2 Tax-transfer integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
6.4.3 Descriptive information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
6.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
CONTENTS iv
6.5.1 Baseline results: EU27 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
6.5.2 Results for the euro area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
6.5.3 Sensitivity analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
6.6 Concluding discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
6.7 Tables and figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
6.8 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
7 Concluding remarks 211
Bibliography 214
Curriculum vitae 236
vList of Figures
2.1 Saez’ elasticities at the extensive/intensive margins . . . . . . . . . 23
2.2 Extensive margin elasticities: comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.3 Tax-benefit revealed social inequality aversion γ . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4 Revealed social inequality aversion: sensitivity checks . . . . . . . . 31
3.1 The different welfare metrics graphically . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2 Rank correlations of empirical welfare metrics using reference pref-
erences vs. full heterogeneity in preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.3 Cumulative distribution functions (CDF) by metrics for 2 selected
countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.4 MRS for Box-Cox vs. quadratic specification of the utility function 73
3.5 Average percentile positions by countries for different methods of
metrics computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.6 Average percentile positions when preference heterogeneity due to
estimated preference parameters only - by different reference house-
holds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.7 Average percentile positions when preference heterogeneity due to
sociodemographics only - by different reference households . . . . . 78
4.1 Robustness of country rankings with respect to methods . . . . . . 93
4.2 Reduction in IOp and IO through taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.3 Reduction in IOp and IO through social benefits . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.4 Reduction in IOp and IO through taxes and social benefits . . . . . 102
4.5 Changes in EOp country rankings for different income concepts . . 103
4.6 IOp and labor productivity per worker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
LIST OF FIGURES vi
5.1 National tax-benefit schemes compared to EU average systems (based
on country means for gross income deciles; weekly thousand 2001
EUR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.2 Composition of 100 Euros disposable income by country . . . . . . 130
5.3 Share of winners in country gross income quintiles by scenario . . . 136
6.1 Equivalent variations across income deciles when moving to an EU27
average tax system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
6.2 Equivalent variations across income deciles when moving to an EU27
average tax system (ctd.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
6.3 Equivalent variations across income deciles when moving to an EU27
average tax system: stabilization value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
6.4 Equivalent variations across income deciles when moving to an EU27
average tax system: stabilization value (ctd.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
6.5 Equivalent variations across income deciles when moving to an EA17
average tax system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
6.6 Equivalent variations across income deciles when moving to an EA12
average tax system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
6.7 Equivalent variations across income deciles when moving to a “North”
and a “South” EA average tax system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
6.8 Plots for estimated net tax function: national vs. EU27 average . . 201
6.9 Plots for estimated net tax function: national vs. EU27 average (ctd.)202
vii
List of Tables
2.1 Marginal social welfare weights gi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.2 Description of the discretized population of childless singles . . . . . 34
2.3 Description of the discretized population of childless singles (ctd.) . 35
2.4 Labor supply elasticities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.5 Labor supply elasticities (ctd.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.1 Income and employment statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.2 Marginal rates of substitution (between consumption and labor) by
countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.3 Average percentile position of households in the global welfare rank-
ing - by country and metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.4 Average percentile position of the income poor (lowest quintile) in
the global welfare ranking - by country and metrics . . . . . . . . . 65
3.5 Variation in MRS and correlation between metrics by different sources
of preference heterogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.6 Average percentile positions for different sources of preference het-
erogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.7 Marginal rates of substitution (between consumption and labor) by
subgroups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.8 Descriptive statistics for reference households in decomposition anal-
ysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.1 Income definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.2 IO and IOp indices for equivalized factor income . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.3 IOp indices for different income concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
LIST OF TABLES viii
5.1 Average weekly household income and taxes (2001 EUR) . . . . . . 128
5.2 Gains and losses in disposable income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.3 Inequality and social welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.4 Political feasibility of reform scenarios using different voting rules . 139
5.5 Income stabilization coefficients (for 5% gross income shock) . . . . 141
5.6 5% asymmetric shock to ’GIIPS’ countries with fiscal equalization
mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
5.7 2008-09 shock to all countries with fiscal equalization mechanism . . 147
5.8 Main taxes captured by EUROMOD as % of total taxation in 2001 151
5.9 Data sources used by EUROMOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
5.10 Cross-country heterogeneity in main characteristics for tax func-
tions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
5.11 Gains and losses in disposable income - for baseline labor supply . . 153
5.12 Estimated labor supply elasticities by subgroups . . . . . . . . . . . 156
5.13 Hours worked and (changes in) fulltime equivalents . . . . . . . . . 157
5.14 Labour supply effects by subgroups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
6.1 Individual average monthly income and taxes (2007 EUR) . . . . . 188
6.2 Equivalent variations of median voters for EU27 . . . . . . . . . . . 189
6.3 Equivalent variations of median voters for different euro areas . . . 190
6.4 Equivalent variations of median voters for varying parameter as-
sumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
6.5 Equivalent variations of median voters for 35% income shock . . . . 192
6.6 Inequality and effective progression: national vs. EU average system 203
6.7 Income stabilization coefficients and AETRs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
6.8 Validation of estimated net tax functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
6.9 Validation of estimated net tax functions (ctd.) . . . . . . . . . . . 206
6.10 Main estimation output for European average tax functions . . . . . 207
1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and key questions
According to Musgrave (1959), the three main objectives of state tax-transfer sys-
tems are an efficient resource allocation, income redistribution and macroeconomic
stabilization. All three functions issued a challenge particularly to European wel-
fare systems in the last few decades and, with view to the latter aspect, especially
during the economic crisis 2008-09. One the one hand, the tax reforms that took
place in many industrialized countries including Europe during the 1980’s until
2000’s involved a movement away from highly progressive schedules, emanating
from the believe that existing tax systems provide large disincentives to work, and
hence decrease economic efficiency through high costs of redistribution.1 On the
other hand, the rising growth in income inequality which can be observed since
then is seen to be a result of those policy changes at least to some extent2 and
re-initiated a debate about how to design a ‘fairer’ tax system that better meets
the concern for equality.3 Lastly, European tax-transfer systems were partly con-
fronted with the fact that they were unable to sufficiently cushion the consequences
1These reforms were accompanied by similarly motivated reforms of labor market institutions,
among other things implying a reduction in generous unemployment benefits (see e.g. Nickell
(1997); Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel (2005)).
2For a documentation of those trends in policies and inequality, see e.g. OECD (2008, 2011).
3See e.g. Atkinson (2013). This is even more true for the US than Europe, where the tremendous
growth in the income share of the top 1% has led to a particular claim of taxing more the rich
(cf. Piketty and Saez (2003)).
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
of the recent economic crisis. However, despite the common trends, European tax-
transfer systems still differ significantly in achieving more equality through redistri-
bution and in providing insurance against asymmetric shocks. Thus, assessing and
understanding those differences is of crucial importance to properly characterize
tax-transfer systems and to subsequently show possible paths for better-designed
policies. This thesis contains five essays that aim at contributing to this end.
In the second chapter we start by investigating the redistributive tastes being
implicit in the European tax-transfer systems. While a large part of the empir-
ical literature simply focusses on the extent of redistribution for that purpose,
they ignore labor supply behavior, and hence important constraints faced by gov-
ernments when setting taxes. More comprehensive approaches account for the
‘equity-efficiency trade-off’ underlying tax-benefit policy design, but only make
use of “plausible” and mostly uniform elasticities taken from the literature. Thus,
to go one step further, it is first necessary to quantify potential cross-country dif-
ferences in labor supply behavior, and then to reassess the redistributive objectives
of different tax-transfer designs. This is the contribution of Chapter 2 which ad-
dresses the following key question: “To what extent do redistributive preferences –
revealed through the tax-transfer system – differ across countries when accounting
for actual differences in labor supply responses to taxation?” We also include the
US in our study which is of particular interest in comparison to Europe, given a
literature pointing to the differences in terms of redistributive tastes on the one
hand, and the differences in terms of work-leisure preferences between both con-
tinents on the other hand.4 The redistributive preferences are derived in form of
the inequality aversion parameter of a social welfare function based on an optimal
tax model that allows for agents’ participation as well as hours decision in labor
supply (Saez (2002)).
The third chapter is concerned with a more fundamental question, namely how
individual welfare should be derived that eventually will be the ingredient to a
social welfare function used to determine redistribution. Most of the optimal tax
literature in the tradition of Mirrlees (1971) assumes that individuals have the
same deterministic preferences over consumption and leisure and only differ with
4See e.g. Alesina and Glaeser (2004), Alesina and Angeletos (2005); Blanchard (2004), Alesina,
Glaeser and Sacerdote (2005).
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respect to skills and (hence) wages. In contrast, more recent approaches recognize
that individual outcomes not only result from skills, which to some extent can be
seen as endowed circumstances, but also from individual preferences. Furthermore,
while Mirrleesian approaches assume cardinality of utilities in order to compare
individual welfare levels, those approaches limit the analysis to the original con-
cept of ordinal utility. Rather, individual comparability to answer the question
who should eventually redistribute towards whom is introduced by certain ‘fair-
ness considerations’ based on a general principle, namely that individuals should
be held responsible for their preferences but not for endowed circumstances (see for
an overview Fleurbaey (2008); Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2010)).5 As a result, not
all inequalities in outcomes might legitimate redistribution. However, the same lit-
erature has also precisely shown that, even if likely to be in conflict with this main
principle, it might not always be possible to remove ethical priors about individual
preferences. Yet, these priors are made explicit in the analysis. This is of special
interest with respect to taxation because the identification of the individuals that
deserve compensation might differ depending on the specific individual welfare
metric at use – and not (only) on the inequality aversion parameter of the social
welfare function. This is fundamentally different from the model of Saez (2002)
used in Chapter 2 which actually allows for heterogeneity in consumption-leisure
preferences of the individuals but where the treatment of this heterogeneity still
remains implicit and thus unclear. While new models of optimal, ‘fair’ taxation
have accordingly been derived (e.g. Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006, 2007, 2011)
), it is beyond the scope of the chapter to develop an accordant empirical frame-
work that could characterize countries’ tax-benefit systems similarly to Chapter 2.
Rather, as a first step, we provide individual welfare comparisons in a European
context when allowing for differences in consumption-leisure preferences.6 This is
also motivated by a literature that emerged around a ‘beyond-GDP’ debate, which
5The philosophical roots of this so-called ‘fair allocation’ literature go back to a very fundamental
debate in contemporary political philosophy about what should determine the desirability of
different social states (for an overview, see Kymlicka (2002)). It was initiated by Rawls (1971)
who criticized utilitarianism for only allowing individual utilities fulfilling this function. How-
ever, if we do not want to redistribute to individuals who, e.g., have a very high preference
for leisure and therefore earn less income, then we need an argument that has to be based on
non-utility factors, hence implying a rejection of utilitarianism.
6As in Chapter 2, we again include the US in the analysis for comparison.
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emphasizes the respect for the different dimensions of individual well-being (e.g.
health or leisure besides income) but also individual preferences over those dimen-
sions (for an overview, see Blanchet and Fleurbaey (2013)). The contribution of
Chapter 3 is a first empirical illustration into that direction by asking: “To what
extent do cross-country comparisons of individual welfare differ when accounting
for possible heterogeneity in consumption-leisure preferences?”
In Chapter 4, we analyze if redistributive policies in European countries reduce
inequality in opportunities. In recent years, in research but also in the public and
political debate, there has been a shift of focus from inequalities in income to
inequality of opportunities by arguing that a society should guarantee its mem-
bers equal access to opportunities for income acquisition rather than to equalize
outcomes. This view allows to differentiate between inequalities that are due to
circumstances (e.g. family background in form of parental education), and in-
equalities that arise due to the application of different effort levels. It is therefore
closely related to the ‘normative background’ of Chapter 3. However, the spe-
cific economic approach considered here goes back to Roemer (1993, 1998) and is
somewhat different as one does not need direct information about individual pref-
erences. Rather, from a viewpoint of empirical application, it might appear to be
more attractive as it only requires to know the distribution of income or well-being
for each circumstance class (and the position of individuals within), and hence can
be applied even when circumstances only are observable but not the ‘responsibility
characteristics’ themselves.7 Yet, the impact of tax-benefit policies on inequality
of opportunity is still rarely addressed in the existing literature and in Chapter 4
we contribute by asking: ”Are tax-transfer systems in Europe reducing inequality
of opportunity and, if yes, how does its extent compare to the reduction in income
inequality?”
In Chapters 5 and 6, we additionally turn to the stabilizing function of Euro-
pean tax-transfer systems. In the aftermath of the economic crisis 2008-09, this
has gained particular importance given the accumulation of debt in many coun-
tries and the resulting inability especially of some Southern European countries
7For recent overviews on empirical approaches to the “equality of opportunity” concept, see
Pignataro (2012) or Ramos and Van de gaer (2012). For the philosophical differences between
Roemer’s approach and the literature cited with respect to Chapter 3, see e.g. Fleurbaey (2008,
Ch. 8) and a recent discussion between Fleurbaey (2013) and Roemer (2013).
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to provide insurance against asymmetric income shocks (see e.g. Bertola (2013)).
This experience initiated a debate about more fiscal integration in the euro area.
Besides more effective rules for fiscal policies or the introduction of specific crisis
mechanisms8, the discussion also included more fundamental and ambitious pro-
posals as that of van Rompuy (2012), arguing for a ‘fiscal capacity’ for Europe.
Yet, as in the nature of things, little is known in the literature about the possible
economic effects of deeper fiscal integration in Europe from an empirical view-
point. In Chapter 5, we therefore set up an hypothetical scenario and analyze the
economic effects of two key elements of existing fiscal federations, if they had been
introduced together with the euro area in 2001. Precisely, we ask: “What would
have been the economic effects in terms of income redistribution and macroeco-
nomic stabilization, if i) a European tax-transfer system or ii) a European fiscal
equalization mechanism would have been introduced together with the monetary
union?”.9
Chapter 6 is a direct extension to the fifth chapter. In Chapter 5, redistributive
effects are analyzed separately (at the micro level) from stabilizing effects (at the
macro level). This might not allow for a comprehensive conclusion whether a
country would really gain or lose from more fiscal integration. As a consequence,
this could be an obstacle to political feasibility, assuming that unanimity of all
EU member states would be required as is currently the case in the Council of the
European Union for tax matters. Using recent data before the crisis, we therefore
apply an explicit theoretical approach based on individual equivalent variations
derived from an expected utility model. This allows to assess the interesting
question whether a reform would be Pareto improving in the sense that at least
one country gains while no one loses. Focussing on different compositions of fiscal
federations as well as varying crisis scenarios, the additional key questions we ask in
Chapter 6 are therefore: “What would be the integrated individual value in terms
of redistributive and stabilizing effects when introducing a European tax-transfer
system and what are the preconditions for a Pareto improving introduction?”
8For an overview on current fiscal policies in the EMU and its state of integration, see European
Commission (2012).
9For detailed overviews on the structure of existing tax systems of the EU member states, see
EUROSTAT (2013) or OECD (2013).
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1.2 Methodology: counterfactual simulations and
labor supply estimation
The central methodological approach that is subsequently applied to identify the
parameters of interest is the technique of counterfactual simulations. Simulation
analysis allows to conduct a controlled experiment where some parameters are
changed while holding everything else constant. This ensures a clear identification
of the simulated effect and, by construction, removes the issue of any endogeneity
or the influence of confounding factors. This especially applies to the method
of microsimulation using tax-transfer calculators. Such models usually simulate
direct taxes, social insurance contributions and cash benefits for representative
microdata samples of households which serve as the model input. By changing
one or several of those policy parameters hypothetically, the distributional effects
to the tax system can precisely be assessed (cf. Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006)).
These models are static in the sense that they only consider immediate ‘first
round’ effects in terms of direct distributional consequences. However ‘second
round’ effects can be incorporated by extending the static model with a behavioral
component. For tax-transfer calculators, this is classically a labor supply model.
The key identification here comes from an estimation of labor supply elasticities
based on a counterfactual wage change and is usually performed using a structural
model, i.e. all behavioral parameters are fully specified. Standard in the literature
on tax reforms is the use of discrete choice models (cf. e.g. van Soest (1995);
Hoynes (1996); Blundell, Duncan, McCrae and Meghir (2000)). In this framework,
labor supply decisions are reduced to choosing among a discrete set of possibilities
including non-participation as one of the options in order to directly estimate
both the extensive (participation) and intensive margin (working hours) decision.
Thereby, a discrete choice model allows to account for the non-linear effect of tax-
benefit systems on household budgets as net income needs to be determined at each
discrete point. Furthermore, discrete choice models are estimated via a direct
specification of individual utility functions which facilitates welfare evaluations.
Finally, in context of the present analyses, relying on structural models is also an
important approach to obtain comparable estimates across countries as it seems
indeed difficult to find natural experiments that would allow performing this task.
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In Chapters 2, 3, 5 and 6 we use EUROMOD, a static tax-benefit model for the
EU and in Chapters 2 and 3 additionally TAXSIM, the NBER’s model for US fed-
eral and state income taxes and benefits.10 In these two chapters, counterfactual
wage changes are performed to estimate labor supply elasticities and individual
utility functions respectively, using a harmonized specification across all countries
under analysis to ensure comparability. While in Chapter 2, we additionally es-
timate elasticities specific to the optimal tax model of Saez (2002) in order to
derive inequality aversion parameters via an inversion procedure, estimated utility
functions are directly used in Chapter 3 to compute a range of individual welfare
measures. In both chapters, we apply the model developed by Bargain, Orsini and
Peichl (2012), however, in Chapter 3, we estimate a different specification of the
utility function.
Bargain et al. (2012)’s model is also used in Chapter 5 to assess potential labor
supply reactions to a European fiscal federation. However, while using EURO-
MOD’s database as an input in Chapters 5 and 6, we adopt a regression approach
for the counterfactual introduction of a European tax-transfer system. Tax regres-
sions can be seen as a ‘short-cut’ to tax-transfer simulation where given net taxes
are predicted based on a very flexible specification estimated by use of higher order
polynomials in gross income and all socio-demographic characteristics relevant for
tax-benefit assignment. Therefore, the regression approach is a more flexible way
to estimate a net tax function on a pooled sample, which is of key interest here.
Furthermore, in order to assess automatic stabilization in these two chapters, we
manipulate the input data by simulating shocks to individual gross income. This
can be seen as a controlled experiment that enables us to identify the shock ab-
sorption of the tax-transfer system in form of net tax adjustment. Importantly,
this approach is not at risk to be biased by discretionary fiscal policy or behavioral
10EUROMOD was originally created in the late 1990’s, by a consortium of research institutes with
members from each EU15 country. The tax-benefit systems included in the model have been
validated against aggregated administrative statistics as well as national tax-benefit models,
and the robustness has been checked through numerous applications (see e.g. Bargain (2007)).
EUROMOD is constantly updated and the most recent version allows for a simulation of pol-
icy systems up to 2010 for all current 27 EU member countries.For a current introduction to
EUROMOD and information on the underlying input data, see Sutherland and Figari (2013).
There are also country reports available with detailed information on the modeling and valida-
tion of each tax-benefit system, see http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/research/euromod. For more
information on TAXSIM see Feenberg and Coutts (1993) and http://www.nber.org/taxsim/.
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reactions of economic agents which would be the case for ex-post analyses based
on macroeconomic aggregates.
Chapter 4 is an exception in the sense that it does not make use of tax-transfer
calculators. Yet, it also uses household microdata but conducts a purely descriptive
analysis corresponding to the standard accounting approach to measure effective
redistribution, where the identification simply follows from adding or subtracting
different income components as e.g. factor income, taxes or benefits.
1.3 Summary of results
Chapter 2: Tax-benefit revealed social preferences
We analyze to which extent social inequality aversion differs across nations
when controlling for actual country differences in labor supply responses. Towards
this aim, we estimate labor supply elasticities at both extensive and intensive mar-
gins for 17 EU countries (and the US). Using the same data, inequality aversion
is measured as the degree of redistribution implicit in current tax-benefit systems,
when these systems are deemed optimal. Our main results are as follows. We find
relatively small differences in labor supply elasticities across countries. However,
this changes the cross-country ranking in inequality aversion compared to scenar-
ios following the standard approach of using uniform elasticities. Differences in
redistributive views are significant between three groups of nations. Labor supply
responses are systematically larger at the extensive margin and often larger for
the lowest earnings groups, exacerbating the implicit Rawlsian views for countries
with traditional social assistance programs. Given the possibility that labor supply
responsiveness was underestimated at the time these programs were implemented,
we show that such wrong perceptions would lead to less pronounced and much
more similar levels of inequality aversion.11
Chapter 3: Welfare, labor supply and heterogeneous preferences
In this chapter, we suggest an international comparison of individual welfare
rankings that fully retain preference heterogeneity. Focusing on the consumption-
11This chapter is based on coauthored work, see Bargain, Dolls, Neumann, Peichl and Siegloch
(2013c).
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leisure trade-off, we estimate discrete choice labor supply models using harmonized
microdata for 11 European countries (and the US). We retrieve preference hetero-
geneity within and across countries and analyze several welfare criteria which take
into account that differences in income are partly due to differences in tastes. Our
results indicate that the resulting welfare rankings clearly depend on the norma-
tive treatment of preference heterogeneity with alternative metrics. We show that
these differences can indeed be explained by estimated preference heterogeneity
across countries – rather than demographic composition.12
Chapter 4: Equality of opportunity and redistribution
We first investigate how family background influences income acquisition in
17 European countries. Second, we particularly scrutinize how governments affect
equality of opportunity (EOp) through redistributive policies. We apply two differ-
ent methods in order to measure EOp and effective redistribution is measured via
income concepts at different stages of the tax-transfer schemes. Our results reveal
that both methods yield rather robust country rankings for various circumstance
sets. We find clear country clustering in terms of EOp for Nordic, Continental
European, and Anglo-Saxon countries. By examining the impact of redistributive
policies in the countries under analysis, we conclude that both taxes and transfers
reduce inequality of opportunity (IOp), with social benefits typically playing a
key role. Furthermore, the equalizing impacts of the tax-benefit system on IOp
differ substantially from the ones observed in the traditional notion of inequality
of outcomes.13
Chapter 5: Economic effects of a European tax-benefit system and
fiscal equalization mechanism
We study the economic effects of European fiscal integration focussing on two
key elements of existing fiscal federations: the introduction of an EU-wide tax and
transfer system and of a fiscal equalization mechanism. We exploit representative
household micro data from 11 eurozone countries to simulate these policy reforms
12This chapter is based on coauthored work, see Bargain, Decoster, Dolls, Neumann, Peichl and
Siegloch (2013a).
13This chapter is based on coauthored work, see Dunnzlaff, Neumann, Niehues and Peichl (2011).
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and study their effects on the income distribution and automatic stabilizers. Our
main results are as follows: First, we find that replacing one third of the national
tax-benefit systems with a European system would lead to significant redistribu-
tive effects both within and across countries. These effects depend on income levels
and the structures of existing national systems. Second, the EU system would par-
ticularly improve fiscal stabilization in credit constrained countries absorbing 10
to 15 per cent of a macroeconomic income shock. Third, introducing a fiscal equal-
ization mechanism would redistribute revenues from high to low income countries.
However, the stabilization properties of this system are ambiguous.14
Chapter 6: Benefiting from a European fiscal union? Redistribution
vs. stabilization
In Chapter 6 we build on the framework presented in Chapter 5 but use an
explicit theoretical approach to analyze redistributive and stabilizing effects of
European fiscal integration in an integrated way. Precisely, using an expected
utility model, we calculate the individual equivalent variation of an integrated
EU tax-transfer system relative to the baseline with national systems and provide
a decomposition into a redistributive and a stabilization component. Our main
results are as follows. We find that a majority of the current 27 EU member
states, represented by their median voters, would gain from such a reform, which
is mainly driven by the redistributive component. Effects across gross income
deciles within countries differ and depend on income levels and the structures
of existing national systems. Moving towards smaller fiscal unions, e.g. for the
current eurozone or subgroups of even more similar countries, generally reduces
redistributive and increases the stabilizing effects. However, Pareto improving
reforms where at least one country gains while no one loses seem to be possible
only for rather severe crisis scenarios with substantial shocks to gross income, or
for high levels of individual risk aversion.15
14This chapter is based on coauthored work, see Bargain, Dolls, Fuest, Neumann, Peichl, Pestel
and Siegloch (2013b).
15This chapter is based on Neumann (2013).
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Chapter 2
Tax-benefit revealed social
preferences
2.1 Introduction
The level of redistribution through taxes and transfers differs greatly between
countries. In the empirical literature, standard characterizations of these differ-
ences rely on the effect of tax-benefit systems on inequality and poverty. However,
most studies ignore labor supply behavior when evaluating the level of redistri-
bution, thus ignoring important constraints faced by governments when setting
taxes. More comprehensive approaches, which account for the equity-efficiency
trade-off underlying tax-benefit policy design, make use of “plausible” elastici-
ties taken from the literature. For instance, Immervoll, Kleven, Kreiner and Saez
(2007) compare the efficiency costs of redistribution across European countries
by assuming “reasonable” uniform elasticities. The fact that some countries are
willing to accept larger efficiency losses from redistribution reflects either highly
redistributive views or – redistributive tastes being equal – larger labor supply re-
sponsiveness to taxation. Hence, to go one step further, it is necessary to estimate
labor supply elasticities on the same data used for optimal tax characterization.
In this way, country differences in social preferences can be disentangled from
differences in individual consumption-leisure preferences.
This chapter addresses this issue by analyzing the extent to which social in-
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equality aversion differs across nations when controlling for actual differences in
labor supply responses. Using a common empirical approach, we estimate labor
supply elasticities at both the extensive and intensive margin for 17 EU coun-
tries and the US. Applying the same estimation method and model specification
provides estimates that can be consistently compared across countries. We focus
on a homogenous group, namely childless single individuals, with individual re-
sponses aggregated to obtain elasticities at income group levels consistent with
the discrete optimal tax model formulated by Saez (2002). As suggested by Bour-
guignon and Spadaro (2012) in the case of France, we invert Saez’s optimal tax
model to retrieve parameters for the degree of social inequality aversion (implic-
itly) embodied in actual tax-benefit systems. Importantly, given the optimality of
the observed systems and existing level of redistribution, social inequality aversion
must be higher when labor supply is more responsive, i.e. efficiency losses from
redistribution are higher.
Our results are as follows. We find relatively small differences in labor supply
elasticities across countries. However, this changes the cross-country ranking in
inequality aversion compared to scenarios following the standard approach of us-
ing uniform elasticities. Differences in redistributive views are significant between
three groups of nations.1 The revealed social inequality aversion parameters range
from utilitarian preferences in Southern Europe and the US to Rawlsian2 views
in Nordic and some Continental European countries. We find that labor supply
responses are systematically larger at the extensive margin – generalizing previous
results for the US to a large group of Western countries – and often larger for the
lowest earnings groups. This result necessarily exacerbates the implicit Rawlsian
views revealed for Continental European countries with traditional social assis-
tance programs. However, revealed redistributive tastes become less pronounced
and much more similar across countries if we impose zero labor supply responses
(for instance, reflecting that policymakers may have ignored efficiency constraints
1That is, we obtain partial orderings. For instance, we can say that the French, Irish and UK
systems are significantly “more Rawlsian” than the US system and less redistributive than the
Swedish one. Yet we cannot conclude that inequality aversion is higher in France than in the
UK or Ireland.
2Note that like many, we improperly use the term ”Rawlsian” throughout the chapter. Maxi-
mizing utility of the worst off person in the society is not the original version of Rawls (1971)
but a kind of welfarist version of Rawls, as explained in Kanbur, Pirttila¨ and Tuomala (2006).
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at the time these welfare programs were implemented). This finding highlights the
importance of accounting for efficiency constraints when assessing social inequality
aversion.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 briefly reviews the related lit-
erature. Section 2.3 presents the optimal tax model and the inversion procedure.
Section 2.4 describes the main elements of the empirical implementation (data,
tax-benefit calculations and income concepts), while Section 2.5 presents the labor
supply estimations. Inequality aversion results are reported and discussed in Sec-
tion 2.6. Section 2.7 concludes. Descriptive statistics and labor supply elasticities
are reported in the appendix.3
2.2 Related literature
The increasing availability of representative household datasets has allowed bring-
ing optimal tax theory to the data (see the survey of Piketty and Saez (2013)).
However, empirical applications remain scarce and limited in policy relevance be-
cause two fundamental primitives of the model are difficult to obtain, in particular
using consistent data, i.e. labor supply behavior and social preferences. While
most applications assume “plausible” values for both of them (as discussed be-
low), we estimate these individual and social preference parameters from the same
data.
First, in terms of labor supply elasticities, most optimal tax applications have
drawn estimates from the literature. However, the size of elasticities varies greatly
across studies, even for the same country, due to different empirical approaches,
data sources, data selection and time periods (see Blundell and MaCurdy (1999);
Bargain et al. (2012)). Therefore, it is not clear which estimates to retain for cross-
country comparisons. In our case, it is important to capture genuine differences in
labor supply preferences across countries in order to retrieve tax-benefit implicit so-
cial preferences. The present study suggests a harmonized approach that nets out
the main methodological differences (estimation method, model specification, type
3Bargain et al. (2013c) includes an additional appendix (online version), gathering further ma-
terial and robustness checks. Including it here would go beyond the scope of this thesis and the
focus of this chapter.
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of data). Another important aspect is the distinction between intensive and exten-
sive responses. The crucial role of the extensive margin has been acknowledged in
the optimal tax literature since Diamond (1980). Our estimates on single individ-
uals show the major role of the extensive margin to be a consistent result across
all countries, with the largest responses found in the low income groups. This
result necessarily impacts on normative analyses (see Eissa, Kleven and Kreiner
(2008)). Precisely, as explained by Immervoll et al. (2007), the prevalence of large
participation responses particularly affects the debate on whether redistribution
should be directed to the workless poor (through traditional demogrant policies)
or working poor (via in-work support). Countries choosing traditional social as-
sistance programs despite large participation responses in low income groups must
therefore have very high redistributive tastes.
Second, available studies typically choose reasonable levels of inequality aver-
sion to characterize optimal tax schedules. Inversely, a country’s redistributive
preferences at a certain point in time can be explicitly retrieved by inverting the
underlying optimal tax model. This approach was first suggested in the context
of optimal commodity taxation (Christiansen and Jansen (1978), Stern (1977),
Ahmad and Stern (1984), Decoster and Schokkaert (1989), Madden (1996)) and
regulation of utilities (Ross (1984)). It has been extended to the Mirrlees’ income
tax problem by Bourguignon and Spadaro (2012), who characterize the properties
of the tax-revealed social welfare function and provide an illustration on French
data, making assumptions regarding the level of labor supply elasticities. These
elasticities are estimated on data for the UK and Germany in Blundell, Brewer,
Haan and Shephard (2009), who retrieve the implicit social welfare functions for
the two countries, focusing on single mothers. The present study adopts the opti-
mal tax inversion approach to systematically compare redistributive tastes between
European countries and the US. In a similar vein, Gordon and Cullen (2011) re-
cover the implicit degree of redistribution between federal and state taxation in
the US.
Our analysis follows the standard welfarist approach with the social planner
maximizing a weighted sum of (increasing transformations of) individual utilities.
In this way, optimal tax formulas can be expressed in terms of the social marginal
welfare weights attached to each individual (or income group), which measure
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the social value of an extra dollar of consumption to each individual (group).
This framework has recently been generalized by Saez and Stantcheva (2012) in
considering endogenous social marginal welfare weights. On the one hand, in a
normative approach, these weights can be ex-ante specified to fit some principle
of justice. On the other hand, in a positive approach, implicit welfare weights
can be derived empirically, namely by retrieving actual social preferences. Our
tax-transfer revealed approach belongs to this second stream of research, which
also includes attempts to directly elicit social preferences.4
Further to a mere measure of social preferences, it is also necessary to un-
derstand the mechanisms shaping them (cf. Piketty (1995)) and investigate the
political economy channel through which policies are designed and implemented.
Real world tax-benefit schedules result from historical and political economy forces.
Nonetheless, the fiction of a social planner can be seen as a proxy for a more com-
plex political process. Probabilistic voting models suggest that particular social
welfare functions are maximized in political equilibrium (cf. Coughlin (1992)).5
Saez and Stantcheva (2012) also show that the median voter optimal tax rate is
a particular case of the optimal (linear) tax rate where social welfare weights are
concentrated at the median. This clarifies the close connection between optimal
4Some studies elicit people’s attitude towards inequality using survey data (see e.g. Fong (2001),
Corneo and Gru¨ner (2002), or Isaksson and Lindskog (2009)). Tax preferences obtained in
surveys have also be compared with actual tax schedules (Singhal (2008)). In behavioral eco-
nomics, experiments are often used to assess preferences of a group (see for instance Fehr and
Schmidt (1999)). With the well-known ‘leaky bucket’ experiment, respondents are able to trans-
fer money from a rich individual to a poor one but incur a loss of money in the process, so that
the equity-efficiency trade-off is taken into account in measuring tastes for redistribution (see
for instance Amiel, Creedy and Hurn (1999)); in recent experiments, participants have voted
for alternative tax structures (e.g. Ackert, Martinez-Vazquez and Rider (2007)). Finally, in the
public economic literature, implicit value judgments may be drawn from inequality measures,
assuming a natural rate of subjective inequality (see Lambert, Millimet and Slottje (2003),
Duclos (2000)).
5It would certainly be interesting to extend the present approach to some explicit political econ-
omy model (see Castanheira, Nicode`me and Profeta (2012), for a survey and empirical as-
sessment), despite basic representations such as the median voter hypothesis being of limited
applicability (cf. Alesina and Giuliano (2011)). Many dimensions are involved in the case
of tax-benefit policy design in the real world, including other institutions (e.g. labor market
policies, as noted above), various actors (workers, unions, lobbies), and the role of expert and
international influences (cf. Banks, Disney, Duncan and Van Reenen (2005)), which are often
not accounted for by theory. Furthermore, social choice models in presence of endogenous labor
supply are rare.
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tax theory and political economy. In the latter, social welfare weights that result
from the political process are used rather than being derived from marginal utility
of consumption as in the standard utilitarian tax theory. Nonetheless, the struc-
ture of resulting tax formulas is the same. Finally, another way to approach the
problem is to take political economy forces as distortions in the optimal tax design
(see Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2010)). However, accounting for political
economy considerations is beyond the scope of the present chapter. Hence, as
discussed in the next section, we assume the observed system to be optimal while
being agnostic about the underlying political process and using the most simplistic
political economy model: the fiction of a social planner.
2.3 Optimal tax model and its inversion
We adopt the discrete version of the optimal tax model by Saez (2002), assuming
the population to be partitioned into I + 1 income groups comprising I groups of
individuals who work, ranked by increasing market income levels Yi (i = 1, ..., I),
and a group i = 0 of non-workers. Disposable income is defined as Ci = Yi − Ti,
where Ti is the effective tax paid by group i (it is effective given that it includes all
taxes and social contributions minus all transfers). Non-workers receive a negative
tax, i.e. a positive transfer −T0, identical to C0 by definition and often referred
to as a demogrant policy (minimum income, social assistance, etc.). Proportion
hi measures the share of group i in the population. With this discretized setting,
Saez derives the following formula for the optimal tax rates:
Ti − Ti−1
Ci − Ci−1 =
1
ζihi
I∑
j=i
hj
[
1− gj − ηj Tj − T0
Cj − C0
]
for i = 1, ..., I, (2.1)
with ηi and ζi the elasticities at extensive and intensive margins respectively,
and gi the set of marginal social welfare weights assigned by the government to
groups i = 0, ..., I.6 The elasticities are defined as:
6Note that Ti−Ti−1Ci−Ci−1 corresponds to
T ′i
1−T ′i in the standard formulation of optimal tax rules, with
T ′i =
Ti−Ti−1
Yi−Yi−1 the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) faced by group i.
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ζi =
Ci − Ci−1
hi
∂hi
∂(Ci − Ci−1) , (2.2)
ηi =
Ci − C0
hi
∂hi
∂(Ci − C0) . (2.3)
Responses are restricted to only occur from one group to the neighboring group,
and vice versa. Social preferences are summarized by the set of welfare weights
gi. These weights can be interpreted as the (per capita) marginal social welfare of
transferring one euro to an individual in group i, expressed in terms of public funds.
The only assumption made on individual preferences is that there is no income
effect, a traditional restriction in this literature, supported by our empirical results
as discussed below.7 When income effects are ruled out, an additional constraint
emerges from Saez’s model, normalizing welfare weights as follows:∑
i
higi = 1. (2.4)
The inverse optimal tax problem is relatively straightforward. A system con-
sisting of I equations (2.1) and equation (2.4) can be inverted to retrieve the I+1
marginal social welfare weights gi given appropriate values for (observed) income
levels Yi, (simulated) net tax levels Ti and (estimated) elasticities ζi, ηi. The com-
plete demonstration of the inversion procedure is documented by Bourguignon
and Spadaro (2012).8 To summarize redistributive tastes in each country by a
single-valued index, we use the parametrization suggested by Saez (2002) to relate
7Utility functions are not directly specified in Saez’s model. Yet, the weights gi comprise the
derivative of the implicit social welfare function (integrated over all the workers within group i)
and the individuals’ marginal utility of income. Utility functions are, however, necessary for the
estimation of elasticities. For this, we choose a flexible functional form (see Section 2.6). The
condition of zero income effects is not imposed a priori, but rather checked a posteriori. We find
small or insignificant effects, therefore this assumption is acceptable as a first approximation
(see in the appendix).
8Due to the inversion procedure above we do not need to calculate elasticities for group 0 – there
is no such elasticity according to definitions in equations (2.2),(2.3). In fact, the definition of
the extensive/intensive elasticity for group 1 η1 (= ζ1) can be interpreted as the decrease in h1
due to a move to group 0 by workers when C1 − C0 decreases, or alternatively as the response
by non-workers (a move to group 1) when C1 − C0 increases. This reverse response is entirely
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weights and net incomes, i.e.:
gi = 1/(p · Ci)γ for all i = 0, ..., I. (2.5)
In this expression, p denotes the marginal value of public funds and γ is a
scalar parameter reflecting the social aversion to inequality.9 The higher γ, the
more pro-redistributive the social preferences, from γ = 0 (utilitarian preferences)
to γ = +∞ (the Rawlsian maximin case). For each country separately, we first
obtain the values of gi by the inversion of the optimal tax model, then we estimate
the log of expression (2.5) to recover the structural parameter γ.10
Note that both the behavioral elasticities ηi and ςi and group sizes hi are en-
dogenous to the tax-benefit system (as explained by Saez (2002) and discussed in
Bargain et al. (2012)) or other institutions affecting labor supply behavior (such as
child care arrangements). Hence, they depend on the social planner’s redistribu-
tive views (represented here by the set of welfare weights gi and summarized by
the inequality aversion parameter γ). This source of endogeneity can be a serious
problem for the standard optimal tax approach, i.e. when using observed data
determined by normalization (2.4), i.e. simple algebra leads to:
C1 − C0
h0
∂h0
∂(C1 − C0) = −
h1g1
h0g0
η1.
It does not mean that groups 0 and 1 are similar in terms of labor supply preferences, simply
that only one Saez elasticity (here η1) is required to capture inter-group moves for these two
groups.
9Of course, there are different views on what social inequality aversion really is - as , e.g.,
discussed by Lambert et al. (2003). We rely here on a parameter γ capturing the concavity of
the social welfare function, as parameterized by Saez (2002, p. 1058).
10The present characterization could be based on alternative social objective functions. Kanbur
and Tuomala (2011) have recently clarified the interrelationships between various types of social
objectives, including some with sharp discontinuity at the poverty line (charitable conservatism
and poverty radicalism) and less angular versions such as usual constant elasticity inequality
aversion (as the measure γ used here) and the “slow, quick, slow” empirical property of the Gini
weights. Notice, however, that it follows from the discrete form of the social welfare function
used in the Saez optimal tax model that we do not impose any restriction on the shape of the
marginal social welfare weights (and hence allow for any discontinuities, as those present in
charitable conservatism, for instance). We only impose a constant elasticity inequality aversion
in equation (2.5), i.e. to derive a single-valued approximation of redistributive tastes in each
country for the purpose of international comparisons. It could be interesting to replicate our
analysis with non-welfarist objectives (e.g. Kanbur et al. (2006)) or welfare measures that
preserve individual heterogeneity (see Fleurbaey (2008) and Chapter 3 of this thesis).
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on population weights and estimated elasticities to derive the optimal tax-benefit
schedule. However, it is, by construction, not an issue in the inversion approach:
The key identifying assumption for this procedure to work is that the social plan-
ner has optimally chosen policies such that the resulting income distribution (tak-
ing into account behavioral responses) corresponds to the planner’s redistributive
preferences. This optimality assumption necessarily incorporates elasticities and
populations weights as well. Without the assumption, agents would respond to
any ‘optimal’ policy set by the planner so that elasticities and group sizes would
change. This would invalidate equation (2.1), i.e., actual tax levels would be no
longer optimal (given the new values for elasticities and population weights), and
the optimal tax rule should be applied again, generating further responses, etc.
Therefore, it must be assumed that at least one fixed point exists in which the left
and right-hand sides of equation (2.1) are consistent. This is only the case when
the observed system corresponds to the optimal one. Only under this assumption,
we are able to recover the underlying inequality aversion of the planner in the
given optimal tax framework.
2.4 Empirical implementation
We now present the data and tax-benefit simulations used to calculate Yi and Ci
as well as the income group definition. We use datasets for the US, 14 members
of the EU prior to May 1, 2004 (the so-called EU-15, except Luxembourg) and
3 new member states (NMS), namely Estonia, Hungary and Poland. The differ-
ent data sources fulfill the basic requirements for our exercise, i.e. they provide
a representative sample of the population (and in particular the income distri-
bution), are comparable across countries (the definition of the key variables has
been harmonized), and contain the necessary information to estimate labor supply
behavior.
The fundamental information required by the optimal tax model is the effective
tax Ti = Yi − Ci for each income group i = 0, ..., I. Household gross income is
aggregated to obtain Yi. We simulate taxes, social contributions and benefits in
order to obtain household disposable income, which can be aggregated at the group
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level to obtain Ci.
11 Tax-benefit simulations are performed using two calculators:
EUROMOD for EU countries and TAXSIM for the US. EUROMOD is designed
to simulate the redistributive systems of EU-15 countries and NMS. This unique
tool provides a complete picture of the redistributive and incentive potential of
European welfare regimes.12 The datasets associated to EUROMOD are presented
in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 (appendix). We cover the policy years 1998 and/or 2001 for
EU-15 countries and 2005 for NMS.13 TAXSIM (version v9) is the NBER calculator
presented in Feenberg and Coutts (1993), augmented here by simulations of social
transfers. As in several contributions (e.g, Eissa et al. (2008), or Eissa and Hoynes
(2011)), we use it in combination with the IPUMS version (Integrated Public Use
Microdata Series) of the Current Population Survey (CPS) data. We use the 2006
data, which contains information on 2005 incomes.
Our selection focuses on potential salary workers in the age range 18−64 (thus
excluding pensioners, students, farmers and the self-employed). We exclude all
households where capital income represents more than 25% of the total gross in-
come, as their labor supply differs from our target group. Most importantly, as
with Blundell et al. (2009) we must focus on a homogenous demographic group,
since aggregating across different household types within a social welfare func-
tion poses fundamental difficulties in terms of household comparisons and implicit
equivalence scales. Furthermore, Saez’s model is formulated for single individuals;
deriving optimal taxes for couple households with two potential earners is acknowl-
edged as being much more difficult (see the survey of Piketty and Saez (2013)).
For our analysis, we thus select single men and single women without children.14
11Simulated disposable incomes are used in place of self-reported incomes for two reasons. First,
they give a better rending of the redistributive intention of the social planner. Indeed, actual
(and self-reported) levels of taxes or benefits are affected by non-intended behavior such as
the low take-up rate of some benefits. Second, simulated incomes are also consistent with the
need to simulate counterfactual disposable incomes for all options of hours worked in order to
estimate the labor supply model.
12An introduction to EUROMOD, a descriptive analysis of taxes and transfers in the EU countries
and robustness checks are provided by Sutherland (2001). EUROMOD has been used in several
empirical studies, notably in the comparison of European welfare regimes by Immervoll et al.
(2007).
13Note that we make use of those policy years available in EUROMOD at the time of writing
(1998, 2001 or 2005). For comparison, we use TAXSIM simulations for the year 2005.
14Blundell et al. (2009) focus instead on single mothers. In our case, samples of single parents
in some countries are too small for meaningful results. Focusing on one homogenous group at
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Remarkably, we show that international comparisons on single individuals reflect
much of the differences in overall redistribution across countries (see in the online
appendix to Bargain et al. (2013c)).
In order to ease cross-country comparisons, we partition the population of
each country into a small number of groups, I + 1 = 6. In our baseline, group
0 is composed of inactive individuals who report neither labor nor replacement
income. Contributory benefits are treated as replacement income derived from a
pure insurance mechanism; in particular, unemployment benefits are interpreted
as delayed income. However, in the case of the UK, Ireland and Poland, unemploy-
ment benefits (UB) are paid according to flat rates and have no strong link to past
contributions. Hence, for these three countries UB are treated as redistribution.
Next, groups i = 1, ..., 5 are simply calculated as income quintiles among workers.
Descriptive statistics of our selected sample are reported in Tables 2.2–2.3 in the
appendix.15
2.5 Labor supply estimation
2.5.1 Empirical model
We estimate the behavioral elasticities from Saez’s optimal tax model, ηi and ζi,
using a homogenous estimation method. We rely on a common structural discrete-
choice model as used in well-known labor supply studies for Europe (e.g. Blundell
et al. (2000), van Soest (1995)) or the US (e.g. Hoynes (1996)), which enables us to
calculate comparable elasticity measures for all countries under study. Given that
the structural labor supply model has become a standard tool in the literature,
we only present our main modeling assumptions (more information can be found
in the aforementioned studies as well as Blundell and MaCurdy (1999)). For each
country separately (suppressing the country index in the following), we specify
a time implicitly assumes some separability in the social planner’s program, with a first stage
of redistribution between demographic groups and a second stage with vertical redistribution
within homogenous groups (see Bourguignon and Spadaro (2012)).
15A description of non-contributory social transfers and contributory UB as well as an extensive
sensitivity analysis on the treatment of UB recipients is provided in the online appendix to
Bargain et al. (2013c).
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consumption-leisure preferences using a quadratic utility function, i.e. the utility
of household k choosing the discrete choice j = 1, ..., J can be written as:
Ukj = Vkj(ckj, hkj) + kj (2.6)
with Vkj(ckj, hkj) = αckckj+αccc
2
kj+αhkhkj+αhh(hkj)
2+αchckjhkj−fkj(2.7)
with household consumption ckj and hours worked hkj. Coefficients on consump-
tion and hours worked, αck and αhk, vary linearly with several taste-shifters (gen-
der, polynomial form of age, region) and a normally-distributed random term for
unobserved heterogeneity. As in Blundell et al. (2000), we introduce fixed costs
of work fkj, equal to zero if j = 1 (inactivity) and non-zero for j > 1 (implic-
itly accounting for differences in demand side constraints). We do not impose
tangency conditions apart from increasing monotonicity in consumption, which
is a minimum requirement for meaningful interpretation and policy analysis. The
deterministic utility Vkj is complemented by i.i.d. error terms kj. Tax-benefit sim-
ulations described in the previous section are used to evaluate disposable income
ckj = d(wkhkj, mk) for each hour choice j, as a function of labor income wkhkj
and non-labor income mk. For wages wk, we first calculate raw wages from data
information on hours and income, proceed with an Heckman-corrected estimation
and finally predict wages for all observations in order to reduce the problem of
division bias (see Blundell and MaCurdy (1999)).
A common issue with the estimation of structural models of labor supply con-
cerns the identification of behavioral parameters under the assumption of wage
exogeneity. Accordingly, unobserved characteristics (e.g. being a hard-working
person) may in fact influence both wages and work preferences and thus potentially
bias estimates obtained from cross-sectional wage variation across individuals. Our
detailed simulation of nonlinear tax-benefit schedules provides a parametric source
of identification which is frequently used in the empirical labor supply literature
(e.g. van Soest (1995); Blundell et al. (2000)). In addition, we benefit from some
time variation (two years of data for 7 countries) and spatial variation in tax-
benefit rules within each country (for instance state-level tax rules in the US, as
exploited in Hoynes (1996)). The role of these exogenous sources of variation is
discussed and analyzed in Bargain et al. (2012).
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2.5.2 Labor supply elasticities
The labor supply model is estimated using J = 7 choices ranging from 0 to 60
hours/week with a step of 10 hours, which enables us to capture the country-
specific variations in hours worked. After the estimation of the labor supply model,
we numerically simulate responses at the individual level and aggregate them at
the income group level to calculate the elasticities specific to Saez’s optimal tax
model.16 Results are reported in Tables 2.4–2.5 (appendix).17
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Notes: This Figure represents estimated Saez' extensi ve and intensive margin elas ticities for the five groups of workers (for group 1,
extensive and intens ive margins are equal by definition).
Intensive Margin Extensive Margin
Figure 2.1: Saez’ elasticities at the extensive/intensive margins
For a more convenient comparison across countries, point estimates are shown
16We calibrate uniform changes in disposable income at the individual level to obtain percent
changes in income gaps, as defined in equations (2.2) and (2.3). Total responses, measured as
a change in the population shares in each income group, are then obtained by aggregation to
calculate ηi and ζi for i = 1, ..., I (see also Blundell et al. (2009)).
17Detailed estimation results, goodness-of-fit measures and robustness checks are reported and
discussed in the online appendix to Bargain et al. (2013c).
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in Figure 2.1 below for the different income groups. The first result is that re-
sponses at the extensive margin are systematically larger than at the intensive mar-
gin (except for group 1, for which both margins are identical by definition). This
finding generalizes previous results for the US (e.g. Eissa and Liebman (1996)),
Germany and the UK (Blundell et al. (2009)).
A second result is that responses are usually larger for the lowest income groups
of workers (groups 1 and 2). Despite this being expected for single individuals,
there is currently very little evidence on this (see the discussion in Bargain et al.
(2012)). However, the implications are important for welfare analysis (see Eissa
et al. (2008)) and the optimality of in-work transfers versus demogrant transfers
(see Immervoll et al. (2007)).18
We also investigate international differences, providing a visual comparison of
extensive margin elasticities across countries in the upper panel of Figure 2.2, with
mean elasticities for income groups i ≥ 1 and confidence intervals based on boot-
strapped standard errors.19 Elasticities are especially large in Southern Europe,
Ireland and Belgium, and particularly small in Eastern Europe, France and the
Netherlands. However, it is important to notice that international differences are
relatively small, with mean extensive margin elasticities mostly in a range .1− .3.
Nevertheless, we hereafter show that even such small variation affects international
comparisons in revealed inequality aversion.
We make two final remarks. First, despite their specific definition, elasticities
used in Saez’s model are highly correlated with “standard” wage-elasticities, i.e.
intensive and extensive elasticities calculated as hour and participation responses
to a 1% increase in wage rates. This is shown for the extensive margin in Figure
2.2 (lower part). Second, as stated by Keane and Rogerson (2012), “labor supply
18Interesting exceptions are France, Finland and Denmark, i.e. countries where social assistance
programs generated high effective marginal tax rates for the lowest income levels in the years
under study. Marginal changes in income differentials d(Ci −C0) used to calculate elasticities
therefore have a small impact on labor supply for them. As discussed in Section 2.3, the
fact that elasticities are endogenous to current tax-benefit systems is not an issue since these
systems are deemed optimal in our characterization. That is, our characterization of social
inequality aversion for these three countries incorporates confiscatory (implicit) taxation being
imposed on the working poor.
19Estimates are generally relatively precise, yet 95% confidence bounds are as broad as .4 − .8
for Italy or .2− .5 for Ireland. As shown below, this affects the international comparability of
tax-benefit revealed social inequality aversion.
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Figure 2.2: Extensive margin elasticities: comparisons
elasticities are neither a single number nor a primitive feature of preferences [...
and] one important source of confusion in the literature is the idea that one can
estimate a labor supply elasticity in one context and import this elasticity into
other contexts.” We have addressed this (Lucas) critique, firstly by using a fully
structural labor supply model, which is secondly integrated with the optimal tax
framework. The labor supply model allows disentangling the effect of tax-benefit
systems from other components, most importantly preferences and demographic
composition. The integration with the optimal tax framework ensures that those
elasticities are perfectly consistent with the actual framework used for the analysis,
namely the optimal tax model of Saez (2002). Bargain et al. (2012) decompose
cross-country differences in elasticities to assess the relative contributions of tax-
benefit systems, preferences and demographic composition. Results for the specific
sample under study are reported in the online appendix to Bargain et al. (2013c).
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The findings convey that while tax-benefit systems explain part of the differences,
there are also genuine differences in work preferences across countries (cf. also
Chapter 3 of this thesis).
2.6 Revealed social inequality aversion
In this section, we estimate the revealed inequality aversion implicit in the tax-
benefit systems of the 17 European countries under study and the US. While some
background information on international differences in tax-benefit policies are sum-
marized in the online appendix to Bargain et al. (2013c), it is clear that the most
important redistributive elements for single individuals are transfers and progres-
sive taxes, with the latter of particular importance in countries where singles are
not eligible for any income support (for instance, the US or Hungary).
2.6.1 Baseline results
We start our analysis by considering the effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs)
and effective participation tax rates (EPTRs), which provide an indication of the
redistributive and incentive effects of the different welfare regimes. In their online
appendix, Bargain et al. (2013c) show a U-shaped distribution of EMTRs across
income groups for most countries in Nordic and Continental Europe, which is well
in line with the results of Immervoll et al. (2007). This pattern is due to progressive
taxation at the top and means-tested social benefits at the bottom. Furthermore,
the working poor (groups 1 and 2) have been rather excluded from redistribution
for the years under consideration.20 In the US and Southern Europe, the overall
level of net taxation is usually lower and the distribution of EMTRs generally flat-
ter. There are exceptions, notably fairly high levels of effective taxation in upper
20International heterogeneity in the degree of redistribution is not affected by the treatment
of unemployment benefits (UB), i.e. whether they are counted as part of the redistribution
function or market income (according to a pure insurance mechanism). Countries that do not
redistribute much among childless single individuals do not redistribute much in general (cf.
online appendix to Bargain et al. (2013c)). This suggests that redistribution among this group
is representative of overall international differences in tastes for vertical equity, confirming that
we can conduct the analysis on single individuals.
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income groups in Poland, Hungary, Ireland and Italy, as well as more pronounced
progressivity in Greece and Portugal.
g0 g1 g2 g3 g4 g5
AT 7.3 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7
BE 4.3 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.3
DK 4.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
FI 1.9 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7
FR 2.9 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7
GE 4.7 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7
GR 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8
IE 3.3 0.6 0.4 0.9 0.8 0.8
IT 2.5 1.6 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5
NL 4.3 0.2 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8
PT 1.6 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 0.9
SP 2.8 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.8
UK 2.3 0.2 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.9
SW 6.1 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.6
EE 1.4 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9
HU 2.5 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8
PL 3.5 0.5 -0.1 0.4 0.6 0.6
US 1.6 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9
Table 2.1: Marginal social welfare weights gi
Next, we report and discuss the distribution of revealed marginal social welfare
weights gi underlying our measure of inequality aversion, as derived from inverting
the optimal tax formula (see Table 2.1). A necessary condition for the implicit
social welfare function to be Paretian, i.e. non-decreasing at all productivity lev-
els, is that weights gi are positive at all income levels. Our results show that this
is broadly the case for all countries and income groups. Marginal social welfare
weights for group 0 are much larger than for the rest of the population in Nordic
and Continental Europe, Ireland and the UK, which target non-marginal trans-
fers towards the bottom of the distribution. As found by considering EMTR, the
welfare weights pattern is much flatter in countries characterized by little redistri-
bution through social transfers (Southern and Eastern Europe, the US). However,
for this group of countries smaller weights on top incomes reflect higher tax pro-
gressivity (Portugal and Greece), while uniformly low weights on non-poor groups
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reflect high tax levels (Italy). Weights on group 1 (and sometimes 2) are smallest
in countries with generous social assistance schemes, reflecting distortions imposed
on the working poor as discussed in the EMTR analysis.
We estimate our main indicator of social inequality aversion, i.e. the single-
value index of γ, according to equation (2.5) based on the distributions of marginal
social welfare weights. Figure 2.3 reports the tax-benefit revealed inequality aver-
sion obtained under different elasticity scenarios.21 The left panel shows inequality
aversion when assuming that labor supply responses are uniform across countries –
in fact, this is how inequality aversion has been analyzed in the literature to date.
We apply the mean extensive margin elasticity over all countries to each country.
First, we find that inequality aversion is in line with general perceptions, reflecting
utilitarian preferences in Southern Europe and the US up to large levels close to
Rawlsian views in Nordic and some Continental European countries. Values are
actually very close to those used for calibration in previous empirical applications:
Saez (2002) states that γ values around .25 (resp. 1) imply a reasonably low
(resp. high) taste for redistribution, while a value of 4 is high enough to proxy
the Rawlsian benchmark. Our estimated parameters span this range, from around
.25 (US, Spain, Italy) or below (Greece) to above 1 in Nordic countries, France
and Belgium, up to 3 in Denmark. Second, instead of the uniform mean elasticity
estimated from our data, we apply the uniform elasticities used in Immervoll et al.
(2007), i.e. from .4 in group 1 to 0 in group 5 with step .1. It turns out that
the elasticities used in Immervoll et al. (2007) provide a good benchmark, as the
distribution of inequality aversion parameters is hardly affected.
The central contribution of this chapter is to assess inequality aversion when
labor supply responses differ across countries. Thus, in the middle graph of Fig-
ure 2.3, we confront the uniform “mean elasticity” scenario with our baseline,
i.e. inequality aversion parameters obtained under country-specific elasticity es-
timates. Some re-ranking occurs for the 18 countries under study. Countries
with below-average elasticities automatically appear less Rawlsian than when us-
ing mean elasticities, because the efficiency constraint is not as tight. Considering
21We focus on the extensive margin because results for the key groups 0 and 1 depend less
crucially on the intensive margin (cf. Saez (2002)). Note also that we take the mean inequality
aversion over the two periods when two years of data are available, in order not to overload
the graphs.
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Figure 2.3: Tax-benefit revealed social inequality aversion γ
France, for instance, we find very low labor supply elasticities. Assigning France
a mean elasticity would thus imply overestimating the efficiency constraints and
consequently overestimating the inequality aversion. Conversely, large elasticities
in Ireland push up the level of true inequality aversion. We can cluster countries
according to three broad groups. First, for Continental Europe, the UK, Ireland
and Finland we find a γ value around 1. Importantly, the large weight on group
0 (workless poor) drives the result of high inequality aversion for these countries,
and is rationalized by the fact that the extensive margin dominates. As discussed
above, if participation responses were small, traditional social assistance programs
could be in place without efficiency costs. However, as the extensive margin is
large, the policy choice in these countries must be interpreted by very high re-
distributive views. Second, our results for Southern/Eastern Europe and the US
suggest rather low levels of inequality aversion (smaller than 1), reflecting a low
weight on group 0 while the weight on group 1 (working poor) is higher on average.
Last, Scandinavian countries and Belgium reveal inequality aversion parameters
far above 1, which reflects an even higher weight on group 0 than observed for the
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first group of countries (see Table 2.1). Finally, we provide 95% confidence bands
for the inequality aversion parameter, accounting for the standard errors of the
estimated participation elasticities (see the right panel of Figure 2.3). Some com-
parisons are unambiguous (e.g. redistributive views in Sweden are more Rawlsian
than in the US). However, differences are not significant for all pairs of countries,
i.e. the ordering of countries’ redistributive tastes is incomplete (for instance, dif-
ferences between Sweden and Denmark). However, reassuringly, we can distinguish
the same three groups of countries as delineated above.
2.6.2 Sensitivity analyses
Our baseline results characterize the redistributive preferences embodied in actual
tax-benefit systems given estimated elasticities and reasonable income group def-
initions. Despite it being plausible to assume that observed tax-benefit systems
are optimal for the governments who implemented them, they may have actually
had completely different priors about these two key parameters of the model.
Elasticities. We first discuss what would happen if we use “wrong” labor
supply elasticities. In fact, it is possible that potential labor supply responses were
underestimated or ignored by policymakers in Continental Europe when generous
demogrant policies were designed and implemented. It was only in the late 1990’s
that numerous policy reports released in Europe highlighted the possibility that
safety nets designed to prevent extreme poverty caused work disincentives and
“inactivity traps”. The same concern that welfare programs had pushed part of
the population into a state of welfare dependency had previously led to the 1996
welfare reform in the US (see Piketty and Saez (2013)).22
22In the context of the US and the UK, Piketty and Saez (2013) argue that governments re-
targeted transfers from groups unable to work to beneficiaries who were potentially able to
work. This trend has led to a shift from traditional means-tested social assistance programs
toward in-work benefits. This policy adjustment to the moral hazard problem attached to
traditional demogrant policies can be seen as a revision of beliefs about labor supply responses
and/or a change in social preferences (social welfare weights on non-workers fall relative to
those on low income workers, as society believes that a majority of the former can actually
work). It is probably impossible to differentiate between these two aspects (i.e. it is equivalent
to say that the society reassesses labor supply responses upwards or increasingly favors desert-
sensitive policies). As discussed in Section 2.2, we do not attempt to explain how social
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Therefore, we suggest a polar case where extensive margin responses are set
to zero, i.e. ’simulating’ the case that politicians completely ignored behavioral
responses. The left panel of Figure 2.4 shows that the international ranking is
broadly preserved. However, absolute inequality aversion mechanically decreases:
preferences are less Rawlsian if participation responses, i.e. mobility between the
workless poor and the working poor, are ignored. Consequently, most of the dif-
ferences between countries vanish. However, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, and to
some extent the Netherlands, still exhibit a high taste for redistribution under the
extreme assumption of a zero participation elasticity.
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Figure 2.4: Revealed social inequality aversion: sensitivity checks
Income groups. Secondly, the definition of the I+1 groups in Saez’s model
necessarily bears some arbitrariness in how the population is partitioned. We
analyze how results are affected by alternative definitions of the cut-off points for
preferences are formed and why they change – yet it is interesting to underscore the political
economy forces at play and the possible role of international influence, with some noticeable
convergence across countries on the principle of “making work pay” (see Banks et al. (2005)).
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the income groups. They might be critical when trying to make group definitions
comparable across countries. By construction, group 0 (workless poor) is identified
as the population with zero market income. In our baseline, the other groups
were simply determined by income quintiles among the workers. We suggest an
alternative group definition that places particular focus on the crucial role of group
1 (the working poor).23 The middle panel of Figure 2.4 shows that results are
mostly insensitive to the income group definition. We explain this finding as
follows: (i) with reasonable definitions of group 1, we always capture the income
gap between groups 0, 1 and 2 to some extent; (ii) the rest of the social welfare
weight distribution is relatively flat, so alternative definitions of higher income
groups have little impact.
Finally, we provide a sensitivity analysis with regard to the number of income
groups. To ease comparisons across countries, we have initially opted for a small
number of income groups (I+1 = 6), checking results obtained with I = 11 groups
(10 groups of workers and the unemployed). The right panel of Figure 2.4 shows
very few changes compared to the baseline.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter retrieves social inequality aversion parameters consistent with current
tax-benefit systems in 18 Western countries under the assumption of optimality,
while controlling for differences in labor supply responsiveness. Labor supply elas-
ticities have been estimated on the same data used for the optimal tax inversion.
We find relatively small differences in labor supply elasticities across countries,
yet resulting redistributive views are significantly different between three groups
of nations. Social inequality aversion is highest in Nordic and some Continental
23Since “working poor” is a imprecisely-defined concept, we suggest simply taking (1 + x) times
the minimum wage (full-time equivalent income) as the upper bound for the income of that
group, rather than fixing an arbitrary poverty line. We are thus able to adopt institutional
definitions of working poverty (e.g. individualized earned income tax credits targeted at the
working poor in France and Belgium in the early 2000’s relied on such a definition with x = 30%,
which we adopt here). We use official or implicit national minimum wages as reported by the
OECD (Immervoll (2007)). Groups 2 to 5 are then defined in proportion to the median income,
in order to consistently account for the income distributions of each country. The upper income
bounds for groups 2-4 are 1, 1.5 and 4 times the median income, respectively.
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European countries, pointing to Rawlsian preferences, while Southern Europe and
the US reflect a very low inequality aversion close to utilitarian views. Further-
more, countries with Rawlsian preferences only appear so because responses at the
extensive margin – the dominant margin – are taken into account. If we impose
zero labor supply responses, reflecting the possibility that policymakers ignored
efficiency constraints at the time traditional social transfers were put in place, re-
vealed redistributive tastes become less pronounced and much more similar. This
highlights the importance of accounting for efficiency constraints when assessing
social inequality aversion.
Future research should extend the scope of the policies under consideration. In-
deed, we have considered a partial optimization problem by looking at direct taxes
and transfers. Some other policies may well have redistributive effects, including
non-cash benefits and public goods. Another limit to our work is the assump-
tion of only one type of behavioral response, namely labor supply. This appears
acceptable as a first approximation, especially as we focus on workers (thus exclud-
ing capitalists). Despite estimates being difficult to obtain, more general analyses
could explore elasticities of other margins, e.g. migration, tax evasion or long-run
behavioral responses such as educational and career choices. In addition, it might
be worthwhile to extent the political economy perspective by accounting for the
political process that generated the observed tax benefit systems in the analy-
sis. For instance, political economy forces could be modeled as distortions in the
optimal tax design before the inversion procedure is applied.
2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 Descriptive statistics
Since the selected population is relatively homogenous, Tables 2.2 and 2.3 essen-
tially focus on the characteristics of the discretized income groups, i.e., the main
ingredients of the optimal tax model. This includes income group shares hi, aver-
age levels of gross income Yi and disposable income Ci for each group i = 0, ..., 5
.We also report effective “marginal” tax rates T ′i =
Ti−Ti−1
Yi−Yi−1 and effective participa-
tion tax rates Ti−T0
Yi−Y0 .
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Table 2.2: Description of the discretized population of childless singles
Country AT BE BE DK FI FI FR FR GE GE GR IE IE
Year 98 98 01 95 98 01 95 01 98 01 95 95 00
Data ECHP PSB PSB ECHP IDS IDS HBS HBS SOEP SOEP HBS LIS LIS
Gross income Yi (note: Y0 = 0)
1 222 203 238 127 190 185 139 189 172 145 113 215 187
2 376 347 392 397 329 356 286 301 373 359 165 371 361
3 452 436 502 545 398 437 360 373 471 490 216 470 454
4 577 532 613 646 481 528 457 467 576 605 263 542 651
5 845 737 856 860 704 769 732 703 814 889 476 724 882
Disposable income Ci
0 61 96 138 140 110 113 110 151 59 80 1 67 65
1 183 181 214 154 178 181 134 171 148 141 101 199 206
2 277 243 284 282 242 273 217 232 245 250 145 287 334
3 321 286 341 367 279 314 267 276 298 320 189 337 433
4 394 333 394 428 326 368 335 338 345 381 219 374 539
5 533 435 510 518 434 491 519 482 475 520 358 478 689
Effective "Marginal" Tax Rate (EMTR)
1 45% 58% 68% 89% 64% 64% 83% 89% 49% 58% 12% 38% 24%
2 39% 57% 54% 53% 54% 46% 43% 45% 51% 49% 15% 44% 27%
3 42% 52% 48% 42% 46% 48% 34% 39% 47% 47% 14% 49% -6%
4 42% 50% 53% 40% 43% 42% 28% 34% 55% 47% 37% 49% 46%
5 48% 50% 52% 58% 51% 49% 33% 39% 45% 51% 35% 43% 35%
Effective Participation Tax Rate (EPTR)
1 45% 58% 68% 89% 64% 64% 83% 89% 49% 58% 12% 38% 24%
2 43% 57% 63% 64% 60% 55% 62% 73% 50% 53% 13% 41% 25%
3 42% 56% 59% 58% 58% 54% 57% 66% 49% 51% 13% 43% 19%
4 42% 55% 58% 55% 55% 52% 51% 60% 50% 50% 17% 43% 27%
5 44% 54% 57% 56% 54% 51% 44% 53% 49% 51% 25% 43% 29%
Group size hi (in %)
0 0.04 0.20 0.15 0.19 0.23 0.20 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.31 0.30 0.13
1 0.19 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.14 0.15 0.18
2 0.19 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.20
3 0.19 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.15
4 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.16 0.19
5 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.16
# observations 206 357 278 518 931 963 1,080 1,013 967 933 164 148 130
This table reports information on income groups for the selected samples. Policy years are 1998, 2001 or 2005. Countries are: AT=Austria, BE=Belgium, DK=Denmark,
FI=Finland, FR=France, GE=Germany, GR=Greece, IE=Ireland. Datasets are: ECHP=European Community Household Panel, PSB=Panel Survey on Belgian
Households, HBS=Household Budget Survey, IDS=Income Distribution Survey, SOEP=German Socio-Economic Panel, LIS=Living in Ireland Survey. Group 0 = non-
participants and Y 0 =0. Other groups: increasing income levels of participants. EMTR are calculated as 1 - {C i - C i-1 }/{Y i  -Y i-1 } and EPTR as 1 - {Ci - C0}/{Y i  -
Y 0 } for all income groups i>0. All incomes in euros per week.
35 CHAPTER 2. TAX-BENEFIT REVEALED SOCIAL PREFERENCES
Table 2.3: Description of the discretized population of childless singles (ctd.)
Country IT NL PT SP SP UK UK SW EE HU PL US
Year 95 00 01 96 01 95 01 01 05 05 05 06
Data SHIW SOEP ECHP ECHP ECHP FES FES IDS HBS HBS HBS CPS
Gross income Yi (note: Y0 = 0)
1 188 189 88 134 165 221 229 172 33 41 36 162
2 314 400 150 238 250 361 397 359 56 72 71 362
3 381 505 222 327 335 463 522 439 77 109 102 528
4 484 617 368 458 423 573 661 522 102 151 141 715
5 632 867 639 649 646 818 999 760 152 267 238 1194
Disposable income Ci
0 3 137 25 17 6 133 144 151 13 16 3 17
1 129 186 77 126 151 191 205 179 33 44 17 149
2 209 298 128 204 215 289 316 247 48 64 25 303
3 251 361 182 268 281 362 406 293 65 86 40 426
4 299 443 273 364 339 441 507 345 84 105 59 557
5 375 599 416 496 491 622 751 478 120 162 106 863
Effective "Marginal" Tax Rate (EMTR)
1 33% 74% 41% 19% 13% 74% 73% 84% 38% 33% 60% 18%
2 37% 47% 18% 25% 24% 30% 34% 64% 35% 35% 78% 23%
3 37% 40% 24% 27% 23% 28% 28% 43% 21% 42% 53% 26%
4 53% 27% 38% 27% 34% 28% 28% 36% 23% 55% 50% 30%
5 48% 37% 47% 31% 32% 26% 28% 44% 27% 50% 52% 36%
Effective Participation Tax Rate (EPTR)
1 33% 74% 41% 19% 13% 74% 73% 84% 38% 33% 60% 18%
2 34% 60% 31% 22% 16% 57% 57% 73% 37% 34% 69% 21%
3 35% 55% 29% 23% 18% 50% 50% 68% 32% 36% 64% 23%
4 39% 50% 33% 24% 21% 46% 45% 63% 30% 42% 60% 25%
5 41% 47% 39% 26% 25% 40% 39% 57% 29% 45% 57% 29%
Group size hi (in %)
0 0.16 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.09 0.24 0.15 0.11 0.15 0.10 0.19 0.06
1 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.18 0.20 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.19
2 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.20
3 0.16 0.18 0.24 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.19
4 0.17 0.18 0.13 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.18
5 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.19
# observations 163 555 106 191 202 561 669 1,768 233 354 1,273 7,053
This table reports information on income groups for the selected sample. Policy years are 1998, 2001 or 2005. Countries are: IT=Italy, NL=the Netherlands,
PT=Portugal, SP=Spain, UK=the United Kingdom, SW=Sweden, EE=Estonia, HU=Hungary, PL=Poland, US=the United States. Datasets are:
ECHP=European Community Household Panel, HBS=Household Budget Survey, IDS=Income Distribution Survey, SOEP=Dutch Socio-Economic Panel,
SHIW=Survey of Households Income and Wealth, FES=Family Expenditure Survey, CPS=Current Population Survey . Notes: Group 0 = non-participants and
Y0=0. Other groups: increasing income levels of participants. EMTR are calculated as 1 - {Ci - Ci-1}/{Yi -Yi-1} and EPTR as 1 - {Ci - C0}/{Yi - Y0} for
all income groups i>0. All incomes in euros per week.
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2.8.2 Standard and Saez elasticities
Once the labor supply model is estimated, we numerically simulate elasticities at
the individual level by predicting the labor supply effect of a change in income.
For a comparison with the literature, we first calculate ”standard” wage (resp.
non-labor income) elasticities for each worker, defined as the increase in work-
ing time or participation rate when wage rates increase by 1%. Standard errors
are obtained by repeated random draws of the preference parameters from their
estimated distributions and, for each draw, by recalculating elasticities.
In fact, despite the large increase in the number of childless single individuals
over the last few decades, their labor supply behavior has received little attention.
Part of it is due to the fact that recent evidence on labor supply responsiveness
stems from natural experiments based on changes in tax and welfare policies,
mainly in the US and the UK, and that these policies are usually confined to
families with children (e.g., Eissa and Liebman (1996)). Mean wage elasticities
together with bootstrapped standard errors are reported in the upper panels of
Tables 2.4–2.5. They are in line with limited available evidence as surveyed in
Bargain et al. (2012). Elasticities are especially large in Spain, Ireland and Italy,
as supported by Callan, van Soest and Walsh (2009) and Aaberge, Colombino and
Wennemo (2002). Other countries show intermediary values, which correspond to
small elasticities around .1 – .2, for instance in Germany (see Haan and Steiner
(2006)). Hour elasticities, which incorporate both change in hours for those in
work and participation effects, are close to participation elasticity. This supports
that most of the total hour adjustment occurs at the extensive margin. Income
elasticities are found to be very small in all countries, often not significantly dif-
ferent from zero and systematically smaller than .1 in absolute value. Ignoring
income effects in the theoretical model and for the selected population is therefore
a reasonable approximation.
For the particular elasticities used in Saez’ optimal tax model, we calibrate
uniform changes in disposable income at the individual levels to obtain percent
changes in income gaps as defined in equations (2.2) and (2.3) in the chapter. Total
responses, measured as a change in the population shares in each income group,
are then obtained by aggregation to calculate the extensive and intensive margins,
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i.e., ηi and ζi, for income groups i = 1, ..., I (see also Blundell et al. (2009)). These
elasticities are reported in the lower part of Tables 2.4–2.5 and discussed in the
main part of the chapter.
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Table 2.4: Labor supply elasticities
AT BE BE DK FI FI FR FR GE GE GR IE IE
98 98 01 95 98 01 95 01 98 01 95 95 00
Standard elasticities
Wage elasticity - Hours .13 .25 .31 .09 .27 .16 .14 .13 .20 .17 .24 .25 .50
(.05) (.05) (.06) (.04) (.05) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.03) (.02) (.05) (.07) (.08)
Wage elasticity - Participation .10 .22 .24 .12 .28 .15 .11 .11 .19 .16 .23 .32 .44
(.04) (.03) (.05) (.03) (.04) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.04) (.06) (.07)
Income elasticity - Hours .00 .00 .00 .00 .10 .01 .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 -.03 -.02
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Saez (2002)'s elasticities
Intensive margin:
Mean .10 .16 .25 .04 .08 .04 .08 .06 .09 .11 .09 .20 .36
Group 1 .14 .43 .38 .04 .23 .09 .06 .05 .38 .39 .18 .66 .45
(.06) (.11) (.09) (.01) (.04) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.07) (.08) (.09) (.17) (.08)
Group 2 .17 .20 .47 .06 .05 .03 .09 .06 .03 .02 .07 .26 .86
(.06) (.04) (.10) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.02) (.11) (.17)
Group 3 .05 .13 .28 .05 .02 .03 .06 .04 .03 .07 .02 .15 .52
(.02) (.03) (.02) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.05)
Group 4 .10 .07 .09 .04 .04 .02 .06 .05 .03 .05 .07 .03 .19
(.04) (.01) (.01) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.05)
Group 5 .04 .10 .22 .04 .05 .03 .12 .12 .03 .04 .08 .03 .33
(.02) (.02) (.11) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.05)
Extensive margin:
Mean .15 .35 .35 .17 .30 .14 .09 .09 .20 .22 .34 .57 .38
Group 1 .14 .43 .38 .04 .23 .09 .06 .05 .38 .39 .18 .66 .45
(.04) (.07) (.05) (.01) (.03) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.04) (.05) (.05) (.08) (.08)
Group 2 .16 .53 .46 .16 .32 .11 .12 .07 .17 .21 .53 .78 .56
(.05) (.08) (.07) (.03) (.05) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.10) (.10) (.10)
Group 3 .19 .25 .24 .24 .35 .13 .10 .09 .25 .25 .40 .51 .49
(.05) (.04) (.03) (.06) (.05) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.07) (.08) (.08)
Group 4 .14 .38 .42 .18 .22 .20 .11 .09 .11 .15 .34 .60 .27
(.04) (.04) (.07) (.04) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.06) (.05) (.05)
Group 5 .11 .15 .23 .23 .36 .19 .07 .14 .10 .08 .27 .30 .12
(.02) (.02) (.07) (.05) (.05) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.05) (.11) (.11)
Note: standard elasticities are computed numerically by simulation of responses to a 1% uniform increase in wage rates or unearned income. Saez elasticities are obtained by simulated increases
corresponding to 1% of the difference in mean disposable incomes between a given income group and the closest lower group (mobility) or the group of nonworkers (participation). Bootstrapped
standard errors in brackets.
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Table 2.5: Labor supply elasticities (ctd.)
IT NL PT SP SP UK UK SW EE HU PL US Mean
95 00 01 96 01 95 01 01 05 05 05 06
Standard elasticities
Wage elasticity - Hours .47 .11 .04 .27 .39 .41 .21 .17 .15 .14 .08 .20 .22
(.10) (.02) (.04) (.07) (.04) (.05) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.04)
Wage elasticity - Participation .42 .09 .04 .27 .32 .33 .20 .14 .14 .13 .07 .17 .20
(.09) (.01) (.03) (.06) (.04) (.04) (.02) (.01) (.03) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.03)
Income elasticity - Hours .03 .00 .00 -.01 -.01 .00 .00 .01 .00 .06 .00 .00 .01
(.02) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.00) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Saez (2002)'s elasticities
Intensive margin:
Mean .28 .12 .08 .12 .44 .06 .07 .06 .07 .07 .04 .18 .13
Group 1 .70 .16 .11 .25 .87 .10 .13 .11 .10 .11 .09 .33 .26
(.14) (.04) (.26) (.10) (.12) (.02) (.02) (.03) (.03) (.04) (.01) (.01) (.07)
Group 2 .47 .19 .07 .11 .50 .07 .05 .12 .02 .06 .03 .09 .17
(.10) (.04) (.15) (.04) (.06) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.04)
Group 3 .14 .04 .05 .03 .37 .01 .01 .04 .05 .09 .03 .13 .06
(.03) (.01) (.06) (.01) (.04) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Group 4 .08 .05 .07 .08 .11 .03 .04 .02 .07 .05 .03 .12 .05
(.02) (.01) (.05) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Group 5 .03 .15 .09 .12 .33 .06 .11 .04 .10 .04 .05 .20 .10
(.01) (.16) (.04) (.04) (.12) (.01) (.07) (.03) (.05) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Extensive margin:
Mean .59 .11 .06 .32 .43 .21 .18 .17 .12 .06 .09 .28 .24
Group 1 .70 .16 .11 .25 .87 .10 .13 .11 .10 .11 .09 .33 .26
(.11) (.02) (.03) (.07) (.12) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.03) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.04)
Group 2 .67 .13 .13 .50 .62 .21 .20 .21 .08 .03 .09 .34 .30
(.11) (.02) (.04) (.13) (.07) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.05)
Group 3 .50 .14 .07 .25 .36 .17 .21 .14 .11 .08 .07 .33 .24
(.09) (.01) (.02) (.06) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.04)
Group 4 .64 .09 .01 .32 .17 .23 .19 .21 .14 .03 .10 .25 .22
(.11) (.01) (.02) (.05) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.03)
Group 5 .46 .04 .01 .26 .12 .34 .18 .17 .17 .05 .09 .13 .17
(.09) (.01) (.02) (.04) (.02) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.04)
Note: standard elasticities are computed numerica lly by simulation of responses to a 1% uniform increase in wage rates or unearned income. Saez elasticities are obtained by simulated increases
corresponding to 1% of the di fference in mean di sposable incomes between a given income group and the closest lower group (mobility) or the group of nonworkers (participation). Bootstrapped
standard errors in brackets.
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Chapter 3
Welfare, labor supply and
heterogeneous preferences
3.1 Introduction
Following the report of the Stiglitz commission (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi (2009)),
there has been a recurrent interest in measuring and comparing well-being within
and especially across countries (see e.g. Jones and Klenow (2010)). One main
motivation of the report was to move ‘beyond GDP’ by recognizing the multi-
dimensional character of welfare. In addition, recent contributions in the theory of
social choice and fair allocation shed new light on how to reasonably measure and
consistently compare individual well-being when individuals have different prefer-
ences over the various dimensions of life (see e.g. Fleurbaey (2011)). In the eco-
nomic literature, individual welfare at least depends on consumption and leisure,
resulting in the consumption-leisure trade-off in, e.g., labor supply modeling. How-
ever, while there has been substantial progress in the development of positive labor
supply models in terms of (structurally) estimating individual consumption-leisure
preferences, the heterogeneity in preferences is usually neglected in the normative
part of the analysis concerned with welfare evaluation. This is due to the difficulties
related to interpersonal welfare comparisons. One way to solve this issue is to use
preferences of a reference household (see King (1983), and, more recently, Aaberge,
Colombino and Strøm (2004); Aaberge and Colombino (2013)). Clearly, this makes
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individual well-being comparable, but the heterogeneity in preferences is assumed
away. In this chapter, we contrast this approach to welfare measures that fully
account for different individual consumption-leisure preferences (Fleurbaey (2006,
2008)) and suggest an international comparison based on pure orderings of individ-
ual well-being. Then, we illustrate that the choice of how to treat heterogeneity
in preferences may substantially affect the evaluation of welfare across different
countries.
The empirical application starts with the estimation of labor supply models,
separately for 11 European countries1 and the US. Focusing on married women, the
group most studied in the literature, we rely on 12 representative micro-datasets
(on household net income, hours worked and various socio-demographics) and a
harmonized econometric approach for all countries in order to obtain comparable
estimates of consumption-leisure preferences. We make use of a common struc-
tural discrete choice model for labor supply, as used in well-known contributions
for Europe (van Soest (1995)) or the US (e.g. Eissa and Hoynes (2004)). This
allows us to account for the comprehensive and usually non-linear effect of tax-
benefit systems on household budgets, which contributes to the identification of
the preference parameters. As the labor supply model is identified via a direct
parametrization of the utility function, we are then able to obtain indifference
curves for all individuals of all countries - and take only this ordinal information
on well-being to derive an international ranking of individual situations for each
of the alternative welfare metrics. These rankings are simple index orderings re-
flecting interpersonal comparisons of individual utilities and are not based on any
kind of a social aggregator function.
The main results go as follows. First, we contrast the standard approaches of
using pure income or classic money metric utilities based on a reference household
to that of taking preference heterogeneity into account. Second, once heterogene-
ity in tastes is accounted for, our findings suggest that the resulting ranking of
individuals across countries remarkably depends on the normative choice related
to the metric at use. Precisely, take the case, where – when two individuals have
1These are Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany
(DE), Ireland (IE), the Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), Sweden (SW) and the United King-
dom (UK).
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different preferences and get the same consumption-leisure bundle – by use of
the metric we make the normative choice to consider the agent with the rela-
tively higher willingness-to-work to be better off compared to the agent with the
relatively lower willingness-to-work. In that case, we find that households from
countries where average female working hours are rather high (as in the US and
the Nordic countries) are ranked relatively higher on average compared to a rank-
ing based on income only. Inversely, with a metric that considers agents with
a relatively lower willingness-to-work as better off, we attribute a higher welfare
level to households from countries where average working hours are rather low (as
in most Continental European countries, Ireland and the UK). This leads to sub-
stantial re-ranking across nations when moving from the former to the latter type
of criteria – with remarkable changes in average individual percentile positions
of at least 15 percentage points for 7 out of 12 countries. Third, we decompose
marginal rates of substitution (MRS) to extract the role of different sources of het-
erogeneity for this result. We find that different rankings across welfare metrics
are mainly due to heterogeneous work preferences across countries – rather than
demographic composition. Thus, the analysis clearly shows that respecting pref-
erence heterogeneity may have substantial influences when comparing well-being
in an international context. We believe that these concerns should precede any
attempts to compare countries on the basis of social welfare functions (SWF) or
other forms of aggregated indices.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 gives an overview
of the related literature. In Section 3.3 we review the welfare criteria and their
normative interpretation. Section 3.4 describes the empirical implementation, in-
cluding the labor supply model, the data and descriptive information. In Section
3.5 we present and discuss the main results together with some robustness checks.
Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Related literature
Related to the present chapter, several studies have recently attempted to provide
international comparisons of welfare levels relying on an equivalent income ap-
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proach when accounting for non-material aspects of well-being.2 Becker, Philipson
and Soares (2005) correct growth rates for life expectancy (as an indicator for qual-
ity of life). Fleurbaey and Gaulier (2009) consider leisure, risk of unemployment,
health and household composition besides GDP in OECD countries. For a large
set of 134 countries over time, Jones and Klenow (2010) focus on consumption
rather than income when accounting for several other dimensions of well-being.
Importantly, all these studies have in common that they compute equivalent in-
comes at the country level assuming identical preferences across individuals (i.e.,
relying on a representative agent approach). Aggregation and comparison across
countries follows by use of a SWF. However, as already pointed out by Fleurbaey
and Gaulier (2009), p. 620, for “an accurate application of this methodology, one
needs survey data on income and on the additional dimensions of consumption
[...], as well as on preferences [...], at the individual level and for all the countries
studied.” This is precisely the path we take in the present chapter.
As standard in the labor supply literature, we retrieve individual and cross-
country specific preference heterogeneity relying on a structural discrete choice
model. Naturally, such models respect individual differences in the taste for con-
sumption versus leisure when estimating preference parameters. However, when
it comes to welfare analyses, we typically observe that preference heterogeneity is
neglected. The main reason is the well-known trade-off between ensuring inter-
personal comparability and respecting individual preferences (see e.g. Fleurbaey
and Trannoy (2003); Brun and Tungodden (2004)).3 In empirical labor supply
modeling, two main approaches emerged (besides the simple – but still prominent
– use of income as a welfare index). One is to mention, but de facto neglect the
comparability and aggregation problems in presence of preference heterogeneity
and to report averages of individual equivalent or compensating variations (see
e.g. Aaberge, Dagsvik and Strøm (1995); Aaberge, Colombino and Strøm (2000);
Dagsvik, Locatelli and Strøm (2009)), or to aggregate them using a certain SWF
2For a comprehensive overview on general attempts to construct measures of social welfare al-
ternative to GDP, see Fleurbaey (2009). Kassenboehmer and Schmidt (2011) critically assess
the additional value of taking into account alternative components to GDP.
3A related, more practical reason might be that even if differences in individual preferences were
accounted for, it could become a very complicated normative exercise to determine the weights
assigned to individual utilities in order to aggregate them.
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(e.g. Eissa et al. (2008); Fuest, Peichl and Schaefer (2008); Creedy and He´rault
(2012)). In contrast, a second approach explicitly addresses the comparability is-
sue using a reference household for welfare analyses. Following King (1983), classic
individual money-metric utilities are derived by means of a fixed preference func-
tion at fixed reference prices (e.g. Aaberge et al. (2004); Ericson and Flood (2009);
Aaberge and Colombino (2013)). However, with this approach, preferences of a
certain reference household build the basis for comparing individual well-being,
which are hence no longer individual specific but unified and determined by the
social planner.4
In the present chapter we adopt an approach from the recent social choice
literature that allows to fully respect individual preferences in welfare analyses
(Fleurbaey (2006, 2008, 2011); Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006)). In this ap-
proach, interpersonal comparisons are conceived directly in terms of subsets of
the consumption-leisure space which are nested into each other. This allows deriv-
ing a welfare metric which will be clearly ordered for different preferences, making
individual situations unambiguously comparable. In the consumption-leisure con-
text, the derivation of comparable, nested subsets could e.g. be implemented by
fixing a specific net wage rate or a certain amount of non-labor income. In that
case, the chosen bundle on a given indifference curve is evaluated based on a subset
that is tangent to the individual indifference surface. While this procedure is thus
similar to the derivation of classic equivalent incomes, the choice of the reference
values might be grounded on certain fairness considerations. This makes the nor-
mative priors of the interpersonal comparison more explicit – as, e.g., requested
by Atkinson (2011).5 So far, measures of this kind have not been implemented
empirically except in Decoster and Haan (2010) and the present chapter. While
those authors address preference heterogeneity within a country (Germany), we
4Then, welfare changes are usually evaluated using a certain SWF over individual money-metric
utilities. This generated another stream of criticism, initiated by Blackorby and Donaldson
(1988): a SWF over equivalent incomes usually fails to be quasi-concave in commodity con-
sumptions which is incompatible with a minimal preference for equality.
5Choosing reference values based on certain fairness considerations is the actual novelty of the
fair allocation approach compared to classical demand theory when deriving equivalent incomes.
See Preston and Walker (1999), for instance, who derive a similar set of metrics in line with the
latter. More popular, however, has been the alternative of exploring reference price independent
comparisons of individual welfare (see e.g. Roberts (1980), Slesnick (1991), Blackorby, Laisney
and Schmachtenberg (1993)).
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compute equivalent incomes for individuals of 12 countries and analyze how inter-
national rankings vary with the use of alternative welfare metrics. In particular,
we focus on the extent to which welfare evaluation is affected by that part of het-
erogeneous work preferences which is genuinely country-specific.6 In addition, we
assess the role of different sources of heterogeneity for the resulting differences in
welfare rankings.
3.3 Theoretical framework
In order to respect preference heterogeneity in the consumption-leisure space, we
follow Fleurbaey (2006, 2008) and look at individual welfare measures which specif-
ically differ in the way they treat heterogeneity in tastes. In the following, we
introduce these measures and their underlying normative rationales. We refer to
Fleurbaey (2006, 2008) for the axiomatic derivation and to Decoster and Haan
(2010) for a more detailed illustration.
The setup. Assume that agent i has individual preferences over consumption ci
and labor time hi, denoted Ri, with ci ∈ R+, hi ∈ [0, 1]. By Ri, agent i weakly
prefers bundle (ci, hi) over bundle (c
′
i, h
′
i). Ri is represented by a preference rep-
resentation function ui defined by the equivalence (ci, hi)Ri(c
′
i, h
′
i) ⇔ ui(ci, hi) ≥
ui(c
′
i, h
′
i). Observed preference heterogeneity is introduced via an individual spe-
cific vector zi (containing all characteristics determining individual preferences),
Ri = R(zi), and thus ui(ci, hi) = u(ci, hi; zi). The chosen bundle (ci, hi) results
from a classic individual utility maximization problem. Let f(.) represent the
tax-transfer function that transforms gross non-labor income Ii and gross labor
income wih (with wi denoting individual i’s gross wage) into net income c, i.e.
(ci, hi) = max [u(c, h; zi)|c ≤ f(Ii, wih), h ≤ 1]. Hence, the observed bundle of con-
6This can also be motivated by a prominent debate about what determines differences in labor
supply behavior across countries, particularly between Europe and the US. Prescott (2004)
states that different labor supply elasticities are almost only due to differences in tax-transfer
systems. This view has been criticized by Blanchard (2004) who – in line with Alesina et al.
(2005) – argues that different preferences for leisure indeed play a role and are maybe due
to cultural differences. Our findings, which control for country-specific consumption-leisure
preferences, tend to support the latter view.
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sumption and leisure results from individual choices subject to preferences and a
budget constraint.
The welfare metrics. Assume the agent’s utility function u(ci, hi; zi) to be
well-behaved, i.e. continuous and increasing in its arguments as well as quasicon-
cave in (c, h). Furthermore, assume tax-transfer rules f(.) determining individ-
ual budget sets c ≤ f(Ii, wih) to be non-linear – as generally observed in real-
ity. Then, for each chosen bundle (ci, hi) on a given individual indifference curve
ICi = ci(u, hi) = min[ci|ui(ci, hi) ≥ u], an associated hypothetical, linear budget
constraint that would leave the agent indifferent between choosing from this or her
actual budget, can be derived as c ≤ w˜ih + µi with virtual non-labor income µi
determined by virtual net wage w˜i - as illustrated for bundles a and b in the upper-
left panel of Figure 3.1. For the definition of different metrics below we further
define the indirect utility function vi(w˜i, µi) = max[ui(ci, hi)|ci − w˜ihi ≤ µi] and
the expenditure function ei(u, w˜i) = min[ci− w˜ihi|ui(ci, hi) ≥ u], with a fixed level
of utility u. The slope of the indifference curve in a given bundle (c, h) is defined as
the MRS between consumption and hours worked, MRSc,h = −∂u/∂h∂u/∂c . Preference
heterogeneity shows up by the fact that, in a given bundle (c, h), different agents
are characterized by different MRS. More precisely, an agent i is characterized
to be relatively more (less) work averse than an agent i′, if, in a given bundle
(c, h), her indifference curve ICi is steeper (flatter) than the indifference curve of
agent i′, ICi′ , and thus, MRSc,h;i > (<) MRSc,h;i′ (where we also assume that
the indifference curves cross at most once). In this setting, different metrics can
be formulated by means of hypothetical budget constraints with specific choices of
the virtual net wage rate or virtual non-labor income.
First, the “wage” metric is defined as the slope of the tangent through the
origin at a given indifference curve ICi, equaling the wage rate w˜i of agent i when
the value of the virtual non-labor income is set to a reference value of 0, i.e.
µi = µ
r = 0. The corresponding function might be called a wage equivalent as
firstly introduced by Pencavel (1977). The upper-right picture of Figure 3.1 shows
that, by use of the metric νWi (u, µ
r), the two agents can be unambiguously ordered
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Figure 3.1: The different welfare metrics graphically
from better to worse off even though preferences differ:
νWi (u, µ
r = 0) = min
w˜i
[w˜i|vi(w˜i, µr = 0) ≥ u]. (3.1)
Second, the “rent + reference wage” criterion compares individual situations
depending on a certain reference value for the virtual net wage rate, w˜i = w
r. Then,
the resulting welfare metric νRWi (u,w
r) is the value of the corresponding virtual
non-labor income given through the expenditure function (bottom-left panel of
Figure 3.1):
νRWi (u,w
r) = ei(u,w
r) = min
µi
[ci − wrhi|ui(ci, hi) ≥ u]. (3.2)
Third, the “rent” metric directly emerges by setting w˜i = w
r = 0. As far as we
assume well-behaved utility functions, this is equivalent to hours worked being set
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to a reference value of hi = h
r = 0. The resulting metric νRi (u, h
r) hence is the
value of the intersection of the indifference curve with the ordinate, equaling the
corresponding virtual non-labor income (bottom-right panel of Figure 3.1):
νRi (u, h
r = 0) = ci(u, 0) = min
ci
[ci|ui(ci, 0) ≥ u]. (3.3)
Normative interpretation. The key feature of the metrics introduced above is
that they fully respect preferences: all metrics increase when the individual moves
to a bundle on a higher indifference curve of her own preference ordering. However,
once we allow for heterogenous preferences across individuals, the non-trivial issue
of making well-founded interpersonal comparisons of well-being re-enters the scene.
More specifically, one will want to use a specific fairness concept, i.e. a device to
separate who is better, and who is worse off, and thus, to determine who should
eventually redistribute towards whom – when taking into account that individual
outcomes not only result from endowed circumstances, but also from individual
preferences. The literature on responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism addresses this
problem by keeping individuals responsible for the latter, but not for the former
(Fleurbaey (2008)).
In order to operationalize this principle, two competing interpretations evolved
in the economic literature, namely the compensation and the (liberal) reward prin-
ciple. The compensation principle states that inequalities due to endowed circum-
stances (i.e. not due to responsibility factors) should be removed. In contrast, the
principle of liberal reward states that inequalities due to individual preferences
are legitimate. Although similar at a first glance, both principles are logically
independent and to some extent even in conflict with each other.
The three measures defined above give priority to the compensation principle:
individuals with poorer hypothetical circumstances are always ranked worse off
(as can be seen from Figure 3.1) and – depending on social preferences to be
specified when moving from the two-agent case to real populations – might deserve
compensation. When individuals have identical preferences, they are ranked in
exactly the same way by all three measures. However, when preferences differ
(as shown in Figure 3.1 with crossing indifference curves), it becomes obvious
that the metrics also introduce ethical priors about how to treat this preference
49 CHAPTER 3. WELFARE AND HETEROGENEOUS PREFERENCES
heterogeneity. Thus, eventual compensation will also depend on the willingness-
to-work of the individuals. This might lead to favoring either the industrious or
the work averse – which obviously is in possible conflict with the reward principle.
In this chapter, we are especially interested in the differences between indi-
vidual welfare metrics that result from giving priority to the compensation and
compromising on the reward principle. That is, we study how the underlying eth-
ical choices in a framework of respecting preference heterogeneity systematically
alter interpersonal comparisons of well-being – in an international empirical con-
text. Thereby, we focus on simple index orderings of individual well-being levels
and do not consider any specific social ordering function. The latter would go
beyond the question of “who is better and worse off” and additionally requires
weighting individual utilities (for this distinction see also Fleurbaey (2007)).
In sum, what is relevant for interpersonal welfare comparisons is the fact that
the three measures defined rank individuals with identical preferences in the same
way (i.e. in accordance with how these individuals would themselves rank their
bundles) – while their sole difference is in the way they treat heterogeneity in
tastes. Then, once we accept the differential treatment of individual preferences,
the ethical choice at hand is related to what generates this difference between the
metrics, namely the choice of the references for interpersonal comparisons. In the
following we explain how the metrics embody this ethical choice.
In a consumption-leisure space, individuals have different preferences for work
(resulting in different levels of exhibited effort) while skill levels (as reflected in
gross wages) and non-labor income are assumed to be exogenous endowments
to the individuals. The welfare measures defined evaluate individual situations
according to hypothetical reference amounts of those endowments such that they
would allow individuals to reach their current utility level.
First, the “rent” metric asks for the amount of (hypothetical) net income which
would be enough to remain equally well off compared to the initial situation if one
did no longer have to earn it. The resulting metric is simply the level of consump-
tion when working zero hours which corresponds to the level of virtual non-labor
income at a reference wage of zero. The bottom-right picture of Figure 3.1 illus-
trates, that in this case, we judge the agent who gets bundle b, say Bob, with
a relatively lower willingness-to-work to be worse off compared to the agent who
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has bundle a, and a higher willingness-to-work, say Ann. Thereby, redistribu-
tion would be granted from Ann to Bob and we might hold Bob only minimally
responsible for his preferences.
Second, the “rent + reference wage” metric asks which amount of (virtual)
non-labor income would make the individual equally well off compared to her
actual situation when receiving a positive (hypothetical) reference wage equal to
wr. Clearly, the higher this reference wage is, the worse off relatively industrious
individuals will be evaluated, i.e. the more they will be favored for receiving
protection. This is illustrated in the bottom-left picture of Figure 3.1 where wr is
constructed such that the associated linear budget curve is tangent to ICb in the
intersection point with the ordinate. In this case, we evaluate Bob to be better off
than Ann for any w ≥ wr.
Third, the “wage” metric asks which wage rate would leave the individual in-
different from her current utility level if she had zero (virtual) non-labor income.
7 Note, that this metric differs from the previous ones in the sense that its prop-
erties are less clear in terms of favoring the industrious or work averse. In the
upper-right picture of Figure 3.1, work averse Bob is considered to be better off
compared to industrious Ann and redistribution (in order to equalize hypothetical
wage rates) would be justified from Bob to Ann. However, one might easily con-
struct a situation where two agents with crossing preferences are evaluated in the
opposite direction by means of the “wage” metric.8
7The underlying fairness criterion is developed in Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006): in an hypo-
thetical world with equal wage rates and zero non-labor income, differences in consumption-
leisure bundles would not call for redistribution as they can only be due to differences in prefer-
ences and laisser-faire would be the best policy. The “wage” metric might thus be interpreted
as holding individuals maximally responsible for their willingness-to-work. Hodler (2009) uses
this metric to study the effect of redistribution on inequality in a highly stylized setting when
a population is heterogeneous in abilities and work-leisure preferences. A variant of the metric
is applied in Ooghe and Peichl (2011) to derive optimal taxes when agents only have partial
control over certain effort variables.
8Thus, further research will be necessary to systematically determine how especially the wage
metric treats agents with different preferences. In fact, in the empirical section it turns out that
(on average) we are making more comparisons of the kind illustrated in Figure 3.1.
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3.4 Empirical approach
The theoretical section presented three specific individual welfare measures that
take into account that individuals might have different preferences for consumption
versus leisure. In this section, we illustrate the empirical application of the metrics.
We proceed as follows. First, we collect information about individuals’ consump-
tion and leisure in 12 countries. Second, we estimate individual preferences based
on those revealed choices and various socio-demographic characteristics. Third,
we calculate the welfare metrics based on individual consumption-leisure bundles
and the estimated preferences (individual indifference curves).
Thereby, using data from different countries enables us to take into account
cross-country differences in consumption-leisure preferences, i.e. preference profiles
of different populations besides the heterogeneity in individual tastes within a
country. Addressing these potential differences requires to keep other factors of
the analysis (socio-demographic variation, differences in the tax-benefit systems
etc.) as comparable as possible. We therefore make use of a unique setting and
estimate household preferences in a harmonized way for all countries under analysis
by using (a) comparable datasets with common variable definitions, (b) a common
econometric approach to estimate labor supply models for each country and (c) a
harmonized tax-benefit calculator to compute net incomes at different points of the
household budget curves as required by the nature of the labor supply model and
explained below. We also focus on a specific subgroup of the population, namely
married women. First, married women is the group most studied in the labor
supply literature as they show lots of variation in work duration and thus also
relatively considerable differences in labor supply elasticities (see e.g. Blundell
and MaCurdy (1999)). Since this variation partly is affected by differences in
consumption-leisure preferences, it might also help to identify differences in the
empirical welfare measures. Second, married women’s labor supply is less likely
to be contaminated by demand-side restrictions compared to single individuals or
married men (Bargain, Caliendo, Haan and Orsini (2010)), a factor not explicitly
considered with our approach (see below).
The empirical model is directly compatible with the theoretical framework pre-
sented in the previous section. The only difference is that we consider “unitary”
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households rather than individuals, i.e., couples are assumed to behave as a sin-
gle decision maker regarding the trade-off between consumption and female labor
supply (male labor supply is kept fixed).
Specification of preferences. In order to empirically derive the welfare met-
rics, we must retrieve indifference curves for each household in our sample and,
hence, estimate utility functions. To do so, we specify a structural model of labor
supply with discrete choices, which is standard in the literature on tax reforms (see
e.g. Aaberge et al. (1995); van Soest (1995); Blundell et al. (2000)).9 Agents are
assumed to choose among a set of discrete hours alternatives rather than continu-
ously distributed options which better corresponds to the observed distribution of
available hours (non-participation and several part-time, full-time and over-time
categories). Also, a discrete choice model better allows to account for the non-
linear effect of tax-benefit systems on household budgets as net income needs to be
determined at each discrete point. Consumption-leisure preferences are explicitly
parameterized as follows while a common specification over all countries is ap-
plied for reasons of comparability. We denote cij the net income (or consumption,
in a static framework) of household i and hij the wife’s working hours at choice
j = 1, ..., J where the household is assumed to obtain a utility level:
Vij = ui(cij, (T − hij)) + ij, (3.4)
with (T − hi) the wife’s “leisure time” (which may include time for domestic
production), i.e., total time-endowment T minus formal hours of work. For the
deterministic part of the utility function, we rely on a Box-Cox specification, that
is:
ui(cij, (T − hij)) = βc
cαcij − 1
αc
+ βli
(T − hij)αl − 1
αl
. (3.5)
This specification is frequently used for welfare assessments (see e.g. Aaberge et
al. (1995, 2000, 2004); Decoster and Haan (2010); Blundell and Shephard (2012)).
Importantly for our purpose, it is easy to check that monotonicity and concav-
9Relying on structural models is also the only way to obtain comparable preference estimates
across countries. It seems indeed difficult to find natural experiments that would allow per-
forming this task.
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ity conditions on consumption and leisure are satisfied (respectively βc > 0 and
βli > 0 for monotonicity and αc < 1 and αl < 1 for concavity). Indeed, tangency
conditions are necessary for measuring and interpreting the welfare metrics in a
straightforward way. The deterministic utility is completed by i.i.d. random terms
ij for each choice, leading to the individual random utility function Vij(ui, ij). By
using a random utility concept, we especially account for the fact that there will
always be characteristics of the household (influencing the hours choice) that are
known by the household itself while being unobserved by the econometrician. This
specifically includes that for a given household, tastes may vary across opportuni-
ties which will not be captured by estimating the deterministic part of the utility
function (McFadden (1974)).10 As a consequence, non-concavity of ui would not
be inconsistent with random utility theory (as long as Vi is quasi-concave). How-
ever, assuming quasi-concavity of ui is necessary in order to empirically derive
(well-behaved) welfare metrics in line with the theory laid out in Section 3.3. This
is explained below where we suggest a way to empirically deal with this issue. In
addition, in Section 3.5.4, we check robustness with respect to a different, more
flexible specification of the utility function and to alternative ways to empirically
compute the welfare metrics.
Under the (standard) assumption that random terms follow an extreme value
type I (EV-I) distribution, the probability for each household of choosing a given
alternative has an explicit logistic form, which is a function of deterministic utilities
at all choices. Then, the likelihood of a sample of observed choices can be derived
from these probabilities as a function of the preference parameters whose estimates
are obtained by maximum likelihood techniques (see McFadden (1974)).
A crucial point for our analysis is the source of heterogeneity across households.
The first obvious difference is that α and β parameters are country-specific, i.e.,
they are estimated separately for each country. The second source is household-
specific heterogeneity through the leisure term, which is specified as follows:
βli = βl0 + βlzzi, (3.6)
10Besides, the random term might also capture possible observational errors, optimization errors
or transitory situations.
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with zi a vector of taste shifters including the age of both spouses, education of
the women, presence of children younger than 3, between 3-6 or 7-12 years old and
regional information.
Note that we keep the labor supply model as simple as possible in order to
ensure a straightforward implementation and clear interpretation of the welfare
metrics. This particularly implies that we do not model potential demand side
restrictions on the labor market nor fixed costs of work. This is further discussed
in Section 3.6.
Data, selection and tax-benefit simulation. For our empirical application,
we focus on a selection of 11 European countries and the US. For each country we
use microdata based on standard household surveys which provide information on
incomes and demographics. For EU countries, we rely on datasets combined with
the simulation of national tax-benefit systems for years 1998 or 2001 as described in
Bargain et al. (2012). For the US, we use 2006 IPUMS-CPS (Integrated Public Use
Microdata Series; Current Population Survey) data containing information for the
year 2005. As mentioned above, we focus on the subpopulation of married couples
and estimate the labor supply of the women. Clearly, this assumes away potential
cross effects between labor supply decisions of the spouses. However, given the
illustrative purpose of the chapter, this assumption seems acceptable. To keep
the sample relatively homogeneous and avoid too much variation in household’s
non-labor income (in this context especially including husbands’ labor income), we
select households where husbands at least work 30 hours/week and exclude those
with extreme amounts of capital income. Furthermore, we keep households where
women are aged between 18 and 59 and available for the labor market, i.e., neither
disabled nor retired nor in education. In order to maintain a comparable framework
while respecting possible variation in the hours distribution across countries, we
adopt a discretization with J = 7 hours categories including non-participation, two
part-time options, two full-time and two over-time categories (0 to 60 hours/week
with a step of 10 hours). Net income at each discrete choice j = 1, ..., J is calculated
as a function cij = f(wihij, Ii,xi) of female earnings wihij and household non-labor
income Ii (i.e., household capital income and husbands’ earnings). Female wages
wi are predicted for all observations using calculated wage rates of the workers and
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estimated with the usual correction for selection bias. The function f(.) represents
how gross income is transformed into net income, i.e., the impact of taxes and
benefits which also depends on certain household demographic characteristics xi.
11
It is calculated numerically using microsimulation models EUROMOD for EU
countries and the NBER’s TAXSIM for the US.12
Empirical welfare metrics. We empirically compute welfare measures based
on individual preferences for each household in the sample. Importantly, the ran-
dom utility framework leads to a frequency distribution of hours choices across the
discrete alternatives rather than a perfect prediction of the observed choice. There-
fore, we have to compute expected values for the metrics. Yet, one might argue
that using a concept of expected measures contradicts the normative background
of the individual welfare measures, which essentially relies on observed preferences
(derived from observed choices). In order to bring the probabilistic nature of the
empirical labor supply model and individual choices together, several approaches
are possible. In the baseline, we compute expected metrics as described below and
provide robustness checks on different methods in Section 3.5.4.
First, we generate a set of r = 1, ..., R draws from the EV-I distributed
random variable j for the given fixed set of hours alternatives (including non-
participation). For each draw r, we then compute each individual’s utilities V for
each alternative j (suppressing index i in the following). As explained above, the
welfare metrics can only be empirically derived in a consistent way for well-behaved
11Using predicted wages for all observations helps to reduce some of the bias due to measure-
ment errors on wages if calculated on basis of yearly income information (division bias). Also,
accounting fully for existing tax-benefit rules completes the identification. Indeed, individu-
als face different effective tax-benefit schedules because of their different circumstances and
socio-demographic characteristics (e.g. age, family compositions, region or levels of non-labor
income). This creates variation in net wages between people with the same gross wage. Using
nonlinearities and discontinuities generated by the tax-benefit system in this way is a frequent
identification strategy in the empirical literature based on static discrete models and cross-
sectional data (e.g. van Soest (1995); Blundell et al. (2000)). See Bargain et al. (2012) for a
more thorough discussion on this point.
12For an introduction to EUROMOD, descriptive information of taxes and transfers in the EU
and robustness checks for tax-benefit calculation, see Sutherland (2007). An introduction to
TAXSIM is provided by Feenberg and Coutts (1993). Both calculators have been already used
in several empirical studies (see e.g. Immervoll et al. (2007) for EUROMOD or Eissa et al.
(2008) for TAXSIM).
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indifference curves, i.e. based on the deterministic utility. Thus, the deterministic
part of the utility of the chosen alternative (the one with highest V ), umaxr , will
form the basis of the welfare metric for each draw. Subsequently, we average over
the number of draws, i.e. u¯ = 1
R
R∑
r=1
umaxr . This “expected optimal utility” u¯ is used
to empirically derive individual indifference curves ICu¯, using the general function
as introduced in Section 3.3 applied to the Box-Cox specification given in equa-
tion (3.5). Finally, equivalent incomes are computed as follows.13 For the “rent”
metric, an analytical solution is obtained by setting h to zero into the formula for
ICu¯ and retrieving the corresponding level of consumption (hence, the intersec-
tion level of ICu¯ with the ordinate), see bottom-right panel of Figure 3.1. Due
to the Box-Cox specification of the deterministic utility we are not able to derive
analytical expressions for the other two metrics. Hence, we must apply numerical
procedures. This basically requires searching for the relevant tangency point (c, h)
of ICu¯ with the hypothetical budget line corresponding to the metric of interest
- along the full shape of each individual indifference curve on the hours interval
[0, T ] (while this point, again, usually will be different from the observed bundle).
Once the tangency point (c, h) is found, the value for the metric is determined as
well. More precisely, for the “rent + reference wage” metric, the tangency point
is the point (c, h) on ICu¯ for which the MRSc,h equals the reference wage w
r.
The virtual non-labor income µ corresponding to this tangency point is the value
for the metric (see bottom-left panel of Figure 3.1). Finally, the “wage” metric
is derived as the slope of ICu¯ for which the MRSc,h, because of the zero virtual
non-labor income, equals c
h
(see top-right panel of Figure 3.1). For the numerical
derivation of the two last metrics, we rely on a precise iterative procedure by in-
crementing hours from 0 to T for each household in the sample using very small
steps (0.01 hours/week). Note that this is different from moving across discrete
categories j = 1, ..., J as used for the labor supply estimation.
13We abstain from providing the relevant formulas for the concrete Box-Cox specification in order
not to exacerbate the understanding of the main procedures with unnecessary technical issues
(see for details Decoster and Haan (2010)). The reader may verify the proceeding directly via
Figure 3.1 and the formulas introduced in Section 3.3.
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Descriptive information. In Table 3.1, we present summary statistics for the
sample under analysis. The first two columns show the average weekly household
net and non-labor income by countries (recall that household non-labor income
essentially includes husband’s earnings). Next, female average wage rates, weekly
working hours as well as participation rates are presented. Depending on the year
of the data, incomes and wages are up- or downrated to the reference year 2001
and transferred into comparable Purchasing Power Parities (PPP)-USD.
Table 3.1: Income and employment statistics
Data Net Non-labor Female Female Female
year income income wages hours participation
per week per week per hour per week rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AT 1998 777 618 11.5 17.9 0.60
BE 2001 823 618 13.9 25.1 0.77
DK 1998 793 562 12.3 30.2 0.84
FI 1998 627 427 9.6 32.3 0.85
FR 2001 688 508 10.9 23.8 0.72
DE 1998 696 545 13.3 19.7 0.64
IE 2001 883 683 10.5 19.3 0.63
NL 2001 804 635 12.4 18.2 0.71
PT 2001 517 370 6.7 28.2 0.76
SW 2001 708 489 11.2 31.3 0.92
UK 1998 798 593 9.5 23.1 0.75
US 2005 1158 857 18.4 27.2 0.71
Note: The whole sample consists of 42975 households with the husband at least working 30
hours/week. By specification, household’s non-labor income includes husband’s earnings. Income
and hours are averages/week, wages are averages/hour. Income and wages in 2001 PPP-USD.
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM.
Women from the US show the highest net wages per hour and clearly work
more (27.2) than average weekly hours across countries (24.7). Together with
husbands’ earnings, this results in the highest household net income on average per
week in the sample (1158 PPP-USD). However, females from the Nordic countries
(Denmark, Finland, Sweden) show the highest inclination to work (all above 30
hours/week and participation rates larger than 80%). Also, Portuguese married
women, the well-known exception out of the Southern European countries, tend
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to work more than US females - even though their wages are by far the lowest
across countries. In contrast, women from Germany, Ireland, Austria and the
Netherlands show relatively low participation rates and hours.
3.5 Results
This section presents results of the empirical analysis in four steps. First, we out-
line estimated household and country specific preference heterogeneity. Then, we
present information on cross-country orderings for the different individual welfare
measures. Next, a decomposition of total heterogeneity into estimated preferences
and demographic composition is performed. Finally, we present some robustness
checks.
3.5.1 Estimated preference heterogeneity
We first present estimation results for the utility function, separately retrieved
for each country with the same empirical specification. For lack of space and to
summarize preference heterogeneity across countries, we focus on average MRS
between consumption and hours worked defined as the amount of net income in
PPP-USD that is needed by an household to be compensated for an one hour
increase in weekly labor time. Note that MRS are of key relevance in our analysis,
rather than labor supply elasticities; while the latter are determined by individual
preferences and budget constraints, the former solely represent consumption-leisure
tastes in the given framework.14 For all observations i, MRSi are computed as the
slope of individual indifference curves at a fixed consumption-labor bundle. By
doing so, we exclusively capture the shape of different preferences rather than the
impact of different actual locations (c, h) along individual indifference curves for a
14This should be distinguished from the fact that individual preferences and thus, MRS, might
be also (indirectly) formed by the (country-specific) design of tax-benefit systems in the long
run. However, this interesting topic can not be considered in the given static framework
where preferences and constraints are clearly separated by construction of the labor supply
model. What remains, of course, is the direct influence of tax-benefit systems in the estimation
procedure which, however, is genuine as preferences are defined over leisure and net (rather
than gross) income.
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set of given estimates.15 In Table 3.2, fixed (c, h)-bundles correspond to the average
and to certain percentiles of the global hours distributions (p10-, p50 - and p90-
values) with accordant net incomes. MRS substantially differ across countries.
They are particularly large in Ireland, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands,
countries known for low participation levels among married women (see Table
3.1). Inversely, Nordic countries, Portugal, Belgium and the US show the relatively
lowest MRS on average. Given our focus on the role of heterogeneity in welfare
evaluations, we shall decompose the variations of MRS with respect to country
demographics and country preferences in Section 3.5.3.16
3.5.2 Cross-country welfare rankings
We first pool households from all countries into one sample and compare individual
ranks for the different metrics by use of correlation plots. Moving closer to country
comparisons, we then investigate how average positions of households by countries
change by choice of the metric.
Rank correlations. For the pooled country sample, Figure 3.2 shows empirical
rank correlations between individual positions in the percentile distribution of the
different metrics. For the sake of comparison, the two upper panels show correla-
tions when identical preferences are assumed (instead of allowing for heterogeneity
in preferences). This corresponds to the prominent approach in empirical welfare
analysis described above. Precisely, for all households in the pooled sample, we fix
their preferences to that of the global median household (in terms of MRSc(h¯),h¯)
while retaining their actual (c, h)-choices and non-preference related characteris-
15As a preliminary check, we have verified that MRS are always positive and increasing as
required from Section 3.3 – i.e., for all countries, we find that βc > 0, αc < 1 and αl < 1;
for the term βli which incorporates heterogeneity, no more than 1% of the observations per
country violates the monotonicity condition on leisure – these observations are excluded from
the sample.
16The impact of taste shifters (age, children etc.) is reported in detail in the appendix. The
compensation needed in income to outweigh one additional hour of work is clearly higher for
women with young children or lowly educated females compared to the average. That is, MRS
are declining in age of children and level of education. For instance, the average MRS for
women with children younger than 3 years old is about 5 PPP-USD higher compared to the
average MRS of the whole sample (13.7 versus 8.7 PPP-USD).
CHAPTER 3. WELFARE AND HETEROGENEOUS PREFERENCES 60
Table 3.2: Marginal rates of substitution (between consumption and labor) by countries
MRS Standard MRS MRS MRS(
c(h¯), h¯
)
error (c(hp10), hp10) (c(hp50), hp50) (c(hp90), hp90)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full sample 8.7 (5.3) 7.0 9.6 12.0
AT 13.2 (5.3) 10.9 13.8 17.1
BE 7.1 (2.1) 5.8 7.7 9.5
DK 5.5 (0.6) 4.4 6.2 7.7
FI 3.8 (0.5) 2.9 4.3 5.5
FR 9.5 (3.1) 7.3 10.9 13.9
DE 13.2 (8.1) 10.7 14.7 17.9
IE 17.6 (7.4) 13.9 19.1 24.2
NL 13.2 (5.1) 10.3 14.8 18.8
PT 3.7 (1.0) 3.0 4.0 5.0
SW 5.3 (0.7) 3.9 6.4 8.4
UK 9.6 (4.5) 7.7 10.5 13.1
US 6.8 (3.2) 5.5 7.3 9.2
Note:
(
c(h¯), h¯
)
is the bundle with global mean hours h¯ and corresponding net income c(h¯).(
c(hp10), hp10
)
contains the mean hours of the 10th percentile in the global hours distribution
and the corresponding mean net income c(hp10). For p50- and p90-values accordingly. c-values
in 2001 PPP-USD. Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM.
tics (net wages and non-labor income). The metrics are recalculated under these
conditions. As indicated in the upper-left panel of Figure 3.2, any metric can be
used at this stage without altering the correlation (which is independent of the
choice of the reference household and verified in the upper-right panel).17 Note
that, compared to the pure income measure, overall re-ranking due to the account
of leisure in the money metrics is fairly modest when agents do not differ in pref-
erences. This could of course vary with the choice of the reference household and
is checked in the robustness analysis in Section 3.5.4.
The next four panels of Figure 3.2 compare rank distributions for two mea-
sures at a time when full heterogeneity in preferences is accounted for. We ob-
serve substantial re-ranking of individual positions between the metrics. While
the center-left panel of Figure 3.2 still reveals a quite strong correlation between
17Indeed, this illustrates nothing else than what Roberts (1980) proved, namely, that individual
welfare orderings are reference price independent when preferences are homogeneous across
individuals.
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Figure 3.2: Rank correlations of empirical welfare metrics using reference preferences vs.
full heterogeneity in preferences
the individual positions under pure income and the “rent” metric (similar to the
upper-left picture), the correlation between the “rent” and the further metrics
in the following three panels sequentially decreases when taking preferences for
leisure increasingly into account. In the bottom-right panel, only a weak corre-
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lation remains between the “rent” and the “wage” metric, showing the relatively
largest re-ranking between individual situations. The next paragraph analyzes to
which extent these re-rankings affect cross-country orderings of individual welfare.
Welfare rankings. As a preliminary exercise, we compare cumulative distribu-
tion functions (CDF) of the different metrics for two illustrative countries, namely
the US and Ireland. The upper-left panel of Figure 3.3 shows that US households
are relatively better off in terms of income or under the “rent” criterion. However,
moving to the “rent+reference wage” metric, CDFs start to cross and households
from the US become worse off. For the “wage” criterion, Irish households are now
clearly better off. In the following, we analyze for the pooled country sample how
these differences in CDFs translate into different cross-country welfare rankings.
Figure 3.3: Cumulative distribution functions (CDF) by metrics for 2 selected countries
In Table 3.3, we use the global distribution of individual ranks to compare coun-
tries on basis of the average percentile position of households for each measure.
Our focus is on how the country ranking changes with the definition of the metric,
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i.e. with different normative rationales about how to treat heterogeneity in pref-
erences. When using the pure income measure in column 1, consumption-leisure
preferences are simply neglected. Here, US households clearly rank first on aver-
age (63rd percentile), due to high average working hours and wage rates.18 In the
second column, individual heterogeneity in consumption-leisure preferences is ne-
glected and identical preferences are assumed (according to the reference household
specified above). Recall that, corresponding to the previous paragraph, individual
positions (and thus, also average percentile positions by countries) do not change
by definition of the metric under these conditions. For instance, we see that Irish
(US) households rank slightly better (worse) on average under the metrics than
under pure income – simply, because a money metric accounts for leisure on top
of income while Irish (US) women work relatively less (more) than the average.19
Table 3.3: Average percentile position of households in the global welfare ranking - by
country and metrics
Ref. preferences Full heterogeneity in preferences ∆pp
Income Any metric Rent RW p25 RW p50 RW p75 Wage Rent-Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
AT 43.6 47.4 41.3 49.1 54.4 58.1 61.0 19.7
BE 49.2 48.6 49.9 47.9 45.4 43.3 42.1 - 7.9
DK 47.2 42.5 48.0 39.9 35.2 32.2 31.3 - 16.7
FI 29.7 23.9 34.3 18.6 15.5 13.7 13.9 - 20.4
FR 34.4 34.5 34.1 35.5 36.1 37.1 37.3 3.2
DE 36.3 38.9 35.9 40.4 43.8 46.7 50.4 14.5
IE 53.1 56.2 46.5 53.8 60.6 66.5 73.9 27.4
NL 47.6 51.3 47.4 53.0 57.1 60.4 64.6 17.2
PT 19.1 17.8 21.8 15.4 13.9 12.8 12.3 - 9.5
SW 38.1 33.4 41.9 29.1 25.8 24.0 23.8 - 18.2
UK 45.0 45.7 44.2 46.2 47.1 47.7 48.4 4.2
US 63.3 62.2 63.4 61.7 60.1 58.5 56.7 - 6.7
Note: For each metric, we compute the percentile position of each household in the global
ranking and average them across all households from the respective country. Reference wages for
the “rent + reference wage” metrics (RW) are p25-, p50- and p75-wages of the global distribution
in 2001 PPP-USD. Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM.
18Country rankings for net income are also broadly in line with respective GDP rankings, which
we compared as a check.
19However, recall from the previous paragraph that this result is dependent on the specification
of the reference household. “Extreme” reference preferences in terms of very large (small) MRS
will affect absolute percentile values. See Section 3.5.4.
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Once heterogeneous work preferences are fully respected, the rankings will
change by choice of the metric. This is reflected by columns 3-7 in Table 3.3. For
instance, US households also rank first under the “rent” metric while the average
percentile is even slightly increased. That is, some US households are replaced at
the bottom of the distribution by households from countries like Ireland, where a
higher preference for leisure is observed (percentile 47 on average for the “rent”
metric after 53 for income). The picture successively changes when moving to the
“rent + reference wage” criteria and finally, to the “wage” metric. In the latter
case, US households rank at the 57th percentile on average versus Irish households
at the 74th. Changes in the same direction as for the US are even more pronounced
among Nordic countries while changes in the opposite direction are particularly
strong for Austria, Germany and the Netherlands. The difference between average
ranks under the “rent” and the “wage” metric is presented in the last column, with
remarkable changes of at least 15 percentage points for 7 out of 12 countries. The
extent of rank reversals is all the more striking as our selection of countries is quite
homogeneous, focusing on the relatively wealthy EU countries (Continental and
Nordic Europe plus the two Anglo-Saxon countries) and the US.20 Thus, this result
suggests that heterogeneous consumption-leisure preferences are the driving factor
for individual re-rankings across countries. In addition, note that international
rankings are affected by population size, which may even limit the extent of rank
reversals for large countries. The same is true for natural differences in household
non-labor income (husband’s earnings) and female wages across countries (given
individual choices).21
20The case of Portugal is an exception. It is different from other Southern countries in the sense
that female participation is very high. However, wage rates are extremely low (among the
lowest in Europe). This explains why ranking differences between the metrics for Portuguese
households themselves exist as expected while there are simply too few households changing
their relative international position to push Portuguese households on average out of the bottom
of the global distribution.
21Note that, given the ordinal framework, we do not need any information about the differences
in the levels of the metrics to answer the question of who will be considered better or worse
off. However, we also checked if the differences in the average ranks correspond to (econom-
ically) significant differences in the levels of the metrics. With view to column (8) in Table
3.3, displaying average changes in ranks, we also find considerable average differences in levels
between the “rent” and the “wage” metric (defined as full-time equivalent for better compar-
ison), ranging from 18 PPP-EUR per week for Finland to 695 PPP-EUR for Ireland. Also
across countries - exemplarily comparing the US and Ireland (as in Figure 3.3) - we find that
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Table 3.4: Average percentile position of the income poor (lowest quintile) in the global
welfare ranking - by country and metrics
Full heterogeneity in preferences ∆pp ∆MRS
Income Rent RW p25 RW p50 RW p75 Wage Rent-Wage
(
c(h¯), h¯
)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
AT 11.8 9.2 20.9 29.6 36.8 41.3 32.1 1.3
BE 20.5 22.2 21.2 20.9 21.1 21.5 -0.7 1.0
DK 20.4 23.9 15.1 13.2 12.3 12.6 -11.3 0.6
FI 6.2 9.6 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.6 -7.0 0.3
FR 5.5 5.7 8.0 9.9 11.9 11.0 5.3 1.7
DE 9.0 10.1 15.2 20.4 25.1 29.4 19.3 0.5
IE 18.2 11.3 22.5 33.8 44.5 55.3 43.9 3.0
NL 15.8 17.4 25.0 31.0 36.5 41.4 24.0 1.5
PT 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 -0.1 -0.2
SW 13.4 18.0 5.9 5.3 5.1 5.4 -12.6 0.8
UK 10.7 10.4 14.1 17.6 20.8 22.3 11.9 1.3
US 18.6 18.3 18.0 19.1 20.6 21.2 2.9 1.6
Note: See Table 3.3. For each metric, we take the percentile position of each household of
the lowest income quintile in the respective country and average. ∆MRS is the difference of
MRSc(h¯),h¯ for the income poor to the country average as reported in Table 3.2. Source: Own
calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM.
While Table 3.3 illustrates potential re-rankings of all households in a country
on average across the different metrics, a similar analysis for the (income) poor
might lead to different conclusions - especially, when preferences of a country’s
worst-off sufficiently differ from the average preferences in that country. Table
3.4 therefore shows how the poorest quintile of a country’s households in terms of
income on average is re-ranked across the different metrics in the global distribu-
tion.22 For most countries, results show by and large the same direction as in Table
3.3, again summarized by the difference between average ranks under the “rent”
the absolute average differences across the metrics are substantial, ranging from 331 PPP-EUR
for the “rent” metric to -245 PPP-EUR for the full-time “wage” equivalent.
22This should be distinguished from a feature of the metrics applied which has not been mentioned
so far. In fact, it has been shown that the normative principles underlying the different metrics
also single out a specific way of how to aggregate them, namely using a maximin (leximin)
SWF with infinite aversion to inequality and thus, focusing on the worst-off (Fleurbaey (2008)).
Again, as this chapter is about interpersonal comparisons and not about social evaluation, we
do not consider any type of an aggregator function for our analysis. However, looking at
how the poor of each country fare in the world distribution might be worth for answering the
question of who will be better or worse off under which metric.
CHAPTER 3. WELFARE AND HETEROGENEOUS PREFERENCES 66
and the “wage” metric in the last column. The extent of re-rankings, however,
differs. For instance, the income poor in Portugal find themselves in the lowest
percentile of the global distribution and thus, unsurprisingly fare also worst under
the remaining metrics, with a marginal improvement for the “rent” metric only.
Contrary, re-rankings are even more significant for households from countries with
a relatively lower preference for work, as e.g. Ireland. For Belgium, there is barely
an effect and most interestingly, the ranking of the poor in the US changes in the
opposite direction compared to Table 3.3. These effects might be somewhat ex-
plained with view to clearly higher MRS for this group in both countries compared
to the average (column (8) in Table 3.4).
Interpretation. As explained in Section 3.3, the metrics applied differ only in
the way they treat heterogeneity in consumption-leisure preferences. As a result,
agents with different willingness-to-work might be evaluated very differently de-
pending on the metric. Then, the first and most important question is, who will be
considered better and worse off under the various criteria. Therefore, we focused
on a pure index ordering for each metric based on individual percentile positions in
the accordant global distribution. In terms of country comparisons, we may clus-
ter households according to certain groups of countries. For instance, households
from apparently “work-loving countries” (as Denmark and the US) are better off
on average than households from apparently “work-averse nations” (e.g., Austria
and Ireland) under the “rent” criterion. The reason is that with the “rent” metric,
the policy maker tends to evaluate an agent with a higher willingness-to-work to
be better off compared to another agent with a lower willingness-to-work (assign-
ing low responsibility for work aversion). Thus, the latter would eventually be
favored to receive redistribution from the former and on average, we more often
conclude from our interpersonal comparisons that households from Ireland should
be “favored” over those from the US. Contrary, under the “wage” metric, we ob-
viously more often favor households from the US over those from Ireland (due to
higher responsibility assigned to work aversion). However, these considerations
are based on the average percentiles for all households while we might conclude
differently when looking at subgroups (income quintiles) of a countries population,
as additionally considered in the previous paragraph.
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3.5.3 Assessing the differences in welfare rankings
Finally, we check what among the direct components of the labor supply model,
i.e. estimated country-specific α and β parameters or country differences in socio-
demographic household composition (taste shifters), can explain the differences in
the welfare rankings. Recall from Section 3.4 that both factors determine over-
all heterogeneity in consumption-leisure preferences and are solely responsible for
ranking differences between the metrics (Figure 3.2). We start with identical pref-
erences imposed for each household in the sample, isolate all components related
to the two factors and separately introduce heterogeneity based on the set of esti-
mates as derived in Section 3.5.1 - while keeping individual budgets and observed
choices (c, h) fixed. We thus do not re-estimate the models but perform a pure
decomposition analysis with respect to observed heterogeneity. Under these condi-
tions, we recalculate the metrics and check each time how international percentile
distributions are affected. Results reported in Table 3.5 first show the coefficient
of variation for MRS. Variation in MRS is taken as an indicator for the extent
to which a certain factor contributes to overall taste differences. Columns 2 to 6
present how empirical rank correlations between the “rent” and the further metrics
change for the different scenarios (equivalent to the correlation plots presented in
Figure 3.2).
In the baseline scenario (first row), we assume reference preferences, i.e. pref-
erence parameters and characteristics are taken from the median MRS household
as defined above.23 The coefficient of variation for MRS equals zero by construc-
tion and the correlation between the “rent” metric and income equals 0.98, while
being perfect for the other metrics (which corresponds to the aforementioned re-
sults in the top panels of Figure 3.2). Rows 2-5 introduce heterogeneity in socio-
demographic characteristics. That is, all preference parameters are held constant
according to the reference household but some characteristics are allowed to change
across countries and households. In row 2, age differences are the only source of
variation. Obviously, this cannot explain much of the variation in MRS and barely
changes the empirical correlations across metrics. Education levels and especially
23Note that results will depend on the choice of the reference household, why they should also
at this stage be considered as illustrative. However, we check for different specifications of the
reference household in Section 3.5.4.
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Table 3.5: Variation in MRS and correlation between metrics by different sources of
preference heterogeneity
Source of preference heterogeneity: Coeff. var. Rank correlation of Rent metric with
Pref. parameters Socio-demographics in MRS Income RW p25 RW p75 Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Identical Identical 0.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00
Identical Age only 0.04 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99
Identical Education only 0.20 0.97 0.99 0.95 0.94
Identical Children only 0.31 0.98 0.97 0.90 0.88
Identical All 0.35 0.98 0.96 0.86 0.82
Country-specific Identical 0.40 0.96 0.95 0.82 0.77
Country-specific Age only 0.40 0.97 0.95 0.84 0.79
Country-specific Education only 0.40 0.96 0.95 0.81 0.75
Country-specific Children only 0.65 0.98 0.92 0.72 0.60
Country-specific All 0.60 0.99 0.91 0.70 0.59
Note: MRS are calculated for a fixed bundle
(
c(h¯), h¯
)
with global mean hours h¯ and correspond-
ing net income c(h¯) and averaged. c-values in 2001 PPP-USD. The median household in terms
of this MRS serves as the reference household. Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD
and TAXSIM.
the presence of children seem to explain more of the variation in MRS (rows 3
and 4). As a result, rank correlations between income and the metrics become
weaker when moving towards the “wage” metric. These effects cumulate when
heterogeneity in all three characteristics is introduced (row 5).
In rows 6-9, country-specific differences in preferences are considered. First,
all socio-demographic characteristics are kept constant and solely differences in
estimated preference parameters determine heterogeneity in tastes. That is, α and
β parameters are the only source of variation across countries while characteristics
zi are set according to the reference household. The magnitude of the effect is very
similar to that of accounting for all socio-demographic characteristics in the case
before. Thus, country-specific consumption-leisure preferences already explain a
good deal of the observed variation in MRS and between the metrics. Second,
country differences in socio-demographics are combined with variation in different
characteristics in rows 7-9. Here, especially the presence of young children has a
substantial impact on the variation across countries, which seems to account for
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most of the variation when allowing for full heterogeneity in characteristics and
estimated preference parameters (last row). A standard variance decomposition
(ANOVA) for MRS and differences in individual ranks across metrics supports
these findings. That is, country-specific preferences as well as the correlation
between country-specific preferences and family size (children) are most important
and significant factors of variation.
While the results presented so far only give an indication about what affects
overall correlation between the ordinal metrics, nothing is said yet about which fac-
tors actually drive the observed differences in individual cross-country rankings.
Therefore, we additionally reproduce welfare rankings, again in terms of aver-
age percentiles, for the two main counterfactual scenarios reflecting the different
sources of heterogeneity. Table 3.6(a) in the appendix only maintains differences
in socio-demographic characteristics while in Table 3.6(b), only the heterogeneity
in preference parameters is accounted for. As can be seen, the differences between
metrics and across countries in Table 3.6(b) are by and large similar to the or-
derings in Table 3.3. In contrast, Table 3.6(a) only reveals a very small influence
of demographics on average ranking positions. This suggests that the ranking of
individuals across countries in Table 3.3 is indeed primarily affected by estimated
country-specific preferences, rather than by demographic composition.24
3.5.4 Robustness checks
In this section, we perform robustness checks with respect to the labor supply spec-
ification, the calculation of the empirical welfare metrics and the decomposition
analysis. Detailed results are presented in the appendix.
Labor supply model. For the illustrative purpose of this chapter, an inter-
pretationally simple specification for the labor supply model has been used. A
Box-Cox specification for the deterministic part of the utility function – as often
used in the normative literature – seemed particularly suitable since monotonicity
24There are few exceptions. For France, the trend in Table 3.3 is more similar to Table 3.6(a),
suggesting that the demographic composition drives the result for this country. Also Belgium
shows a reverse influence of demographics, which, however, does not outweigh the impact of
estimated preferences.
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and concavity conditions are usually fulfilled which can easily be checked ex-post.
Using a more flexible functional form (e.g. quadratic, see Bargain et al. (2012))
is more frequent in the empirical literature on labor supply and taxation. How-
ever, notice that the gains from flexibility are partly lost in the present context
given that tangency conditions must be imposed (which can be done by adding
monotonicity and concavity requirements as constraints directly into the likelihood
maximization). This is checked for the countries under analysis using the same
data. We find that MRS as defined in Table 3.2 turn out to be very similar for the
Box-Cox and a (constrained) quadratic specification for the labor supply model
(see Figure 3.4).25
Calculation of welfare metrics. We calculate welfare metrics by using indif-
ference curves based on estimated preference parameters and corresponding to a
certain level of utility. In the baseline, this level of welfare is taken as the expected
value over a large number of draws for the EV-I random terms (while always taking
the resulting optimal level of utility; method 1 in Figure 3.5). However, alternative
ways of computation can be suggested, also consistent with the random nature of
the labor supply model. First, metrics for each optimal utility level of each draw
are computed while averaging then follows over all calculated metric values (for
each individual) rather than utilities (method 2). Second, we compute the metrics
for the utility level corresponding to each discrete hours category and directly take
the weighted sum (by predicted probabilities using the expected random term) -
rather then artificially drawing many random terms (method 3). While these al-
ternative procedures necessarily change the levels of the metrics, we find that they
do almost not affect the resulting orderings compared to the baseline results.
Specification of the reference household. For the decomposition analysis in
Section 3.5.3, the reference household in the baseline scenario was specified accord-
ing to the median MRSc(h¯),h¯. However, variation in MRS and, hence, correlation
between the metrics when partly introducing preference heterogeneity, might be
25Starting with 7 hours choices for both specifications as described above, we also find that
estimation results are robust to choosing an even narrower choice set with 13 categories (0 to
60 hours/week with a step of 5 hours). See also Bargain et al. (2012).
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sensitive to that specification. Thus, as a robustness check, further specifications
for the reference household have been set with respect to p10-, (p50-) and p90-
values in the global distribution of MRS (net income c), while checking that the
reference households selected show sufficient heterogeneity, both in terms of the
country they stem from and in terms of socio-demographic characteristics (Table
3.8). Average MRS, the coefficient of variation for MRS and correlation between
the metrics of course change quantitatively with the specification. Yet, our core
results do not change, i.e. the finding that estimated country-specific preference
parameters (rather then socio-demographic differences) determine heterogeneity
in the rankings across metrics and countries is confirmed (see Figures 3.6(a) and
3.6(b)).
3.6 Concluding discussion
The aim of this chapter was to contribute to the ‘beyond GDP’-debate in terms
of interpersonally comparing well-being in several dimensions and across different
countries. We have departed from standard income rankings by the inclusion of
leisure, hence, respecting one of the most primary specifications of welfare in the
normative literature. Our main focus was to illustrate for the consumption-leisure
space the use of welfare metrics that take preference heterogeneity into account.
Our results suggest that differences in consumption-leisure preferences – and their
normative treatment – might matter substantially when interpersonally evaluating
welfare in an international context. Precisely, under criteria that tend to evaluate
agents with a relatively higher willingness-to-work to be better off compared to
agents with a lower willingness-to-work, households from apparently “work-loving
countries” (e.g. the US or Denmark) rank higher on average. Inversely, with a
metric that considers agents with a relatively lower willingness-to-work as better
off, we on average attribute a higher welfare level to households from nations that
appear to be more “work-averse”(e.g. Austria or Ireland). The re-ranking of house-
holds between nations when moving from the former to the latter types of welfare
criteria is substantial, which is noticeable given that we consider a relatively homo-
geneous set of countries and since the welfare measures only add one dimension to
income (“leisure”). A decomposition analysis shows that cross-country differences
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in consumption-leisure preferences are driving this result. The analysis is entirely
performed in terms of interpersonal comparisons and our findings suggest that
the respect for preference heterogeneity should precede any attempts to compare
countries on the basis of a SWF or other forms of aggregated indices.
For the sake of illustration and implementation of the welfare metrics, we in-
tended to keep the empirical framework of this chapter simple. Hence, a lot re-
mains to be done to bring empirical estimations closer to the possibility of sound
normative evaluations. In particular, the fit of labor supply models is often im-
proved by the introduction of a term accounting for fixed costs of work. Thus it
is possible to rationalize the non-participation of some people in terms of fixed
costs rather than through steep indifference curves – and introducing fixed costs
would certainly reduce some of the apparent differences in MRS across household
types and countries. However, fixed costs of work are usually not identified from
preferences, as shown by van Soest, Das and Gong (2002), but, if introduced in
the model, they may in fact capture some elements of work disutility (or even
work utility, i.e., negative fixed costs, if inactivity is a source of despair, as shown
by Clark and Oswald (1994)). A similar logic applies to demand-side constraints
which restrict the choice set available to the individual (Dagsvik (1994); Aaberge,
Colombino and Strøm (1999); Dagsvik and Strøm (2006)) and could also result
in involuntary unemployment (Peichl and Siegloch (2012)). Here, a specific and
additionally demanding requirement in the present context would have been to
determine country-specific choice opportunities. In addition, one limitation of the
tax-transfer calculators we use is that in-kind benefits or public services more
generally are not taken into account due to data limitations. As the levels of
non-cash transfers differ across countries, this has implications for cross-country
differences in welfare metrics. However, it is hard to assess ex-ante how accounting
for public services would affect the estimation of consumption-leisure preferences
and hence the different welfare rankings. Importantly, the construction and es-
pecially interpretation of welfare metrics as used in the present chapter is clearly
more complicated when additionally accounting for the various factors mentioned,
i.e., especially in presence of non-regular and possibly discontinuous indifference
curves. We leave these considerations for further research. Finally, we have cho-
sen to model married women’s labor supply since variability in work hours of this
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group is more likely to reflect true choices in the consumption-leisure space (and
responses to financial incentives) compared to other groups. Of course, a more
complete welfare analysis across countries should first include other subgroups as
well and second, consider further dimensions of individual well-being besides in-
come and leisure. Then, comprehensive international welfare comparisons might
also involve further aspects as the respect for different population sizes or intertem-
poral comparisons (Fleurbaey and Tadenuma (2009)).
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Figure 3.4: MRS for Box-Cox vs. quadratic specification of the utility function
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Figure 3.5: Average percentile positions by countries for different methods of metrics
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Table 3.6: Average percentile positions for different sources of preference heterogeneity
(a) Source of preference heterogeneity: differences in socio-demographic
composition
Income Rent RW p25 RW p50 RW p75 Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AT 43.6 47.7 47.4 47.2 47.1 47.3
BE 49.2 45.9 48.7 49.8 50.7 51.4
DK 47.2 41.1 41.1 41.0 41.1 41.5
FI 29.7 24.1 22.6 22.5 22.6 22.6
FR 34.4 33.7 35.1 35.9 36.6 37.0
DE 36.3 39.7 39.3 39.3 39.5 40.1
IE 53.1 55.5 56.5 57.1 57.5 58.2
NL 47.6 51.0 52.5 53.1 53.6 54.4
PT 19.1 17.2 18.2 18.8 19.5 18.8
SW 38.1 33.5 32.0 31.5 31.3 31.3
UK 45.0 45.8 45.9 45.8 45.8 45.8
US 63.3 62.4 61.9 61.6 61.2 60.9
(b) Source of preference heterogeneity: differences in estimated preference
parameters
Income Rent RW p25 RW p50 RW p75 Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AT 43.6 41.6 50.7 55.1 57.9 59.3
BE 49.2 50.5 47.6 44.7 42.2 41.1
DK 47.2 50.4 38.4 33.3 29.8 29.3
FI 29.7 35.5 18.2 14.9 12.9 13.4
FR 34.4 36.8 33.9 32.8 32.3 32.2
DE 36.3 31.4 41.3 47.4 52.2 55.4
IE 53.1 42.7 52.9 62.2 69.9 78.6
NL 47.6 44.7 53.1 58.4 62.9 67.5
PT 19.1 21.2 16.1 14.7 13.6 13.4
SW 38.1 42.5 29.3 26.2 24.4 24.5
UK 45.0 43.4 47.1 47.9 48.6 48.6
US 63.3 64.4 61.6 59.5 57.8 56.2
Note: See Table 3.3. Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM.
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Table 3.7: Marginal rates of substitution (between consumption and labor) by subgroups
MRS Standard MRS MRS MRS(
c(h¯), h¯
)
error (c(hp10), hp10) (c(hp50), hp50) (c(hp90), hp90)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full sample 8.7 (5.3) 7.0 9.6 12.0
Children younger 3 13.7 (6.6) 10.9 15.0 18.8
Children between 3 and 6 13.5 (6.9) 10.8 14.8 18.5
Children between 7 and 12 10.8 (5.7) 8.6 11.8 14.8
No young children 6.3 (2.9) 5.0 6.9 8.6
Low education 12.5 (5.9) 10.0 13.9 17.3
Medium education 9.1 (5.0) 7.2 10.0 12.5
High education 7.3 (4.6) 5.8 8.0 10.0
Wife younger 25 7.4 (4.7) 5.9 8.1 10.1
Wife between 25 and 55 8.9 (5.3) 7.1 9.8 12.2
Wife older than 55 7.7 (4.3) 6.1 8.4 10.5
Husband younger 25 6.8 (3.9) 5.4 7.4 9.3
Husband between 25 and 55 8.9 (5.4) 7.1 9.8 12.2
Husband older than 55 7.7 (3.7) 6.2 8.5 10.6
Note: See Table 3.2. Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM.
Table 3.8: Descriptive statistics for reference households in decomposition analysis
Reference Age Age Child Child Child Low Med. MRS Net
household Country wife husband < 3 3− 6 7− 12 educ. educ. (c(h¯), h¯) inc.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
MRS−p10 US 37 35 − − − X − 4.0 672
MRS−p50 FR 44 45 − − X − − 7.4 862
MRS−p90 NL 39 30 − X − X − 14.5 965
c−p10 BE 28 30 X X − − X 9.4 632
c−p50 UK 46 47 − − − X − 7.3 789
c−p90 SW 48 47 − − − − − 4.6 1504
Note: MRS−p10 (c−p10) is the household with the p10-value for MRS (net income) in the
global distribution. For p50- and p90-values accordingly. Income in 2001 PPP-USD. Source:
Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM.
77 CHAPTER 3. WELFARE AND HETEROGENEOUS PREFERENCES
AT
BE
DK
FI
FR
GE
IE
NL
PT
UK
SW
US
0
20
40
60
80
R
W
 p
50
 a
nd
 W
ag
e
0 20 40 60 80
Rent
MRS-p10
AT
BE
DK
FI
FRGE
IE
NL
PT
UK
SW
US
0
20
40
60
80
R
W
 p
50
 a
nd
 W
ag
e
0 20 40 60 80
Rent
c-p10
AT
BE
DK
FI
FR
GE
IE
NL
PT
UK
SW
US
0
20
40
60
80
R
W
 p
50
 a
nd
 W
ag
e
0 20 40 60 80
Rent
MRS-p50
AT
BE
DK
FI
FR
GE
IE
NL
PT
UK
SW
US
0
20
40
60
80
R
W
 p
50
 a
nd
 W
ag
e
0 20 40 60 80
Rent
c-p50
AT
BEDK
FI
FR
GE
IENL
PT
UK
SW
US
0
20
40
60
80
R
W
 p
50
 a
nd
 W
ag
e
0 20 40 60 80
Rent
MRS-p90
AT
BE
DK
FI
FR
GE
IENL
PT
UK
SW
US
0
20
40
60
80
R
W
 p
50
 a
nd
 W
ag
e
0 20 40 60 80
Rent
c-p90
Note: Line = exact equality of average percentiles.
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD and TAXSIM.
RW p50 Wage
Figure 3.6: Average percentile positions when preference heterogeneity due to estimated
preference parameters only - by different reference households
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Figure 3.7: Average percentile positions when preference heterogeneity due to sociode-
mographics only - by different reference households
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Chapter 4
Equality of opportunity and
redistribution
4.1 Introduction
Socio-economic inequality is high on the political agenda in many European coun-
tries. In recent years there has been a shift of focus from inequality in incomes
to inequality of opportunities (in income acquisition). The concept of equality
of opportunity (EOp), proposed by Roemer (1993, 1998), represents a departure
from the traditional notion of equality of outcomes (EO), which refers to an equal
distribution of economic outcomes (e.g. income, consumption or well-being) across
a population. The EOp theory, in contrast, separates the influences on the out-
comes an individual experiences into circumstances and effort. Circumstances are
defined as all factors outside individual control for which the society in question
deems individuals should not be held accountable. These can be, for instance,
social background, parental education, gender, age, place of birth or ethnic origin.
Effort, on the other hand, is all actions and choices within individual responsibility
for which a society holds the individual responsible, for example, schooling choices
or labor supply decisions. An EOp policy thus aims at leveling the playing field by
compensating individuals for any deficits due to circumstances and ensuring that
only effort affects outcome achievement (Roemer (1993, 1998)).
The extensive body of work on EOp has largely focused on Latin America
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and on OECD countries.1 Cross-European comparisons have only recently begun
using microdata from the 2005 wave of the European Union Statistics on Income
and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). For example, Checchi, Peragine and Serlenga
(2010) and Marrero and Rodr´ıguez (2010b) use the data to investigate inequality
of opportunity (IOp) levels and their main determinants in Europe. Marrero and
Rodr´ıguez (2010b) find that in particular varying development levels, education
and social protection expenditure are responsible for differences in IOp in Europe.
The macroeconomic tax structure and the labor market, on the other hand, do
not have a significant impact. Checchi et al. (2010) also distinguish the impact
of such macroeconomic factors on ex ante and ex post IOp. To empirically assess
IOp levels, both papers rely on inequality measures from the Generalized Entropy
(GE) family and focus on a single income concept. Our study follows this line of
research by using microdata from the EU-SILC to assess the extent of EO and
EOp in several European countries.
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we apply and compare two
different measures – the Gini opportunity (GO) index developed by Lefranc et al.
(2008) and a parametric estimation approach based on decomposable inequality
measures of the GE family (Bourguignon et al. (2007a); Ferreira and Gignoux
(2011)). Second, and more importantly, we investigate how the different tax-and-
transfer systems affect outcome and opportunity inequality by comparing EOp
levels for income concepts at different stages of redistribution. Since most modern
theories of justice only defend compensation for inequalities due to circumstances,
the empirical assessment of public policy effects on IOp seems to be the logical
second step in comprehensive EOp analysis. However, the effective microeconomic
impact of the tax-benefit system is rarely addressed in the existing EOp literature
(see, e.g., Roemer et al. (2003) and Checchi et al. (2010)). Therefore, we analyze
questions such as: are redistributive policies in Europe effective in promoting EOp?
If so, is this primarily a result of income taxes and social contributions or do benefit
1Bourguignon, Ferreira and Mene´ndez (2007a), Ferreira and Gignoux (2011), and Paes de Barros,
Ferreira, Molinas Vega and Saavedra Chanduvi (2009), for example, analyze EOp in Latin
America. Roemer, Aaberge, Colombio, Fritzell, Jenkins, Lefranc and et al. (2003) and Lefranc,
Pistolesi and Trannoy (2008) examine EOp in OECD countries. Lately, Africa has become an
additional focus of research among less developed countries (see, for example, Cogneau and
Mesple´-Somps (2008)).
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schemes play the more important role? Moreover, are improvements in terms of
EO associated with advances regarding opportunity equality? Answering these
questions will help to identify the priorities of the different redistributive systems
in the EU.
Throughout our study, outcomes are defined as equivalized income.2 For the
circumstances variable in our EOp analysis, we primarily consider parental back-
ground, proxied by the father’s and mother’s level of education. It has been estab-
lished by many studies that in Western societies an individual’s economic success
is largely determined by the family background.3 Parents may influence their chil-
dren’s income-generating capacity through various channels. These include the
formation of preferences and aspirations, the genetic transmission of natural abil-
ities and also the parents’ social connections in the labor market. However, since
no one can choose their parents, these factors are clearly outside individual con-
trol. In addition, we include an indicator of the activity status of the father and an
indicator whether the respondent was born in a foreign country. Methodologically,
we rank countries by applying the GO index developed by Lefranc et al. (2008).
Then we compare the results to the parametric estimation approach introduced
by Bourguignon et al. (2007a) and Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) which allows for
the inclusion of more than one circumstance in the presence of small sample sizes.
Our results reveal that both methods and different circumstance sets yield
rather robust country rankings for various circumstance sets. We also find a di-
vide in Europe between the Continental and the Nordic states that provide their
citizens with relatively high levels of EOp and the Anglo-Saxon and Eastern Eu-
ropean countries where opportunities for income acquisition are relatively unequal
distributed. With regard to redistribution in Europe, we find that tax- and benefit-
schemes partially reduce IOp, with social benefits being the most important fac-
tor for reducing inequality in the majority of countries. The largest income- and
opportunity-equalizing effects are found in Nordic and Continental European coun-
2We choose income as the dependent, or outcome, variable rather than, for example, consump-
tion, because we believe that economic inequality is more about the access to, or control over,
economic resources than about the actual exercise of this power (see Jenkins and Van Kerm
(2009) for details).
3See Dustmann (2004), Roemer (2004), Bjo¨rklund and Ja¨ntti (2009), as well as Checchi and Per-
agine (2010). The sub-sequent description of the channels through which parental background
influences their offspring’s income acquisition closely follows Bowles and Gintis (2002).
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tries. In Anglo-Saxon countries, taxes and benefits only lead to relatively small
improvements in income and opportunity equality. We show that the equalizing
effects of taxes and benefits on IOp substantially differ from the ones based on
inequality of outcomes (IO).
The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we review
the conceptual framework and introduce our methodology for measuring EOp. Sec-
tion 4.3 presents the data set as well as the main variables of our study. Section 4.4
contains the results of our empirical analysis. In addition to a cross-country com-
parison of EOp, we contrast our results using different measurement techniques.
Furthermore, we investigate the direct impact of redistributive policies. Our re-
sults are discussed further in Section 4.5, where we also analyze the relationship
between economic performance and EOp. Section 4.6 concludes and identifies
some directions for future research.
4.2 Methodology
4.2.1 Conceptual framework
Relying on the philosophical work by Rawls (1971), Sen (1985), Dworkin (1981a,
1981b), Cohen (1989), and Arneson (1989), it is Roemer (1993, 1998) who in-
troduces the concept of equal opportunities in the economics literature. Roemer
(1998) separates the influences on the outcome an individual experiences into cir-
cumstances and effort. Circumstances are defined as factors outside individual
control. These can be, for instance, the individual’s social background, parental
education, gender, age, place of birth or ethnic origin. Effort, on the other hand,
is all actions and choices within individual responsibility, for example, schooling
choices and labor supply decisions or the degree to which one leads a healthy
lifestyle (see Pistolesi (2009)).
Roemer (1998) argues that inequalities due to effort can be considered as equi-
table, since they are the result of individual freedom and choice, whilst inequalities
due to differences of circumstances cannot be ethically acceptable. ‘Equalizing op-
portunities’ thus means correcting unequal circumstances while leaving differences
due to effort unchanged. Accordingly, an ‘equal opportunity society’ is charac-
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terized by guaranteeing its members equal access to advantage regardless of their
circumstances, but holding them responsible for turning that access into actual
advantage by the application of effort (Roemer (1998), p. 24). Hence, leveling the
playing field means guaranteeing that those who apply equal degrees of effort, i.e.
those who are at the same rank of their respective type-effort distribution, end up
with equal achievements.
In accordance with Roemer (1998), we only distinguish between two generic
determinants of individual outcome: circumstances c , which are characteristics
outside individual control, and effort e , representing all factors affecting earnings
that are assumed to be the result of personal responsibility. We partition the
population into a set of types, T = {1, 2, ..., t} , whereby a type t comprises a
subset of the total population with similar circumstances.
The income y of individual i is defined as depending on both individual cir-
cumstances and personal effort:
yi = f(ci, ei). (4.1)
For our empirical application we have to deal with the informational constraint
that only an individual’s circumstances are observable, whereas the responsibility
variable, i.e. effort, is non-observable. While Roemer’s approach measures the
degree of a person’s effort by her rank in the effort distribution of her type4,
we follow Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) and – in line with Van de gaer (1993),
Lefranc et al. (2008) and Bourguignon et al. (2007a), Checchi and Peragine (2010)
– apply the ex-ante approach to EOp. Hence, we define the remaining differences
in individual incomes, once the influence of circumstances has been identified, as
a result of effort.5 Hence, our effort variable, e, comprises all factors that have
not been assigned to circumstances, including measurement errors and transitory
departures from the permanent level of income, together with luck and innate
abilities. Although talent and luck are not explicitly modeled6, they are implicitly
4For a summary of the procedure Roemer (1998) uses to deal with this problem and how it is
applied to the ranking of income distributions, see Peragine (2004).
5For a detailed distinction between an ex-ante and ex-post approach to EOp, see Fleurbaey and
Peragine (2013).
6For a formalization that includes luck, see Lefranc, Pistolesi and Trannoy (2009).
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classified as within the sphere of individual responsibility. This assumption leads
to a lower-bound of IOp (Ferreira and Gignoux (2011)) and an overestimation of
the fraction of inequality which is considered ethically acceptable.
We track the consequences of different social origins and denote opportunities as
unequal as long as incomes are subject to this circumstance variable, i.e. F (y|c) 6=
F (y). Put differently, EOp is satisfied if, and only if, the distribution of income is
independent of circumstance:
∀(c, c′)∀e, F (y|c, e) = F (y|c′, e). (4.2)
To test for the existence of EOp, we rely on two different methodologies. First, we
apply the GO index, which was developed by Lefranc et al. (2008). This IOp index
allows us to rank countries according to Lorenz dominance. The drawback of this
approach, however, is that it cannot take into account more than one circumstance
variable when applying it to small sample surveys because of too small cell sizes.
In a second step we also use a parametric estimation procedure introduced by
Ferreira and Gignoux (2011). This approach allows circumstances to be controlled
for, even with small sample and cell sizes.
4.2.2 The GO index
Inspired by Van de gaer (1993), Lefranc et al. (2008) develop an IOp index based
on the Gini inequality measure. The GO index enables us to quantify the degree
of IOp and to rank countries according to their degree of EOp.
According to Lefranc et al. (2008), the GO index must fulfill five properties.
First, it has to meet the requirement of within-type anonymity, i.e. the index
has to be invariant to any variation of two individuals with similar circumstances.
Moreover, the between-type Pigou-Dalton transfer principle must also hold. Third,
normalization implies that the index must be equal to zero if the cumulative dis-
tribution functions corresponding to all circumstances are identical. Finally, the
principles of population and scale invariance mean that the index is invariant to a
replication of the population and to a multiplication of all incomes by a positive
scalar.
The proposition in Lefranc et al. (2008) concentrates on the opportunity sets
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to which people have access and attempts to make these sets as equal as possible.
Hence, to comply with their approach, we first need to define a measure of the
opportunities offered to the different types. In line with Lefranc et al. (2008), we
measure the feasible opportunities of a given type by the area under its Generalized
Lorenz (GL) curve. We then rank all circumstances according to twice this area,
starting from the smallest one. For type t, whose population share is q, this area
is equivalent to
µt(1−Gt) (4.3)
where µ is the type-specific mean income and G denotes the type-specific Gini
coefficient. The GO index for income x is then defined by:
GO(x) =
1
µ
k∑
i=1
∑
j>1
qiqj(µj(1−Gj)− µi(1−Gi)) (4.4)
where i and j denote different types. It computes the weighted sum of all the
differences between the areas of the opportunity sets and thus is, in essence, a
Gini aggregator of the areas under the GL curves for each type (cf. Bourguignon,
Ferreira and Walton (2007b)). As the GO index is divided by the mean income
of the entire population µ, it is independent of the wealth of the society. It can
be shown that if the number of circumstances, t, corresponds to the number of
individuals, the GO index is equal to the Gini coefficient (cf. Lefranc et al. (2008)).
It can therefore be seen as an extension of the traditional Gini index, which takes
values between 0 and 1.
However, since estimation of GL curves requires a reasonable number of obser-
vations within each type, the partition of the population must be rather coarse. A
consideration of more than one circumstance is difficult due to practical reasons
in the presence of small cell sizes. We therefore introduce an alternative approach,
which allows for a more inclusive treatment of EOp.
4.2.3 Parametric estimation
The parametric estimation procedure applied in this chapter is based on Bour-
guignon et al. (2007a) and Ferreira and Gignoux (2011). In contrast to Lefranc
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et al. (2008), they introduce a weaker criterion for the empirical identification of
EOp. According to Ferreira and Gignoux (2011), EOp is achieved if the mean
advantage levels are identical across types. If µk(y) =
∫∞
0
ydF k(y), this weaker
criterion for EOp can be written as:7
µk(y) = µl(y),∀l, k|Tk ∈ Π, Tl ∈ Π. (4.5)
Measuring IOp means capturing the extent to which µk(y) 6= µl(y), for k 6= l. Their
IOp index has to satisfy the same properties as the GO index, namely anonymity,
the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, normalization, population replication, and
scale invariance. Moreover, the index has to be additively decomposable. All
these properties are satisfied if we choose a positive multiple of a member of the GE
class (Eα) as an inequality measure. Yet by introducing the further requirement
of path-independent decomposability (see Foster and Shneyerov (2000)), the set
of eligible indices reduces to a single inequality measure, the mean logarithmic
deviation (Theil (0)), which is denoted by E0, since it is a member of the GE class
of measures if its parameter is set to zero.
Furthermore, their parametric approach allows for the consideration of different
circumstances variables, since it also works for small sample sizes. Explicitly noting
that circumstances are exogenous by definition, whereas effort variables can also
be affected by circumstances, equation (4.1) is expressed as:
y = φ(C, e(C)). (4.6)
With OLS we can estimate a log-linearized version of (4.6):
ln y = Cψ + ε (4.7)
where ε represents a random term and ψ captures both the direct effect of circum-
stances on outcomes as well as the indirect effect through their impact on effort
variables (Bourguignon et al. (2007a)). Following Ferreira and Gignoux (2011),
we can then construct a parametric estimate of the smoothed distribution:
7For an in-depth discussion on this criterion and its relation to Roemer’s original definition, see
Ferreira and Gignoux (2011).
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µ˜i = exp[ψˆCi] (4.8)
where µ˜i indicates the counterfactual advantage level of individual i and ψˆ the
parameter estimate from the OLS regression. As we replace individual incomes
by their predictions, all individuals with the same circumstances must have the
same advantage levels. Thus, in the case of perfect EOp all predicted income
levels would be identical. IOp can then be measured as the inequality of these
counterfactual incomes, where differences are only due to circumstances. It can be
computed as IOp = E0(µ˜) and the share of IOp in total inequality E0(µ˜)/E0.
4.3 Empirical strategy
In this section we introduce the EU-SILC data set, on which our empirical anal-
ysis is based. It constitutes the largest comparative survey of European income
and living conditions. We depict the main variables of our analysis, income and
individual circumstances, and explain how the income and circumstance variables
are generated from the EU-SILC.
4.3.1 The EU-SILC
Our study relies on cross-sectional and multidimensional microdata from the EU-
SILC, which is an annual survey conducted across European countries and collated
by Eurostat. The EU-SILC was launched in 2004 and succeeds the European
Community Household Panel (ECHP). Its comparative statistics are fast becoming
the new reference source for income distribution, living conditions, and social
exclusion at the European level.
The EU-SILC consists of two components: a household survey, which is an-
swered by the household reference person, and an individual questionnaire for each
household member aged 16 and over. At the household level the EU-SILC covers
basic information on income, social exclusion and housing. At the individual level
the EU-SILC provides information on demography, education, labor force status,
health and income. In this manner, it provides both information on individual cir-
cumstances and data on individual income, which serves as the dependent variable
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in our analysis.
We utilize data from the 2005 wave of the EU-SILC because this is the only
wave in which the cross-sectional component is supplemented with additional ques-
tions relating to the intergenerational transmission of poverty. Respondents aged
25 to 65 were questioned about parental and family attributes during their early
teenage years (12-16 years of age). The questions cover, for instance, the occupa-
tional status of the respondents’ parents, information on parental education and
the presence of financial difficulties in the household. This information will serve
as circumstance variables our analysis.
The 2005 data set covers 24 EU member states plus Norway and Iceland. It
provides information on the income and living conditions of 422,400 individuals
and 197,657 households. Our study, however, excludes Italy, France, Spain, Portu-
gal, Greece, as well as Latvia and Lithuania because we have no suitable individual
gross income data for these countries. We also exclude Cyprus because under our
restrictions the Cypriot data does not yield a representative sample size. Due to
its small size and obvious outlier position, we also remove Luxembourg from the
analysis. Our cross-country comparison of EO and EOp thus includes 17 coun-
tries, focusing on Continental Europe (Austria, Belgium, Germany and the Nether-
lands) and Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) as
well as on Anglo-Saxon countries (Ireland and the United Kingdom). A further
six countries, found in Eastern Europe, comprise the Central Eastern European
(CEE) countries of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland the Slovak Republic and
Slovenia, as well as the Baltic state of Estonia. This database offers a high degree
of heterogeneity in terms of economic features and public policy.
Since we want to confine our analysis to full-time workers, we only keep indi-
viduals who usually work 30 hours or more per week. We restrict our sample to
working-age individuals, aged 30 to 60 at the time of the survey. This age interval
is chosen to exclude students or pensioners and permit a sound and comparable
analysis of earnings across types and countries. Since the non-parametric approach
only allows for one circumstance, we exclude women and restrict our analysis to
male heads of households. This sample consists of 33,688 men aged 44.2 years
on average. Country sample sizes vary between 582 observations for Iceland and
5,561 observations for Poland.
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4.3.2 Income concepts
Income at a very detailed component level is the core of the EU-SILC survey.
All income variables are expressed in euros and refer to the year 2004. We use
equivalized, individual income variables, which are deduced from household data.
The advantage of using variables derived from household statistics instead of per-
sonal data is that they better reflect the impact of redistributive policies, usually
aimed at the entire household. Since household statistics cover all household mem-
bers, benefits or allowances for unemployed or disabled individuals, as well as for
families, children and pensioners, are all taken into account.
Our household income variables are derived from total household factor income,
which is the sum of all household members’ gross personal income components plus
gross income components at the household level (see Table 4.1). Note that pensions
are also treated as factor income. In order to analyze the effects of taxes and so-
cial benefits separately, we include a post-tax income variable (factor income after
taxes and before benefits) and a post-benefit income variable (factor income after
social benefits but before taxes), respectively. The taxes included in this analysis
include taxes on income, social insurance contributions8, regular taxes on wealth
and regular inter-household cash transfers paid. The social transfers considered
are all in cash except for housing benefits. Total disposable household income
is total household factor income minus taxes plus social benefits. Note that this
approach corresponds to the standard accounting approach to measure effective
redistribution, where income concepts are defined at different stages of redistribu-
tion (e.g. Mitchell (1991), Whiteford (2008)). With this accounting framework a
number of measures of the direct redistributive impact of the tax-benefit system
can be constructed by comparing inequality measures (or IOp measures) for the
different concepts of income. However, this approach is not able to account for
any behavioral effects caused by redistributive policies and can only be regarded
as a descriptive tool to capture effective redistribution.
We normalize household income by family size, using the household-size equiva-
8The variable “tax on income and social insurance contributions” includes tax adjustments-
repayment/receipt on income, income tax at source and social insurance contributions, if appli-
cable, see Eurostat (2008a), p. 108.
CHAPTER 4. EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY AND REDISTRIBUTION 90
Table 4.1: Income definitions
(FI ) / EQ Equivalized factor income
(FI - TX ) / EQ Equivalized post-tax income
(FI + SB) / EQ Equivalized post-benefits income
(FI - TX + SB) / EQ Equivalized disposable income
Note: All income variables refer to annual incomes.
FI = (Factor income) The sum of all household members’ gross personal income components
(gross employee cash or near cash income; gross non-cash employee income (in the 2005 data
set this variable only includes company car); gross cash benefits or losses from self-employment
(including royalties); old-age benefits; survivor benefits); and gross income components at the
household level (rental income from property or land; regular inter-household cash transfers
received; interest, dividends and profit from capital investments in unincorporated business;
income received by people aged under 16).
SB = (Social benefits) Unemployment, sickness and disability benefits; education-related al-
lowances; family/children related allowances; social exclusion not elsewhere specified; and hous-
ing allowances.
TX = (Taxes) Taxes on income and social insurance contributions; regular taxes on wealth and
regular inter-household cash transfer paid.
EQ = Equivalence scale.
lence scale.9 By dividing total household factor income and total disposable house-
hold income (adjusted with the within-household non-response inflation factors)
by the equivalized household size, we obtain equivalized factor income, equival-
ized post-tax income, equivalized post-benefits income and equivalized disposable
income. Considering individuals, rather than households, as the unit of analy-
sis is appropriate, since our analysis of EOp aims to identify inequalities at the
individual level.
In order to rule out any potential bias due to extreme values, we adjust all
income measures for each country by omitting the top 0.1 per cent of the total
income distributions and all values equal to or below zero.
9For each person the equivalent (per-capita) income is the household income divided by the
equivalent household size according to the modified OECD scale, which assigns a weight of 1.0
to the head of household, 0.5 to every household member aged 14 or older and 0.3 to each
member aged under fourteen. Summing the individual weights gives the household-specific
equivalence factor.
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4.3.3 Individual circumstances
The circumstances affecting individual income are manifold. The GO index, in
contrast to the parametric method, requires a reasonable number of observations
within each type, as described in Section 4.2. Consequently, we begin by analyzing
the impact of a single circumstance and investigate how the resulting EOp levels
differ with respect to the underlying method. In line with most of the literature
on EOp (see Roemer (1998); Ferreira and Gignoux (2011); Lefranc et al. (2008);
Aaberge and Colombino (2012)), we use the level of father’s education to represent
social background.
In the 2005 EU-SILC module “Intergenerational transmission of poverty”, re-
spondents are asked about the highest level of education their father had attained
before and during the period the interviewee was a young teenager, i.e. between the
age of 12 and 16 (Eurostat (2008b)). Respondents were asked to choose between six
categories: (1) less than primary education, (2) primary education, (3) lower sec-
ondary education, (4) upper secondary education, (5) post-secondary non-tertiary
education and (6) first and second stages of tertiary education. We combine levels
(1), (2) and (3) to create a new category of ‘low educational level’. Similarly, the
combination of education levels (4) and (5) is ‘medium level of education’ and level
(6) constitutes the ‘high educational level’.10
When using the parametric approach to assess EOp levels, we increase our
circumstance set. Together with the father’s highest level of education, we also
include the highest education level of the mother. The variable is operationalized
in the same way as the father´s educational level. In addition, we include a
variable representing the main activity status of the father. Here we differentiate
between the categories (1) employee, (2) self-employed, (3) unemployed, (4) retired
and (5) unpaid family worker, housework or other. Finally, we also include a
categorical variable which indicates the migration status of the individual: whether
the individual was born (a) in the same country as residence, (b) in an EU country
or (c) in any other country. We do not include further circumstance variables such
as father’s occupational status or if the respondent experienced financial difficulties
10As a robustness check, we assess the impact of parental education on EO and EOp by combining
father’s and mother’s level of education. However, this does not qualitatively change our main
findings.
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during childhood because this information is not (sufficiently) available for all
countries in the sample.
4.4 Empirical analysis
4.4.1 Inequality of opportunity in Europe
We first proxy family background according to the father’s level of education for
only the GO index and the parametric estimation method. The left-hand columns
of Table 4.2 show the GO and corresponding Gini indices for equivalized factor
income for all 17 countries under analysis. On the right-hand side of the table is
the Theil (0) index of classic outcome inequality and the results for the parametric
estimation method. Here we first base our results on one circumstance only in order
to allow for better comparison to the non-parametric estimation method according
to Lefranc et al. (2008). We then use the parametric framework to compute IOp
levels based on our full set of four circumstances. Thus, in the last columns of Table
4.2, together with father’s education we also consider mother’s level of education,
the country of birth and father´s activity. For easier comparison all indices have
been multiplied by 100. In the case of the parametric estimation method, we also
express IOp levels in terms of the share in total inequality (measured by the Theil
(0) index).
Note that it is not possible to compare directly the resulting IOp levels of
the two methods, even when considering the same set of circumstances (in our
case father´s educational level). Observed differences may be due to the different
construction of the underlying inequality measures and the fact that inequality
measures from the GE family are not normalized. In addition, the Gini coefficient
is more sensitive to changes in the middle, and the Theil (0) is most sensitive to
income differences at the bottom of the distribution. An investigation whether
the country rankings remain stable under the two different methods is much more
appropriate. Figure 4.1 illustrates how country rankings change under different
methods and different circumstance sets. First, the black dots show how countries
differ when ranked according to the GO index (y-axis) compared to the parametric
IOp index (x-axis) using only father’s education as circumstance variable. Second,
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Figure 4.1: Robustness of country rankings with respect to methods
the dashed arrows show how the ranking changes when comparing the GO in-
dex (y-axis) with the parametric IOp index using all four circumstances (x-axis).
Countries are ordered from the lowest to the highest IOp levels, i.e. from most
opportunity-equal to most opportunity-unequal. Thus, dots lying above the 45
degree-line show countries that achieve relatively better ranks in terms of EOp
when relying on the parametric method using one circumstance variable compared
to the GO index. An arrow to the left of the dot indicates that this rank increases
when using four circumstances instead of one. Contrary, arrows to the right of the
dot mean that a country is ranked worse in terms of EOp in that case.
When both methods rely on the same circumstance (black dots), we see that
the states – with a few exceptions – are found close to the 45 degree-line, indicating
that the rankings in this case remain fairly stable. The exceptions concern changes
of three ranking positions: Czech Republic from 8 to 11, Finland from 5 to 8 and
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Norway from 9 to 6.11 When considering all four circumstances, it is especially the
ranks of the worst performing countries which remain very stable. We do find some
larger switches within the middle-ranking countries. The Czech Republic and the
Slovak Republic rank considerably better, but for Austria, Denmark and Norway
the opposite is true. Yet on the whole, we can conclude that the country ordering
remains relatively robust, regardless of the method and the set of circumstances
used. Given that the different approaches yield similar results, in the next section
we focus on the parametric estimation method with the full set of circumstances,
which allows for easier comparison to related studies.
Returning to Table 4.2, the Nordic and some Continental countries clearly rank
higher in terms of EOp. The Anglo-Saxon countries, in contrast, are found in the
bottom half of the ranking and are hence categorized by relatively low EOp. There
is a divide within the Eastern European countries: the Czech Republic, the Slovak
Republic and Slovenia are situated in the middle of the ranking, while Estonia,
Hungary and Poland are at the end of the scale. When comparing IOp with IO,
as represented by the Gini and the Theil (0) indices, we observe that countries in
which IO is low, IOp is also usually low. In addition, countries which score worst
in terms of EO also score worst in terms of EOp. However, we also see that there
are some interesting changes in the country order. Germany and the Netherlands
score considerably better for IOp than for outcomes. The opposite is true for
Belgium and Slovenia. However, the Nordic countries of Denmark and Finland
rank lower in IOp than IO. As can be seen from the IOp ratios, the circumstance
variable of father’s education can only explain a rather small fraction of inequality
in most countries. Although our full circumstance set explains considerably more
of the observed IO (up to 13.8 per cent) when compared to the set with only one
circumstance, we are still likely to underestimate the true share of IOp, since we
are not able to observe and include all relevant circumstances. Therefore, we can
only reveal the lower bounds of IOp (Ferreira and Gignoux (2011)). Although the
clustering of countries remains basically the same, our results suggest important
differences in the ordering of countries if we examine IOp instead of IO. This is in
11When comparing the country rankings based on the Gini index with those from the Theil (0),
the ranking is almost exactly the same. Only the Czech Republic has a significant gain in
ranking with regards to the Theil (0) index compared to the Gini (a change of more than one
ranking position).
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line with findings in Lefranc et al. (2008) and emphasizes the importance of distin-
guishing between the different concepts of inequality assessment. As the degree of
inequality is often used as a basis for the redistributive design of tax-benefit sys-
tems, we now extend existing EOp analyses (Lefranc et al. (2008), Checchi et al.
(2010), Marrero and Rodr´ıguez (2010b)) and also examine the different impacts of
redistributive policies on reducing IOp versus IO.
Table 4.2: IO and IOp indices for equivalized factor income
Gini vs. Theil(0) vs.
Non-parametric GO index Parametric IOp index
One One Four
circumstance circumstance circumstances
Country Gini index GO index Theil(0) IOp Ratio (%) IOp Ratio (%)
AT 0.305 0.026 0.170 0.003 1.9 0.012 7.0
BE 0.279 0.035 0.153 0.005 3.2 0.013 8.3
CZ 0.301 0.028 0.158 0.005 3.3 0.007 4.2
DK 0.239 0.021 0.125 0.001 0.9 0.005 4.4
EE 0.345 0.055 0.210 0.014 6.6 0.016 7.7
FI 0.293 0.022 0.161 0.004 2.8 0.008 5.0
DE 0.311 0.009 0.172 0.001 0.5 0.002 0.9
HU 0.385 0.061 0.259 0.022 8.6 0.025 9.7
IS 0.268 0.023 0.126 0.002 1.7 0.005 3.8
IR 0.382 0.049 0.269 0.020 7.6 0.030 11.0
NL 0.312 0.014 0.186 0.001 0.3 0.003 1.8
NO 0.317 0.031 0.206 0.003 1.4 0.008 3.7
PL 0.400 0.077 0.296 0.031 10.5 0.041 13.8
SK 0.298 0.032 0.163 0.005 3.0 0.007 4.0
SI 0.298 0.046 0.163 0.009 5.6 0.014 8.9
SE 0.286 0.019 0.152 0.003 1.8 0.005 3.2
UK 0.350 0.047 0.214 0.011 5.4 0.016 7.3
Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC 2005 data.
4.4.2 EOp and redistribution
Governments can impact on the distribution of incomes and promote EOp among
their citizens through the specific design of their tax and transfer policies. In
the following we examine the degree to which income taxes, social contributions
and social transfers are associated with establishing more EOp, i.e. with reducing
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IOp. These policies primarily aim at reducing income inequality and providing
insurance against unforeseeable events. In doing so, however, they may prioritize
disadvantaged groups, thus leading to more equal opportunities. To capture the
different welfare mechanisms across Europe, we analyze the impact of taxes and
social benefits separately before considering their common influence. As indicated
earlier, we consider the impact of effective redistribution via four income concepts
defined at different stages under the tax and transfer scheme (see Section 4.3.2).
Note again that this method does not account for any behavioral effects caused by
redistributive policies. Therefore, it may only be regarded as a descriptive tool to
capture direct effective redistribution.
The effect of taxes (benefits) is measured by comparing IOp for equivalized fac-
tor income with that for equivalized post-tax (post-benefit) income. The effect of
both taxes and transfers together is captured when comparing IOp for equivalized
factor income with that obtained using equivalized disposable income as defined in
Section 4.3.2. In all cases IOp is measured via the parametric index described in
Section 4.2.3 with the use of four circumstances variables as indicated in Section
4.3.3.
4.4.2.1 Post-tax income
To analyze how a country’s tax system impacts on EOp, we compare the paramet-
ric indices for pre- and post-tax income. Table 4.3 reports the parametric indices
without taxes in the first column and with taxes in the second. In almost all
cases taxes lead to a reduction in the parametric index and thus to a decrease of
IOp. These reductions are more pronounced in countries where opportunities are
originally rather unequal, such as Ireland, Hungary and Slovenia. However, there
are also countries, namely the three Nordic states of Finland, Iceland and Sweden,
that show relatively large reductions in their IOp indices – albeit their initial levels
of IOp are already relatively small. The only exception is Germany, with a higher
IOp after taxation compared to the pre-tax situation. Even if we are not able
to explore this finding further within the realm of our methodological approach,
one might hypothesize that this is partly due to the well-known regressivity of the
German social security contribution (SSC) system.
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In Figure 4.2 we contrast the relative inequality reduction by taxes in IOp with
the reduction they achieve in IO as measured by the Theil (0) index. For reasons of
comparison, the additional symbols beside the bars show the respective changes for
the GO index, the parametric IOp index using one circumstance and the classical
Gini index. For the vast majority of countries the reduction in IOp measured
via the parametric index (four circumstances) is larger than the reduction in IO
measured via the Theil (0) index, when moving from the pre- to the post-tax
situation. The only exceptions are Germany, the Netherlands and Slovenia. This
might suggest that the overall effective redistributive impact of taxation tends
to mitigate IOp more than IO. Whether, and to which extent, this result is due
to policies specifically aimed at decreasing IOp must be left for future research.
Nevertheless, if this is the case, the design of these tax systems might appear
“fairer” to citizens and be more likely to be accepted, according to theories of
distributive justice that account for some notion of EOp. As far as Germany is
concerned, it is interesting to see that effective taxation reduces IO but increases
IOp. Continuing the hypothesis from the previous paragraph, this would suggest
that the regressivity of the German SSC system meets disadvantaged people in
terms of opportunities rather than people at the bottom of the income distribution.
The overall results hold when compared to changes in IOp (IO) measured by
the non-parametric GO (Gini) index, i.e. for most of the countries the reduction
in IOp is larger than the reduction in IO. For Germany the negative (positive)
impact of taxation on EOp (EO) remains when using the GO (Gini) index.
4.4.2.2 Post-benefit income
In order to analyze the impact of social benefits on IOp, we compare the parametric
IOp index for post-benefit income, in the third column of Table 4.3, with that one
obtained for equivalized factor income, in the first column. For all countries we
observe that the parametric IOp index for post-benefit income is smaller than
the same index obtained in the pre-benefit situation. Thus, in all 17 countries
under analysis the direct redistributive effect of social benefits leads to a reduction
in their parametric IOp indices and to an increase in EOp. Considering Figure
4.3, we find that the equalizing effects of social benefits are substantially larger
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Table 4.3: IOp indices for different income concepts
Parametric index Parametric index Parametric index for Parametric index for
Country for equivalized for equivalized equivalized post- equivalized dispos-
factor income post-tax income benefit income able income
AT 0.0119 0.0090 0.0097 0.0068
BE 0.0128 0.0100 0.0080 0.0059
CZ 0.0066 0.0055 0.0049 0.0037
DK 0.0055 0.0046 0.0022 0.0013
EE 0.0161 0.0145 0.0151 0.0136
FI 0.0081 0.0057 0.0061 0.0040
DE 0.0015 0.0018 0.0012 0.0013
HU 0.0251 0.0166 0.0193 0.0116
IS 0.0048 0.0037 0.0046 0.0032
IR 0.0297 0.0228 0.0242 0.0180
NL 0.0033 0.0030 0.0030 0.0026
NO 0.0075 0.0067 0.0036 0.0030
PL 0.0407 0.0391 0.0354 0.0322
SK 0.0066 0.0050 0.0056 0.0041
SI 0.0145 0.0113 0.0102 0.0073
SE 0.0049 0.0037 0.0028 0.0019
UK 0.0156 0.0130 0.0136 0.0106
Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC 2005 data.
compared to those achieved by taxes (see Figure 4.2) with maximum reductions in
opportunity inequality of about 40–60 per cent (Denmark, Norway and Sweden)
compared to a range of maximum values around 25–35 per cent (Finland, Hungary
and Sweden) in the case of taxes.
In Figure 4.3 we compare the impact of social benefits on IOp with their effects
on classic IO, as measured by the Theil (0) index. Similar to Figure 4.2, the
symbols in front of the bars show the respective reductions for the GO index, the
parametric IOp index using one circumstance and the classical Gini index. In line
with Fuest, Niehues and Peichl (2010) we also find that the outcome equalizing
effects of social benefits are substantially larger compared to those ones obtained
in the case of taxation. When comparing the IOp results with the traditional
IO, some considerable differences can again be observed. Particularly in the three
Nordic countries of Denmark, Norway and Sweden the reduction in the parametric
IOp index is considerably larger than the reduction in the Theil (0) index. This
is also true for two of the CEE countries (the Czech Republic and Slovenia) and
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Figure 4.2: Reduction in IOp and IO through taxes
for Belgium. For most of the Continental European (Austria, Germany and the
Netherlands) and the Eastern European countries (Estonia, Poland and the Slovak
Republic), however, the opposite is observed. Iceland is the Nordic exception
here. Once again, whether, and to which extent, these results are due to benefit
systems specifically designed on the basis of some EOp or EO principles can only
be hypothesized at this point and must be left for future research.
Finally, when comparing IOp measured by the GO index with the Gini index
of IO, the results are again very similar: for most of the countries a parametric
IOp index higher than the Theil (0) corresponds to a GO index higher than the
Gini. In addition, the impact of benefits on EOp measured via the GO index is
positive for almost all countries. The exception is Iceland, where this effect turns
to be negative when measured via the GO or the parametric IOp index using one
circumstance.
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Figure 4.3: Reduction in IOp and IO through social benefits
4.4.2.3 Disposable income
In the two previous sections we analyzed how taxes and benefits separately affect
IOp. In this section we explore how the full tax-benefit schemes, i.e. taxes and
benefits together, impact on EOp. Therefore, we compare IOp for disposable
income (as defined in Section 4.3.2) to IOp for factor income. Note that this effect
cannot be calculated in an additive way using the two former effects.
The parametric IOp indices for disposable income are shown in the fourth
column of Table 4.3. For almost all countries we observe that IOp for disposable
income is not only markedly smaller than IOp in the initial, i.e. factor income,
situation but also smaller than IOp obtained for the separated cases of post-tax and
post-benefit income. This is, of course, not surprising, as for both of these cases
we are able to observe reductions in IOp. The only exception is Germany. Due
to the increase in IOp in the post-tax situation, the effect of taxes and transfers
together on IOp is slightly smaller than the exclusive effect of benefits. However,
the former still positively affects EOp compared to the original situation.
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Figure 4.4 reveals that for a clear majority of countries, the reductions in IOp
due to the overall tax-benefit scheme are usually larger than the decrease of IO. The
largest relative changes, up to nearly 80 per cent, can be observed for the Nordic
countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), some of the CEE countries
(the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia) and, again, Belgium. Exceptions are
Estonia, Germany and the Netherlands, which show not only a higher reduction in
the Theil (0) index compared to the parametric IOp index but also relatively small
reductions in IOp in general. Note from Table 4.3, however, that it is especially
Germany and the Netherlands which perform relatively well in terms of the level of
EOp.12 Together with all five of the Nordic countries, they rank highest in terms
of EOp, followed by the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic and the remaining
Continental European countries of Austria and Belgium. At the bottom of the
ranking are the Anglo-Saxon countries and the remaining Eastern European coun-
tries (Estonia, Hungary and Poland). Nevertheless, this cross-country variation
in IOp is still smaller than before redistribution, indicating that the direct tax-
and cash-benefit systems narrow the overall opportunities for income acquisition
across countries.
4.5 Discussion of results
Opportunities for income generation are more equally distributed after taxes and
benefits are taken into account in all countries. We compared the relative changes
in IOp with those in IO (using the Theil (0) index) after redistributive state in-
tervention. Whilst in the case of taxation the reduction in IOp is usually higher
compared to the decrease in IO, the picture is less definitive in the case of benefits.
For disposable income the opportunity equalizing effect prevails again, with two
clear exceptions: Germany and the Netherlands. Both countries, however, perform
among the best in terms of the level of EOp. While in the previous section we con-
centrated on cross-country differences in IOp changes, this section discusses more
specifically differences in the level of IOp as well as the corresponding ranking of
countries.
12How country rankings differ when comparing IOp levels for the different income concepts is
discussed in the following section.
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Figure 4.4: Reduction in IOp and IO through taxes and social benefits
Figure 4.5 shows how the ranking of countries changes when moving through
the different income concepts. Countries are ranked from 1 to 17 from most oppor-
tunity equal to most opportunity unequal. The top-left graph of Figure 4.5 shows
the ranking differences in terms of EOp when moving from initial factor income
to income after taxes. A position on the 45 degree-line means that the country’s
rank does not change. As can be seen, only a small amount of re-ranking takes
place, with only four countries changing their rank. For Finland and Sweden the
post-tax income leads to a better performance in terms of EOp, while for Ice-
land and Norway the opposite is true. However, few changes also indicate that
even if we observe quite substantial changes in IOp through taxes, especially for
some of the Eastern European states, this does not improve their ranking among
countries. For the top-right graph we observe a few more changes. Albeit their
relatively low level of IOp for factor income, it is especially Denmark and Norway,
but also Sweden and Belgium, which can improve their rank via social benefits.
In contrast, Austria, Iceland, the Netherlands and the Slovak Republic perform
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Figure 4.5: Changes in EOp country rankings for different income concepts
worse when benefits are taken into account.13 At the bottom of the ranking, for the
Anglo-Saxon and most of the Eastern European countries, again nothing changes.
This holds for the bottom-left graph, where the ranks in IOp indices for dispos-
able income are compared to the ranking in the initial situation. While it is – not
surprisingly – similar to the previous one, Germany now loses its top position to
Denmark. The bottom-right graph of Figure 4.5 shows that this effect of benefits
is also similar when taxes have been accounted for.
In a second step we explore how equity and economic efficiency are correlated
across countries.14 In our analysis, equity is understood as EOp measured by the
parametric IOp coefficients (four circumstances) for disposable income. Economic
13All these countries show relative small reductions in IOp trough benefits (see Section 4.4.2.2).
14It is widely believed that there exists a trade-off between outcome equality and economic effi-
ciency because of its detrimental effects on incentives. However, the literature is less conclusive
about the relation between EOp and economic performance (e.g., Roemer (1998), Paes de Bar-
ros et al. (2009), Marrero and Rodr´ıguez (2010a)).
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efficiency is gauged by a country’s labor productivity per worker.15 Hence, we
compare the opportunity equalizing effects of the different tax and transfer sys-
tems with the economic performance of the different countries. Figure 4.6 reveals
a strong negative correlation between our inequality measure and economic per-
formance (for easier comparison, the IO coefficients are multiplied by 1000). All
Eastern European countries are found in, or at the border to, the fourth quadrant,
combining low levels of labor productivity with high parametric IOp coefficients,
i.e. with high IOp for earnings acquisition after taxes and transfers. Exceptions
are the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, showing fairly low levels of IOp
but also below-average levels for labor productivity. Without exception, the Con-
tinental economies and the Nordic countries are located in the first quadrant,
performing above-average, as measured by labor productivity per worker, while at
the same time being characterized by low IOp, i.e. below-average IOp coefficients.
The Anglo-Saxon countries score above-average in both dimensions.
Overall, higher economic performance in the European countries under analy-
sis is accompanied by higher levels of EOp after redistributive state intervention.
However, whether this finding contradicts the (theoretical) trade-off hypothesis
between economic power and EOp – as stated by Roemer (1998) – cannot be
concluded from this purely descriptive exercise and the limited set of countries
at use. Thus, the direction and shape of causality is still far from being clear,
and further research is necessary with regard to the links between EOp and eco-
nomic strength. Yet our analysis at least suggests that – with certain exceptions
– Europe seems to be divided between the Eastern European countries, where
low economic performance is accompanied by low levels of EOp, and the Conti-
nental and Nordic countries, which are not only economically stronger, but also
provide their citizens with higher levels of EOp. Hence, the link between family
background and economic success seems to be generally tighter in poor countries
than in rich ones, even after redistributive state intervention. The Anglo-Saxon
countries, however, do not correspond to the general pattern. Being among the
top economic performers, Ireland and the United Kingdom are below-average with
regard to EOp.
15Ideally, we would have used total factor productivity (TFP). However, due to data limitations
we are restricted to use labor productivity as a proxy for a country’s economic efficiency.
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Figure 4.6: IOp and labor productivity per worker
Despite these descriptive findings, more needs to be learned about the causal
mechanisms linking economic performance with EOp and more research needs to
be carried out with respect to the identification of opportunity equalizing public
policies. Furthermore, it would be interesting to study what might explain the
observed differences in EOp across countries. Are they, for instance, the result of
differing attitudes towards eliminating IOp among individuals in European coun-
tries? If preferences for EOp turn out to be country-specific, this could explain
why European welfare regimes really put different degrees of emphasis on equal-
izing opportunities, i.e. why redistribution is, for example, less pronounced in
Estonia but plays an integral role in Finland.
4.6 Conclusion
The recent EU enlargements have brought together countries with considerably
different economic back-grounds. Strengthening economic and social cohesion has
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become a key issue in the European Union, with specific attention given to equal-
izing opportunities between and within member states (Commission, 2007, 2008).
In this study we analyze the status quo of EOp in 15 EU member states plus Nor-
way and Iceland and investigate the extent to which current tax-benefit systems
in Europe succeed in equalizing opportunities for their citizens – in terms of direct
effective redistribution.
Our results suggest that differences in opportunities are still widespread both
within and across the countries under analysis. Europe seems to be divided be-
tween the Continental nations and the Nordic countries (especially Denmark and
Sweden), where EOp is high, and the Anglo-Saxon and Eastern European coun-
tries, where the degree of EOp is relatively low. The tax and transfer schemes,
however, are generally found to reduce IOp, albeit their redistributive power differs
across Europe. In particular, it can be concluded that both taxes and transfers
reduce IOp in Europe, while social benefits are typically playing the key role in
this regard. If we compare the equalizing effects of taxes and benefits across the
two concepts of inequality assessment, we generally find that the full tax-benefit
schemes are more successful at equalizing opportunities rather than outcomes (ex-
ceptions are Estonia, Germany and the Netherlands). Greater differences can be
observed when looking at the tax-benefit instruments separately, where results
are less homogeneous especially for the impact of social transfers. The results
in terms of country rankings are robust with respect to different methods and
different circumstance sets.
Note, however, that our study has several limitations. First of all, and as
mentioned above, we abstract from behavioral adjustments caused by redistribu-
tive policies, and thus assume that taxes and transfers do not have any indirect
influence on the pre-tax income distribution. Our results can only be seen as de-
scriptive in terms of capturing direct effective redistribution. Second, because of
data restrictions our redistributive analysis cannot take into account the effects of
indirect taxes and in-kind transfers on EOp. Third, our analysis remains static,
since we do not consider the distribution of lifetime incomes. Future research needs
to make dynamic and long-run, cross-national comparisons of EOp, including var-
ious age cohorts and different periods of time. Such studies could reveal national
trends and shed light on the role of economic development and globalization.
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We suggest two additional lines for further research. We believe that more re-
search is needed on the causal mechanisms behind the observed family associations.
Previous research on the determinants of IOp has, among other things, tried to
explain unequal opportunities through native intelligence, family networking and
differences in productivity (Bjo¨rklund, Eriksson, Ja¨ntti, Raaum and O¨sterbacka
(2002); Roemer et al. (2003); Checchi and Peragine (2010)). Behavioral economics
and neuroeconomics might provide a deeper understanding of the channels through
which parental background impacts their offspring’s income generating capacity.
We also suggest investigating how EOp can be best promoted. Many research find-
ings point to the importance of education in fostering equal opportunities, such
as pre-primary education, reducing dropout rates and ensuring education until at
least the secondary level (Checchi, Peragine and Serlenga (2008); Causa, Dantan
and Johansson (2009); Marrero and Rodr´ıguez (2010b)). The stratification of the
educational system, in contrast, seems to exacerbate IOp (Brunello and Checchi
(2007); Cunha and Heckman (2007)). Others highlight the role played by labor
market institutions. They find that union presence, the access to the labor market
and work-support programs, such as earned income tax credits, positively impact
on EOp (Checchi and Peragine (2010); Checchi et al. (2010)).
The issue of EOp is central to contemporary policy design and will become
even more important in view of the progressing European integration. Perhaps
even the proposal found in Roemer (2006) to switch from per capita income as a
measure of economic development to the degree, to which the society in question
has equalized opportunities for income acquisition, might become reality some day.
Research in this field is and will continue to be of the utmost importance for public
policy makers.
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Chapter 5
Economic effects of a European
tax-benefit system and fiscal
equalization mechanism
5.1 Introduction
The debt crisis in the eurozone has brought the issue of deeper fiscal integration to
the top of the European policy agenda. Many observers argue that the currency
union will not survive unless it is complemented by a ‘fiscal union’. The concept
of fiscal union has many interpretations, ranging from the introduction of a set
of balanced budget rules to the more ambitious project of shifting significant tax
and spending powers to the European level. The latter would imply that fiscal
institutions in the EU or at least in the eurozone would become more similar to
those of existing federations like the US or Switzerland (see e.g. Bordo, Markiewicz
and Jonung (2011); Fuest and Peichl (2012)).
In the debate about how a fiscal union should be designed, some countries,
in particular Germany, emphasize the role of budgetary discipline and fiscal gov-
ernance. Yet, the widespread view is that this is insufficient. In a recent pa-
per, Herman van Rompuy, President of the European Council, makes this point:
“Strengthening discipline alone is . . . not sufficient. In the longer term, there is
a need to explore the option to go beyond the current steps to strengthen economic
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governance by developing gradually a fiscal capacity for the EMU. Such a fiscal
capacity could take several forms and various options would need to be explored”.1
Moreover, EU Commissioner La´szlo´ Andor recently suggested that an EU level
unemployment insurance scheme should be introduced.2 Such proposals reflect an
upcoming debate about fiscal integration in Europe which would introduce fiscal
stabilization mechanisms and which might even include elements of a joint tax and
transfer system.
Although fiscal integration in Europe is a key policy issue, little is known about
its economic implications. This chapter analyzes the economic effects of two im-
portant potential elements of fiscal integration: i) an EU-wide integrated tax and
transfer system; and ii) a fiscal equalization mechanism. Our analysis includes 11
eurozone countries.3 We employ the European tax-benefit calculator EUROMOD,
which uses harmonized and representative household microdata and allows calcu-
lating taxes, transfers and disposable incomes for each household. EUROMOD
enables us to run counterfactual simulations so that we can analyze policy reforms
and their effects on tax revenues, the income distribution and labor supply. We
proceed as follows. First, we construct a European tax and transfer system, which
can be interpreted as an average of the national tax and transfer systems. The
system is designed such that its introduction would be revenue neutral at the EU
level but not necessarily at the level of each member state. We analyze various
scenarios where the European tax and transfer system (partly or fully) replaces
the national systems. Second, we consider the introduction of a fiscal equalization
1‘Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union’, Interim Report, The President of the
European Council, Brussels, 12 October 2012, p. 4. Along the same lines, in October 2012, the
German chancellor Angela Merkel suggested the introduction of a budget for the eurozone, which
would coexist with the EU budget and would have the function to provide fiscal stabilization in
the case of asymmetric shocks (‘Regierungserkla¨rung von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel zum
Europa¨ischen Rat vom 18. und 19. Oktober in Bru¨ssel’, Berlin, 18 October 2012).
2La´szlo´ Andor: ‘A strong employment agenda – the pathway to economic recovery’, dinner
speech at the Conference ”Jobs for Europe: The Employment Policy Conference“, Brussels, 6
September 2012, European Commission, SPEECH/12/588.
3These are the founding members of the EMU (except Luxembourg) and include Austria (AT),
Belgium (BE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (GE), Greece (GR), Ireland (IR), Italy
(IT), the Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT) and Spain (SP). In the following we will refer to this
group as ‘the EU’, neglecting that the European Union has 27 member countries. We focus on
these 11 countries due to data availability and because we are primarily interested in studying
fiscal integration in the eurozone.
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scheme which redistributes tax revenue across countries.
The main argument in favor of deeper fiscal integration in Europe is that it
might improve macroeconomic stability in the eurozone. However, fiscal integra-
tion also raises various concerns. Firstly, households in high income countries fear
bearing the burden of income redistribution to countries with lower incomes. Sec-
ondly, a common tax and transfer system may have a negative impact on incentives
to work, not just in poorer countries, where people would receive higher transfers,
but also in richer countries where people would face higher tax burdens. Thirdly,
tax avoidance and tax evasion may significantly differ across countries, and conse-
quently a common tax system uniform for all countries may be implemented rather
differently in practice than theory. The analysis in this chapter focuses on the first
two concerns – income redistribution and the effects on incentives to work – yet
abstracts from the latter. This is because our simulation model and underlying
data do not allow us to simulate avoidance and evasion behavior.4
Thus, in our simulation of an EU wide tax and transfer system, we measure
the redistributive effects, taking into account behavioral responses in the form of
labor supply adjustments that can be expected as a reaction to the change in tax
burdens (Bargain et al. (2012)). Moreover, we analyze how the different reforms
affect the ability of the tax and transfer system to act as an automatic stabilizer
in the presence of macroeconomic shocks. Building on Dolls, Fuest and Peichl
(2012), we study simulated shocks on gross income and investigate to which extent
the existence of the European tax and transfer system contributes to stabilizing
disposable income. We are particularly interested in a situation where individual
countries are unable to let national automatic fiscal stabilizers work because they
have lost access to capital markets as is partly the case in the recent economic
crisis.
Our analysis leads to the following results. In the first simulation experiment,
the introduction of a European tax and transfer system that replaces one third of
the national systems would increase the disposable income of a small majority of
households in Europe. At the same time it would lead to significant redistribu-
4Schneider and Enste (2000) compare shadow economies for a large set of countries and do find
significant differences between Northern and Continental European countries on the one hand
and Southern European countries on the other.
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tive effects between countries. The winners include Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy,
and, surprisingly, Germany, with average gains ranging between approximately
eight per cent of disposable income in Greece and one per cent in Germany. The
gains in the Southern European countries come at the cost of a decline in labor
supply. In contrast, Austria, France, Ireland and the Netherlands all lose. Within
countries, households at different income levels are affected differently: in the
Southern European countries, the gains are concentrated among the low income
quintiles whereas in high income countries, the upper income quintiles gain on
average. The middle class loses in some countries. Introducing the EU tax sys-
tem reduces EU-wide income inequality and this also holds for inequality within
countries in most cases.
How does the introduction of the EU tax-benefit system affect automatic fis-
cal stabilizers? Unsurprisingly, the reform will increase automatic stabilizers in
countries where national tax systems have smaller stabilizers than the European
average – this particularly applies to the Southern European countries. In the case
where the EU tax and transfer system replaces one third of the national system, the
EU system would absorb between 10 per cent (Ireland) and 15 per cent (Germany)
of a proportional shock to gross income across countries, assuming that countries
are credit constrained. In the case of the more progressive EU tax system, the
stabilization properties are similar.
Our second simulation experiment involves the introduction of a fiscal equal-
ization system within which the national tax and transfer systems are assumed
to remain in place. The fiscal equalization mechanism redistributes tax revenue
across countries. It does so based on an indicator measuring the taxing capacity
and expenditure needs of each member country. Countries with lower taxing ca-
pacity/higher expenditure needs than the EU average receive transfers and vice
versa. As expected, the system implies transfers flowing from high to low income
countries.
How does this system of fiscal equalization perform when it comes to providing
stabilization in the event of an asymmetric shock? We consider a shock in the form
of a proportional decline in gross income by five per cent which hits Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Portugal, and Spain (the ‘GIIPS’ group). In all other countries, income
remains constant. Interestingly, the fiscal equalization mechanism performs rather
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poorly in terms of stabilization even leading to a destabilizing effect in Greece
and a stabilization effect close to zero in Portugal. The reason is that Greece and
Portugal benefit most from fiscal equalization in the situation before the shock.
The shock reduces their taxing capacity, but also the taxing capacity of the union
as a whole. Therefore, the sum of money available for fiscal equalization declines,
and countries that initially benefited may even lose transfers due to the shock.
This effect becomes even more relevant when simulating a shock comparable to
the 2008-09 economic crisis.
Our findings for both reform scenarios have important policy implications.
First, in order to achieve significant income stabilization effects through the intro-
duction of an EU tax and transfer system, that system would have to be large.
However, this would lead to significant redistributive effects, which will make the
reform difficult to sell politically – despite a small majority of EU citizens gaining
in terms of disposable income. As decisions about more fiscal integration in the EU
require unanimity among member states, such a reform does not seem feasible as
long as there are winner and loser countries. However, even considering less strict
voting mechanisms casts doubt on the political feasibility. Moreover, the EU tax
and transfer system would have adverse effects on labor supply incentives in some
countries. In addition, as mentioned above, one important margin of behavioral
adjustment is not considered within our analysis: tax avoidance and evasion. As
avoidance and evasion behavior differs across countries, this may represent a fur-
ther obstacle to finding support for the introduction of a joint tax-transfer system.
Second, the creation of a fiscal equalization mechanism could give rise to even
larger redistributive effects, depending on the design of the system. But a high
degree of fiscal equalization does not imply that the system always offers a sub-
stantial degree of fiscal stabilization in the presence of asymmetric shocks. The
stabilization effect may vary for different countries, with the variant considered
here showing that even a destabilizing effect is possible.
The setup of the rest of this chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 describes the
related literature as well as the concept and design of a fiscal union in our general
simulation scenarios. Section 5.3 introduces the empirical strategy, i.e. the micro
data and the tax-benefit calculator EUROMOD, the different sub-scenarios, as well
as some descriptive information. The results for the EU tax and transfer system
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are presented in Section 5.4. Our findings for the EU fiscal equalization mechanism
follow in Section 5.5. Section 5.6 further discusses the results and points out some
caveats of the analysis. Section 5.7 concludes.
5.2 Related literature and conceptual framework
5.2.1 Related literature
The related literature about European integration in the area of fiscal policy can
be divided into two broad areas.5 The first strand of literature focuses on the
EU budget, its expenditure and its revenue sources (see e.g. Atkinson (2002b);
Begg (2005)). One important issue is whether the EU should be allowed to levy
taxes. For instance, Sijbren Cnossen argues in favor of “a federal government
with real taxing powers and financial leverage over the Member States to mitigate
adverse effects that might arise from Member State tax policies” (Cnossen (2001),
p. 466f). The EU is currently essentially financed through contributions from the
member states, with most literature about EU taxes focusing on indirect taxes such
as a European VAT or environmental tax. Other proposals include a European
corporate income tax or, more recently, a European financial transactions tax (see
e.g. Le Cacheux (2007); Begg (2011)). The key argument in favor of a European
tax is that it would increase the transparency and improve democratic control
of EU policies. Wigger and Wartha (2003) develop a theoretical model focusing
on the interaction between tax coordination and allocating taxing rights between
the national and EU level. In the presence of tax coordination between member
states, they argue that giving the EU the power to tax is not desirable due to the
coexistence of taxing powers at the national and EU level leading to overtaxation.
The key difference from our study is that none of these contributions considers the
quantitative economic effects of introducing a European tax, while our focus lies
on quantifying redistribution, labor supply and income stabilization effects.
The second strand of related literature studies the implications of EMU for fis-
5There is a third strand of literature that discusses the coordination and harmonization of taxes
and tariffs required to create a common market, surveyed, for instance, in Keen (1993). For the
present chapter, this literature is less relevant because our focus does not lie on tax obstacles
for border crossing economic activity.
CHAPTER 5. EFFECTS OF A EUROPEAN TAX-BENEFIT SYSTEM 114
cal policy integration (see e.g. De Grauwe (2009), for an overview). An important
early discussion of the key issues can be found in the MacDougall (1977) Report,
which had the broad objective to analyze the role of public finances for European
monetary integration. One of the key findings of the report is that “public finance
in existing economic unions plays a major role in cushioning short term and cyclical
fluctuations ... there is no such mechanism in place ... between member countries
and this is an important reason why in present circumstances monetary union is
impracticable” (p. 12). This view has been confirmed by most of the later litera-
ture on the implications of EMU for fiscal policy in Europe. Eichengreen (1990)
compares Europe to the US, emphasizing that the federal income tax in the US
provides significant insurance against asymmetric macroeconomic shocks. Since
regional problems are likely to be greater in Europe than in the US, he argues that
fiscal shock absorbers would have to be significantly larger.
Many economists have similarly warned that the Euro area is too heterogeneous
and thus far from being an optimum currency area, along the lines of Mundell
(1961) and Kenen (1969). Therefore, the EMU will be fragile and vulnerable to
economic shocks unless complemented by more fiscal integration (see e.g. Sachs
and Sala-i Mart´ın (1992); Buiter, Corsetti and Roubini (1993); Me´litz and Vori
(1993); Bayoumi and Masson (1995); Masson (1996); Eichengreen and Wyplosz
(1998); Engwerda, van Arle and Plasmans (2002); Uhlig (2003)). One exception is
Fata´s (1998) who argues that the cross-regional insurance potential of a European
fiscal union would be limited, based on GDP data prior to the introduction of the
EMU. His main objection to other empirical studies is that they fail to distin-
guish properly between intertemporal transfers (essentially self-insurance through
debt financing), on the one hand, and true interregional insurance, on the other
hand. Moreover, several authors have proposed an increase in the European bud-
get in order to establish a horizontal fiscal equalization mechanism (Italiener and
Vanheukelen (1993); Hammond and von Hagen (1998); Dullien and Schwarzer
(2005); Marzinotto, Sapir and Wolff (2011)). Schuknecht, Moutot, Rother and
Stark (2011) emphasize the importance of fiscal discipline, proposing an indepen-
dent fiscal council for the euro area with the aim of improving governance and
compliance.
Some economists, however, challenge the view that monetary union requires
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more fiscal integration. They argue that the “unprecedented divorce between
the main monetary and fiscal authorities” (Goodhart (1998)) offers advantages in
limiting political influence on monetary policy (see e.g. Beetsma and Bovenberg
(1998); Dixit and Lambertini (2003); Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010)). However,
the current debt crisis in the eurozone has renewed doubts about the wisdom of
this approach.
5.2.2 What is a ‘fiscal union’? Simulation scenarios
The term ‘fiscal union’ is used very differently within the debate on reforms of
fiscal institutions in the eurozone. Fuest and Peichl (2012) suggest five possible
elements of a European fiscal union, namely: (i) fiscal rules for the member states
and concerning policy coordination and supervision (like those currently in place in
form of the Stability and Growth Pact and the new Fiscal Compact); (ii) a crisis
resolution mechanism (e.g. the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF),
the European Stabilization Mechanism (ESM) or the ECB Outright Monetary
Transactions); (iii) a joint guarantee for government debt (see e.g. the discussion
about eurobonds or a Debt Redemption Fund); (iv) a fiscal equalization mechanism
for transfers between countries; and (v) an extended EU budget and European
taxes. While much of the political debate so far has focused on short term crisis
management and thus elements (i) - (iii), this chapter concentrates on elements
(iv) and (v), which are probably more relevant in the medium and long term
and for which the political discussion has started at least partly. We start by
considering element (v), the creation of a European tax and transfer system. As
a second simulation experiment, we analyze the creation of a fiscal equalization
system (element (iv)).
EU tax-benefit system. Conceptually, simulating the introduction of a Eu-
ropean tax and transfer system raises four key questions: (1) How is the European
system designed? (2) How does the reform affect overall tax revenue and spend-
ing? (3) What is the share of the European system in overall taxes and transfers?
(4) How is the revenue distributed among the EU level and member states?
First, several approaches are possible for the design of the EU tax-benefit
system. A simple one would be introducing an EU income tax surcharge as a
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percentage of national income tax payments. However, this raises various issues.
Most importantly, a simple surcharge on the national income tax would have very
different effects in different member states since national income tax systems vary
significantly. It would also create incentives for individual member states to rely
more on revenue sources other than income taxes, such as social insurance con-
tributions. They could also replace transfers by tax credits, which reduce income
taxes. Thus, introducing an EU income tax surcharge would require a complete
harmonization of national income tax systems. Therefore, we consider the in-
troduction of a separate EU tax and transfer system which can coexist with the
national systems. The EU tax and transfer system in our simulations includes the
income tax, social insurance contributions and cash transfers. The reason is that
the member states have very different combinations of income taxes and social
insurance contributions. Moreover, cash transfers are integrated into the income
tax system in some member states but not in others. Accordingly, it is helpful
to consider all three elements together as part of an integrated tax and transfer
system (and not just income taxes).
How is the EU tax and transfer system designed in our analysis? Rather than
inventing a new tax system, we derive what can be interpreted as an average of
the national systems.6 Importantly, for the EU as a whole, this system collects the
same amount of revenue as all national systems taken together. As a next step,
we also increase the progressivity of the EU system .
Second, for overall revenue, we focus on reforms that are revenue neutral for
the EU as a whole. This choice appears to be a natural solution for two reasons:
first, it ensures the comparability of different reform scenarios; and second, we
avoid the debate about generally increasing (decreasing) the size of government.
Note that revenue neutrality at the EU level does not imply revenue neutrality
at the national level when introducing the reform. However, as we discuss below,
we have to impose revenue neutrality also at the national level after implementing
the EU system (through redistribution of EU net revenues in order to ensure that
taxes and expenditures not included in our analysis remain unchanged).
Third, a wide range of possibilities could be considered regarding the share of
6How exactly we derive this tax and transfer system will be explained in Section 5.3.2. Note also
that we consider different variants of this system, with different degrees of progressivity.
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the EU system in overall taxes and transfers. In most existing fiscal unions, tax-
benefit systems exist at different levels of government. For instance, two thirds
of overall tax revenue in the US is collected at the federal level, compared with
one third at the state and local level. However, moving two thirds of the national
tax and transfer systems to the EU level might seem unrealistic, even if a major
reform towards fiscal union takes place. Our analysis therefore considers two sub-
scenarios: in the first sub-scenario, the EU system replaces one third of the national
systems; whereas in the second sub-scenario, the national systems are replaced
entirely as a theoretical benchmark.
Fourth, we have to make assumptions about which level of government receives
the revenue generated by the EU system. When national tax and transfer systems
are partly replaced by the EU system, the EU tax and transfer system collects
revenue from all citizens in the participating countries, paying out cash transfers
to all recipients. However, note that the member states lose part of their (net)
revenue as a share of the national tax and transfer system is replaced by the EU
system. We therefore assume that the net revenue now available at the EU level
is redistributed to the member states, with each member state government fully
compensated for the net revenue lost due to the introduction of the EU system. As
a result, national expenditures on public goods and services, other tax sources at
the national level (e.g. indirect taxes) and national budget deficits are unaffected
by the reform. The only elements that change are the revenues and payments from
the taxes and benefits included in the EU system and its redistribution among
households, affecting their tax burdens.
Fiscal equalization. Concerning the introduction of a fiscal equalization
mechanism in Europe, we assume that national tax and transfer systems are un-
affected, but that the mechanism redistributes revenue between member states.
Whether a member state contributes to the fiscal equalization scheme or receives
money depends on its relative taxing capacity and expenditure needs. This is in
line with most existing fiscal equalization schemes, typical of federal states. In
order to determine the taxing capacity and expenditure needs of individual mem-
ber states, we use the EU average tax and transfer system developed in the first
simulation experiment as a measurement tool. The net revenue produced if it
was hypothetically applied to a country can be interpreted as an indicator of tax-
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ing capacity and expenditure needs. Member states where this indicator is below
(above) the EU average will be recipients (contributors) in the fiscal equalization
mechanism.
5.2.3 Conceptual framework
In this section, we provide an intuitive framework for the simulations described
in Section 5.3 (while the concrete empirical model is described in Section 5.3.2).
Gross market income Xi of household i is defined as the sum of all incomes from
market activities:
Xi = Ei +Qi + Ii + Pi +Oi, (5.1)
where Ei is labor, Qi business, Ii capital, Pi property, and Oi other income.
Disposable income Yi is defined as market income minus net government interven-
tion Ti = TAXi + SICi −BENi:
Yi = Xi − Ti = Xi − (TAXi + SICi −BENi), (5.2)
where TAXi are income taxes, SICi employee social insurance contributions,
and BENi cash benefits (i.e. negative taxes). In the following, we refer to the
difference between taxes and social insurance contributions paid and transfers re-
ceived, Ti, as ‘net taxes’.
Example. As an illustrative example, consider a common tax and transfer
system for two countries k = A,B with net tax schedules Tik = fk(Xi, zi) for
individuals i. Xi is gross market income and zi is a vector of other characteris-
tics relevant for taxation, like marriage status, age or occupation. For simplicity,
consider a linear-progressive net tax schedule independent of characteristics zi, i.e.
Tik = tkXi− ak where tk is the marginal tax rate and ak is a refundable tax credit
(equal to a benefit if ak is positive). Then, an easy way to introduce a revenue
neutral common tax system is to use the “average” system
Ti,avg =
tAXi − aA + tBXi − aB
2
=
tA + tB
2
Xi − aA + aB
2
, (5.3)
i.e. applying the average marginal tax rate and average tax credit to each
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country. In reality, tax-benefit systems do not only depend on income but also
on other characteristics. In addition, the observed tax-benefit systems are directly
progressive with increasing marginal tax rates. Therefore, we construct the EU
average tax and transfer system using a regression approach as described in Section
5.3.2, however, with the economic intuition as in our simple example.
Two country model of a fiscal union. As a next step, we consider a
simple model of a fiscal union, again with two countries A and B and where the
tax system Tik = fk(Xi, zi) might be non-linear as usually observed in reality. In
country A there are NA citizens with characteristics (XA, zA), while country B
has NB citizens with characteristics (XB, zB). Under the national tax and transfer
systems, the national government budget constraint of country k is given by
Nk∑
i=1
Tik + T
R
k −Bk = Ek (5.4)
where
∑Nk
i=1 Tik is revenue from net taxes (income taxes and social insurance
contributions net of transfers), TRk is revenue from other taxes like consumption
taxes or corporate income taxes, Bk is the budget deficit and Ek is expenditure
on publicly provided goods and services such as defence, police or schools (includ-
ing interest payments on government debt). Equation 5.4 holds in the reference
scenario in our simulations, i.e. the initial situation without a common tax and
transfer system, referred to as the ‘baseline’ in the following. In this reference
scenario, the aggregate disposable income of the citizens of country k is given by
Nk∑
i=1
Yik =
Nk∑
i=1
(Xik − Tik). (5.5)
Now, both countries define a common tax and transfer system denoted by
TiEU = fEU(Xi, zi) (with subscript EU denoting the ‘fiscal union’, which not nec-
essarily has to be constructed by averaging tax systems to achieve overall revenue
neutrality, as assumed in the previous paragraph). In the following, we denote
by TiEUk the net tax payment arising if the common tax system is applied to cit-
izen i residing in country k. This tax system is constructed such that, for the
union as a whole and given market incomes, it generates the same net tax revenue
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as the national tax systems:
∑NA
i=1 TiA +
∑NB
j=1 TjB =
∑NA
i=1 TiEUA +
∑NB
j=1 TjEUB.
Countries A and B reduce their national net taxes by a factor (1 − α) and fill
the gap by introducing the common tax system. As a result, aggregate dis-
posable income of the citizens of country k in the case of fiscal union becomes∑Nk
i=1 Yik =
∑Nk
i=1(Xik − (1− α)Tik − αTiEUk).
Labor supply adjustment. Thus far, we have assumed that market incomes
remain constant. However, the reform of the tax and transfer system will affect
market incomes due to its influence on labor supply. Denoting the market income
of individual i residing in country k before the reform by X0ik and market income
after the reform by X1ik, the change in aggregate disposable income of citizens of
country k,
∑Nk
i=1[Y
1
ik − Y 0ik] can be expressed as
Nk∑
i=1
[Y 1ik−Y 0ik] =
Nk∑
i=1
[X1ik−X0ik−[(1−α)fk(X1ik, zik)−αfEU(X1ik, zik)−fk(X0ik, zik)]].
(5.6)
Most of our analysis focuses on the change in disposable income as an indicator
of whether countries or individuals benefit or lose from a reform.7 What are
the factors driving changes in disposable income in different countries? Firstly,
countries with a low net tax burden compared to the European average will suffer
a loss in disposable income due to the reform, simply because European taxes
are higher. Secondly, low income countries will tend to experience an increase
in disposable incomes because they benefit from now sharing a tax and transfer
system with richer taxpayers in other countries. Thirdly, changes in disposable
income will occur as taxpayers adjust their labor supply.
Effects on overall tax revenue and national budgets. How does the
reform affect overall tax revenue and the budget constraints of the national gov-
ernments? Consider first the impact on the national budgets. National net tax
revenue changes for two reasons. Firstly, the national tax and transfer system is
7Here, one may object that ‘welfare’ should be used as an indicator because a higher level of labor
supply may increase disposable income but not welfare (taking into account leisure). We use
disposable income because it is a widespread and easily understandable indicator, however we
also report results for welfare changes (Section 5.4.2) and disposable income changes without
labor supply adjustments (appendix). The pattern of the results remains the same for all
indicators.
121 CHAPTER 5. EFFECTS OF A EUROPEAN TAX-BENEFIT SYSTEM
cut by a factor (1 − α). Secondly, the net revenue changes due to labor supply
adjustments. The change in net tax revenue collected by country k due to the
reform is given by
Nk∑
i=1
[T 1ik − T 0ik] =
Nk∑
i=1
[(1− α)fk(X1ik, zik)− fk(X0ik, zik)]. (5.7)
The net revenue collected by the common tax system (for two countries A and
B), denoted by REU , is given by
REU = α[
NA∑
i=1
fEU(X
1
iA, ziA) +
NB∑
j=1
fEU(X
1
jB, zjB)]. (5.8)
REU is equal to the sum of net revenue lost by the national governments by
abolishing a share α of their national tax and transfer systems if market income
remains constant. The reason is that the new tax system was designed to assure
revenue neutrality ex ante, before labor supply adjustments. Without changes in
labor supply, the tax revenue collected at the European level would be exactly
sufficient to compensate the governments of the member states for their net tax
revenue losses (or gains). No further adjustments to balance the government bud-
gets would be required: the variables ‘other’ taxes (TR), budget deficits (B) and
expenditures on public services (E) are the same before and after the reform.
However, given that we take changes in labor supply caused by the reform
into account, revenue neutrality ex post is not guaranteed, i.e. the net revenue
collected by the common tax system may differ from the revenue required to com-
pensate the national governments for changes in their net tax revenue. Assume
that the European budget nevertheless compensates the national governments for
the changes in national net tax revenue caused by the reform, i.e. also after labor
supply adjustments. In this case, the European budget constraint can be written
as
BEU =
NA∑
i=1
[T 1iA − T 0iA] +
NB∑
j=1
[T 1jB − T 0jB]−REU (5.9)
where BEU is the deficit (or, if negative, surplus) in the EU level budget. A
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deficit BEU > 0 arises if the reform leads to behavioral adjustments that reduce
EU-wide net tax revenue. If there is a deficit, the question of how to finance it
arises, likewise how the burden is distributed across countries. Similarly, if there
is a surplus, this money can be distributed to the national governments. As we
show below, this effect is quantitatively very small and can thus be neglected.8
5.3 Empirical strategy
5.3.1 EUROMOD: model and database
In order to analyze the hypothetical introduction of an EU-wide tax-benefit sys-
tem, it is necessary to run counterfactual simulations. We use the microsimulation
technique to calculate taxes, benefits and disposable income for a representative
microdata sample of households. As a basis for our simulations, we use EURO-
MOD, a static tax-benefit model for the EU countries, which was designed for com-
parative analysis, allowing the comparison of countries in a consistent way through
a common framework. EUROMOD was originally created in the late 1990’s, by
a consortium of research institutes with members from each EU15 country, with
detailed knowledge and expertise in their respective national tax-benefit systems.
The tax-benefit systems included in the model (1998 and 2001 for the EU-15, 2003
for a subset of countries and 2005 for four new member states) have been vali-
dated against aggregated administrative statistics as well as national tax-benefit
models (where available), and the robustness has been checked through numerous
applications (see e.g. Bargain (2007)).
The model can simulate most direct taxes (especially income taxes on all
sources of income including tax credits, payroll taxes and social insurance contri-
butions) and benefits (e.g. welfare benefits and social assistance, housing benefits,
family and child benefits) except those based on previous contributions due to
information not usually being available from the cross-sectional survey data used
as input datasets. Information on these instruments is taken directly from the
8In the different scenarios outlined in Section 5.3.2, the deviations from revenue neutrality range
between a surplus of 0.47 Euros to a deficit of 0.68 Euros per week and household. Table 5.13
in the appendix reports these numbers as a percentage of net tax payments.
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original data sources. While simulations are usually carried out for counterfactual
situations, EUROMOD also simulates various taxes and transfers for the baseline
that are not observed in the original data. We use the original data provided by
EUROMOD complemented by those simulated components.
Information on consumption is missing in the data; hence indirect taxes and
taxes on corporate profits are not included in the model, likewise in-kind bene-
fits. Clearly, these elements differ between countries and would affect the results
presented. Table 5.8 in the appendix reports the shares of taxes captured by the
model for the different countries. While these shares vary across countries - be-
tween 44 per cent (Ireland, Portugal) and 66 per cent (Germany), we do not find
a systematic relationship between these shares and our results. In addition, the
table contains information about the deficit and debt ratios for each country. In
our analysis we do not impose a balanced budget rule and thus keep these initial
conditions fixed.
EUROMOD assumes full benefit take-up and tax compliance focusing on the
intended effects of tax-benefit systems, which may influence the results in terms
of the redistributive and stabilizing effects of fiscal reforms when this behavior
substantially varies across countries.
The main stages of the simulations are as follows. First, a representative micro-
data sample of individuals in households (including information on gross income
from various sources as well as demographic characteristics that are relevant to
determine taxes and benefits such as household size, age and number of children,
marital status, employment status, disability status, region of living; see also be-
low) and the respective tax-benefit rules (e.g. for singles or couples) are read into
the model. Subsequently, the model constructs corresponding assessment units (for
instance the individual, family or household) for each tax and benefit instrument,
ascertaining which are eligible for that instrument and determining the amount of
benefit or tax liability for each member of the unit (accounting for the individual
or joint assessment of taxes or benefits for each household member). Finally, after
all taxes and benefits are simulated, disposable income is calculated, including all
monetary incomes except capital gains and irregular incomes.9
9For further information on EUROMOD, see Sutherland (2007). There are also country reports
available with detailed information on the modeling and validation of each tax-benefit system,
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Due to data limitations, our analysis is based on the 2001 tax-benefit systems,
two years after the introduction of the euro for the eurozone countries.10 It is
important to bear this in mind, especially given that many countries have imple-
mented significant reforms in their tax and transfer systems in the last decade. The
input datasets for these countries are summarized in Table 5.9 in the appendix.
The sample sizes vary across countries from 7,000 to more than 25,000 households.
All monetary variables are updated to 2001 using country-specific uprating factors,
as the income reference period varies from 1999 to 2001.11
5.3.2 Tax-benefit scenarios
The simulations of the different reform scenarios for the introduction of an EU tax-
benefit system, as introduced in Section 5.2.2, proceed in four steps. As mentioned,
the estimated EU average system will then also be used later on as a basis to
construct a fiscal equalization mechanism. First, we use EUROMOD to extract
net taxes for each individual (and household) i in representative samples for each
country k. In particular, EUROMOD simulates the country specific net taxes
(income and payroll taxes minus benefits) Tik = fk(Xi, zi) as a function of gross
market income Xi and a vector of non-income factors zi taken from the data.
Second, using those simulated net taxes Tik, we obtain the “average EU tax
function” Ti,EUavg so that it yields the same net revenue at the EU level as the
sum of the national systems. In order to calculate this average system, we adopt
an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression approach and estimate the following
reduced form tax function on the pooled sample:
Tik = ωifEU(Xi, zi) + i (5.10)
Function fEU is specified as a transformation of (Xi, zi) → Tik. i is the OLS
see http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/research/euromod.
10Unfortunately, this is the most recent year for which for all countries data is available. For later
years, Germany and France would be missing. A more recent version for the EU27 countries
is being constructed at the time of writing this chapter.
11There are three exceptions: Austria (1998), Greece (1994) and Italy (1995), which are the most
recent years of data integrated in the version of EUROMOD that we used. Note however, that
also for these two countries the data is uprated/re-weighted by the EUROMOD team based
on aggregate statistics to reflect 2001 distributions.
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residual and ωi the household sample weight. We use a very flexible functional
form with higher order polynomials and interaction terms of income and all rele-
vant characteristics observed in the data for the assignment of taxes and benefits
(such as gross income from various sources, household size, age and number of
children and old people, marital status eligibility for certain benefits and pensions,
homeownership etc.). Table 5.10 in the appendix reports the mean values of the
main variables in each country. Given that weights sum up to the EU population
size this function directly accounts for a population weighted average tax function
at the EU level. Through this approach we are able to predict households’ net tax
payments except for the difference across countries, i.e. the difference of interest.
Therefore, the fit of this tax regression in terms of the R2-measure is close by but
not equal 1. Third, the estimated function is subsequently used to predict net tax
payments for the EU average tax system Ti,EUavg for each household in the sample.
Fourth, we use the predicted EU average tax system to construct four different
scenarios of replacing the national tax-benefit systems with an EU-wide system
(again, yielding the same revenue on the EU level, but not for each country).
In principle, a continuum of scenarios for introducing a fiscal union is possible.
We focus on two different tax systems, either replacing the current national sys-
tems Tk = Tnat with the EU average system TEUavg or with a system TEUavg−p
with increased progressivity compared to TEUavg (again yielding revenue neutral-
ity).12 The latter scenario can be considered a proxy for a switch towards a more
“northern” European system with higher progressivity. Thus, for both systems,
we simulate two weighted combinations of the current national and the EU average
system, resulting in a total of four different scenarios. Here, we simply look at full
integration (the share of the average system being 100%) and partial integration
of 33.3% (which could be seen as a first step for such a major reform). The bench-
mark is the current national system of each country (i.e. the share of the average
system is 0%). Formally, we calculate for each household i of country k
12Precisely, we calculate TEUavg−p by first introducing a proportional surcharge of 7.5% to TEUavg
which will subsequently be fully redistributed across all households in the pooled sample via
a lump sum transfer equal to its mean value across households, i.e. Ti,EUavg−p = Ti,EUavg +
Ti,EUavg ∗0.075−b with b = 1N
∑N
i=1
Ti,EUavg ∗0.075. Results for a surcharge of 5% (10%) are
qualitatively in line with the results presented here, and simply less (more) pronounced with
view to the expected effects when increasing progressivity of the EU average system.
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Ti = αTi,EUavg + (1− α)Tik;α ∈
{
1
3
, 1
}
.13 (5.11)
In sum, the four scenarios are:
i) EUavg - Sc.1: The partial substitution (α = 1/3) of the national tax systems
by the EU average system;
ii) EUavg - Sc.2: the full substitution (α = 1);
iii) EUavg-p - Sc.1: the partial substitution (α = 1/3) of the national tax
systems by the more progressive EU system;
iv) EUavg-p - Sc.2: the full substitution (α = 1) by the more progressive EU
system.
What are the implications of this approach with respect to the resulting “new”
tax-transfer systems of the different countries? By construction and as described
in Section 5.2.3, we assume that all of the revenue collected from TEUavg as well as
TEUavg−p goes to the central EU budget and is immediately redistributed across
countries and households. The structure of national budgets is affected in the
importance of the simulated elements being reduced according to the weighting
factor (1 − α). In the extreme scenario with α = 1 it is decreased to zero and
fully replaced by the EU system. This also implies that revenues and expenditures
that are not captured by our data – such as revenues from indirect or corporate
income taxes or expenditures on defence and other publicly provided goods, as
well as deficit (or surplus) levels – remain constant for each country. The absence
of a balanced budget in the analysis is particularly important, since following the
recent crisis, fiscal consolidation and the size of governments have become central
to the debate on fiscal reforms in Europe.14 In principle, countries with a deficit
(surplus) would need to raise more (less) revenue – or spend less (more) on benefits
– and hence the households in those countries would, ceteris paribus, lose (gain)
in terms of disposable income.
13For α = 1/3, results are qualitatively similar and lie in between the results for α = 1/3 and
α = 1.
14In principle, it would be possible to increase or decrease the revenues from each country,
however this would prompt the question of how this should be achieved (e.g. in a proportional
or progressive manner). This would then have additional distributional and stabilizing effects
which are not in the focus of the present chapter. Hence, we abstract from modeling changes
to the fiscal position of each country in our analysis.
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Figure 5.1: National tax-benefit schemes compared to EU average systems (based on
country means for gross income deciles; weekly thousand 2001 EUR)
CHAPTER 5. EFFECTS OF A EUROPEAN TAX-BENEFIT SYSTEM 128
Figure 5.1 includes plots of the current national tax-benefit functions as well
as the two EU average functions for each country in the sample. It is immediately
evident that the redistributive effects of the different reforms under consideration
will differ between countries. In some cases the EU average function is always below
(above) the national tax-benefit system, in others there are sometimes crossings,
i.e. different parts of the income distributions will be affected differently. A first
visual inspection suggests that low income households in Greece and Portugal as
well as high income households in Belgium, Finland and Germany will gain, while
particularly high income households in France, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain
will pay higher taxes.
5.3.3 Descriptive information
In this section we report descriptive information on the variables used in our
simulation exercise as well as for the estimated tax-benefit scenarios. We report
values of these variables at the overall EU level and for individual countries in
Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Average weekly household income and taxes (2001 EUR)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
EU 1.00 491.0 466.4 83.6 68.9 127.8 24.7 24.7 24.7
AT 0.03 544.3 539.9 104.0 94.1 193.6 4.5 42.2 43.5
BE 0.04 547.2 502.2 146.1 54.0 155.1 45.0 52.7 54.8
FI 0.02 507.9 464.4 159.3 35.0 150.8 43.5 45.5 47.0
FR 0.21 463.7 487.3 42.9 89.1 155.6 -23.6 16.2 15.6
GE 0.32 519.5 457.4 100.3 86.8 124.9 62.1 48.3 50.1
GR 0.03 259.4 254.4 25.4 34.4 54.7 5.1 -59.4 -65.8
IR 0.01 699.8 661.9 116.3 25.8 104.3 37.8 91.4 96.4
IT 0.17 498.4 485.0 104.6 40.6 131.8 13.4 2.3 0.6
NL 0.06 614.6 537.0 75.5 106.2 104.1 77.6 83.3 87.7
PT 0.03 314.2 308.9 35.4 31.6 61.7 5.4 -36.4 -41.0
SP 0.10 430.9 434.4 68.0 26.1 97.6 -3.5 -13.8 -16.7
Note: (1) Population share; (2) gross income; (3) disposable income; (4) gross taxes; (5) gross
SIC; (6) gross benefits; (7) net taxes baseline; (8) net taxes EUavg (9) net taxes EUavg with
increased progressivity. EUavg indicates the estimated EU average tax system. Source: Own
calculations based on EUROMOD.
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Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5.1 show the average weekly gross and disposable in-
comes per household, respectively (population shares in the first column). Columns
4 to 6 include initial gross taxes, employee social insurance contributions (SIC) and
benefits. Column 7 reports initial net taxes, namely income taxes plus SIC paid
minus cash benefits received. Average net taxes in France and Spain are negative,
reflecting that benefits paid by the government exceed revenue from income taxes
and SIC. Thus, these countries use revenue sources that are not included in our
analysis (such as indirect taxes) to finance transfers. This becomes also visible
with Figure 5.2, illustrating how gross income is transformed into disposable in-
come and highlighting considerable differences in structures of tax and transfer
systems across member states. Clearly, income taxes play a relatively small role in
financing transfers in France compared to countries such as Germany or Belgium.
Again considering Table 5.1, the final two columns report net taxes emerging un-
der the EU average system (without and with increased progressivity in columns
8 and 9, respectively). Note that by construction, at the EU level, both systems
lead to the same average net tax revenue as the sum of the national systems in
the baseline.
Finally, Table 5.1 and Figure 5.2 reveal considerable differences across individ-
ual countries with respect to income levels. Average gross income ranges from 700
Euros in Ireland, 43 per cent above the EU average of 491 Euros, to a value of
259 Euros in Greece, just 47 per cent below the EU average. However, one should
note that these income levels are not adjusted for differences in purchasing power,
which would render income differentials somewhat smaller.15 Initial net taxes also
differ considerably, between 78 Euros in the Netherlands and -24 Euros in France.
Net taxes would change significantly under the EU average system. They would
increase to 83 Euros in the Netherlands while the countries with the largest net
transfers would now be Greece (59 Euros) and Portugal (36 Euros). This is plau-
sible because these countries have the lowest gross income levels. These effects are
re-enforced in the EU average system with higher progression, as expected.
15This leads to slight changes when recalculating the results presented in Section 5.4 for PPP-
EUR. The main difference is that Spain now shows a majority of gainer households for the
reforms considered, while the rest of the findings are qualitatively broadly in line with the
results presented here, i.e. for not PPP-adjusted 2001 EUR.
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Figure 5.2: Composition of 100 Euros disposable income by country
5.4 Economic effects of a European tax-transfer
system
In this section we present and discuss the key results of our first simulated pol-
icy scenario, the introduction of an EU-wide tax and transfer system, in four
subsections. Section 5.4.1 focuses on the impact on the distribution of income,
considering the four sub-scenarios described in the previous section (share of the
EU average system of 33.3% and 100%, respectively, with and without increased
progressivity). Behavioral effects are accounted for throughout the analysis in the
form of labor supply adjustments. We summarize these effects in the appendix
(Table 5.13), and also report results without behavioral adjustments (Table 5.11).
In Section 5.4.2, we consider changes in inequality and social welfare, as well as
changes for income quintiles in the different countries. In Section 5.4.3, we in-
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vestigate whether such reforms could be politically feasible. Finally, Section 5.4.4
analyses the potential of the EU average tax system to act as an automatic fiscal
stabilizer in presence of an asymmetric shock, compared to the current national
tax-benefit systems.
5.4.1 Changes in disposable income and labor supply
This section addresses the concern that a common tax-transfer system within the
eurozone would lead to massive redistribution and adverse effects on work incen-
tives. As Bargain et al. (2012), we follow van Soest (1995) or Hoynes (1996),
estimating a structural discrete choice labor supply model for all European coun-
tries under analysis by specifying consumption-leisure preferences in a very flexible
way (without imposing separability between consumption and leisure). The model
is estimated from the microdata and subsequently used to predict the potential
labor supply effects of a switch to the European system. The model is described
in detail in Appendix 5.8.3, where estimated elasticities (Table 5.12) as well as the
labor supply effects (Tables 5.13 for the full population and 5.14 for subgroups)
are also reported.
The labor supply effects are negative in all countries that are found to benefit
from the reform (cp. below), except Germany and Finland. For instance, in Greece
and Spain overall labor supply, measured in full time equivalents, falls by more
than 2 per cent. However, in countries where the most significant income losses
occur, labor supply effects are mostly positive, except for Ireland and Austria. We
find the largest effects for women in couples and single females. This reflects the
relatively high labor supply elasticities for this group as reported in Table 5.12 in
the appendix. For Austria, women in couples are the only group reducing their
labor supply due to the reform, which determines the direction of overall change
in labor supply. This is also true for single men in Germany, which reflects an
income effect for those who initially worked full- or over-time and now benefit from
a reduced progressivity, compared to the German tax-benefit system. For all other
countries, the direction of overall labor supply effects and those for the subgroups
are the same, albeit magnitudes differ substantially. Particularly large negative
responses can be observed for married and single women in Greece and Spain.
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With respect to Greece, we find this to be partly due to income or substitution
effects caused by the substantial increases in transfers while for Spain this reflects
both, income or substitution effects for those experiencing a shift in disposable
income due to more generous benefits and a substitution effect for higher income
earners suffering from increased progressivity.16
How does the introduction of the common tax and transfer system redistribute
income between households in Europe? Table 5.2 summarizes information on
changes in disposable income for all four scenarios. The first column for each
scenario simply reports the fraction of winners in terms of changes in disposable
income – for the EU as a whole as well as each country. While this information
does not account for the size of gains or losses (an increase in disposable income by
one cent already constitutes a winner), the percentage change of mean disposable
income is provided in the second column for each scenario. Even if a country
shows a majority of winners (losers), the average gain (loss) of the winners (losers)
might be lower than the average loss (gain) of the losers (winners). This additional
information is summarized in the final two columns for each scenario.
As can be seen from Table 5.2, a partial introduction (EUavg - Sc.1) of the
EU average system leads to a slight majority of winners at the EU level (while
overall mean disposable income does not change as the average loss is higher than
the average gain). The share of winners slightly increases again when moving to
full integration (EUavg - Sc.2). Note that, by construction, the shares of losers
and winners do not change over these two scenarios in case of fixed labor supply
(Table 5.11 in the appendix).
Therefore, the change in the fraction of winners can only be due to behavioral
responses. At the level of the individual member states, a majority of winners is
derived in 6 of 11 countries, namely Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and, perhaps
surprisingly, Germany, as well as Finland, which is only slightly above the margin
with 51% winners – in Belgium it is 50-50. In Spain and Germany, average gains
in disposable income are rather small (they are zero in Finland). As expected,
they are largest in Greece (more than 8 per cent) and Portugal (4.5 per cent). The
most significant income losses occur in Austria, Ireland and France, where average
disposable incomes decline by between 2 and 3 per cent.
16For an intuitive explanation of the results, see Figure 5.1.
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Table 5.2: Gains and losses in disposable income
A-Sc.1 A-Sc.2 B-Sc.1 B-Sc.2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
EU 55 0.0 20 -24 56 0.5 60 -70 53 0.0 21 -24 54 0.4 64 -71
AT 35 -2.2 17 -28 36 -6.5 51 -85 32 -2.4 19 -28 33 -6.8 55 -83
BE 50 -0.3 19 -22 51 -0.5 58 -67 44 -0.5 19 -20 46 -1.2 57 -59
FI 51 0.0 19 -20 53 0.7 57 -59 49 -0.1 18 -19 51 0.1 55 -57
FR 31 -2.8 14 -26 32 -7.9 43 -79 30 -2.8 17 -27 31 -7.9 51 -80
GE 66 1.0 20 -25 68 3.6 61 -74 64 0.8 19 -23 66 3.0 59 -70
GR 80 8.5 31 -13 80 26.1 94 -38 79 9.3 34 -13 80 28.8 103 -41
IR 28 -2.7 21 -34 29 -7.6 63 -98 28 -3.0 26 -38 29 -8.2 76 -110
IT 63 0.9 20 -22 63 2.8 60 -66 62 1.0 22 -22 62 3.3 66 -67
NL 40 -0.6 17 -17 41 -1.3 50 -47 38 -0.9 20 -21 39 -2.2 59 -59
PT 68 4.5 29 -18 69 13.6 88 -54 67 5.0 33 -19 67 15.0 99 -56
SP 60 0.9 20 -20 61 3.1 61 -61 59 1.1 23 -21 61 4.0 70 -64
Note: (A) EUavg; (B) EUavg-p; (1) Percentage of winners (100 minus (1) is the percentage of
losers); (2) overall %-change in household weekly mean disposable income; mean difference from
zero for (3) positive and (4) negative changes in household weekly mean disposable income (in
2001 EUR). Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD.
An interesting aspect of these results is that one would intuitively assume the
rich countries systematically losing in a common system; however this is only
partly true. It is particularly puzzling that Germany and France are affected very
differently, with France losing significantly despite its average income being lower.
This finding is due to the national tax and transfer systems of these two countries
being very heterogeneous, despite their similarity in other dimensions. Indeed,
inspecting Figure 5.1 shows that the EU tax system involves higher taxes and
lower transfers than the French national system, which implies that the net tax
burden on the French population increases. In addition, French income levels are
close to the EU average, so the country cannot benefit from participating in a
system with higher average incomes. Figure 5.3 (which will be discussed in detail
in the next section) shows that the low income quintiles in France suffer more
than the high income quintiles. However, the situation is different in Germany,
with the national tax and transfer system characterized by higher progressivity
and slightly higher taxes for high income earners. For lower income levels, the
distance between the national and the EU tax and transfer system is rather small.
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As a result, all quintiles in Germany gain from introducing the EU tax.
The general pattern of results in terms of losers and winners at the country
level (as well as the direction in labor supply responses) is robust when switching
to the EU average tax system with an increase in tax progressivity (EUavg-p - Sc.1,
Sc.2). The fractions of winners and losers change slightly, as do the magnitudes
of average gains and losses. However, apart from Belgium and Finland, for which
the difference between fractions of losers and winners is more pronounced now, no
country shows a shift from a majority of losers to a majority of winners, or vice
versa.17
5.4.2 Effects on welfare and inequality
Table 5.3 reveals that the pattern of winner and loser countries does not change
when considering welfare instead of disposable income, using a social welfare func-
tion (SWF) increasing in income and decreasing in inequality. At least in the first
two scenarios, it is again the same group of countries - Germany, Greece, Italy,
Portugal and Spain (but not Finland) - that benefits in terms of the percentage
change in social welfare.18 Inequality also declines in the EU as a whole, likewise
all individual countries except Belgium and Finland. Greece again benefits the
most, showing the largest decrease in the Gini coefficient (having the highest level
of initial inequality).19
When moving to the average system with increased progressivity, the over-
all pattern does not change (minor changes can be observed for Finland and the
17The reason is that Belgium and Finland have very similar tax schemes that are also close to the
EU average system, but slightly more progressive. This difference is basically offset under the
more progressive EU system for the upper income quintiles while especially the lower income
quintiles in Finland gain more (see Figures 5.1 and 5.3).
18Precisely, the SWF applied is defined as W = µ ∗ (1−G) with µ the mean disposable income
of the respective population and G the accordant Gini index (Yitzhaki (1979)). Findings
are confirmed when aggregating the individual utilities from the labor supply model using a
utilitarian SWF, which we did as a check.
19The Gini levels reported here are generally higher compared to official (e.g. OECD) and
EUROMOD statistics for the data year 2001 (EUROMOD (2008)). This is due to the fact
that consistently with the rest of our analysis, calculations for Gini coefficients are based on
household disposable income as the un-weighted sum of individual disposable income across
all household members. Usually, Gini coefficients are calculated on an individual basis using
equivalized household income to account for economies of scale within households. With the
latter approach, we are able to reproduce the results presented in EUROMOD (2008).
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Netherlands). However, as expected, decreases (increases) in inequality and in-
creases (decreases) in welfare become stronger (less strong or even negative) com-
pared to the scenarios without increased progressivity.
Table 5.3: Inequality and social welfare
Baseline A-Sc.1 A-Sc.2 B-Sc.1 B-Sc.2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4) (3) (4)
EU 0.34 315 -3.2 1.7 -6.4 3.8 -4.5 2.4 -10.5 6.0
AT 0.31 382 -0.4 -2.1 3.5 -7.9 -1.8 -1.6 -1.2 -6.3
BE 0.33 347 1.8 -1.2 8.1 -4.4 0.1 -0.6 2.9 -2.6
FI 0.34 315 1.0 -0.5 5.1 -2.0 -0.4 0.1 1.2 -0.6
FR 0.31 343 -2.1 -1.9 -2.4 -6.9 -3.5 -1.2 -6.9 -5.0
GE 0.33 323 -2.8 2.4 -5.5 6.3 -4.4 3.0 -10.3 8.2
GR 0.42 151 -12.8 18.4 -27.4 50.7 -14.3 20.5 -29.8 56.2
IR 0.36 432 -1.3 -2.0 -3.1 -6.0 -2.4 -1.7 -6.2 -5.1
IT 0.37 307 -4.0 3.2 -9.5 8.6 -5.2 4.1 -13.0 11.2
NL 0.31 391 -1.1 -0.1 -2.2 -0.3 -2.4 0.2 -5.9 0.3
PT 0.40 191 -8.0 10.1 -16.3 25.9 -9.4 11.5 -18.7 29.3
SP 0.37 281 -4.5 3.5 -10.9 9.6 -5.7 4.4 -14.1 12.5
Note: (A) EUavg; (B) EUavg-p; (1) Gini coefficient; (2) social welfare; (3) change in Gini in %;
(4) change in social welfare in %. Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD.
Figure 5.3 shows the share of winners across gross income quintiles for the
different scenarios by countries. The left (right) panel displays the 6 (5) countries
that on average suffer (benefit) from the EU tax reforms (with switching countries
Belgium and Finland on the left hand side). Consider first the countries that
benefit on average. In the four Southern European countries, low income quintiles
benefit most due to transfers in the EU system being more generous than those in
the national systems. In Italy and Spain high income quintiles lose most. However,
the pattern in Germany is different, with the share of winners slightly higher in
the middle to upper quintiles than in the lower ones. This pattern can also be
observed for Austria, Belgium and Finland, whereas the losses mostly fall on the
high income quintiles in France, Ireland and the Netherlands (cf. also Figure 5.1).
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Figure 5.3: Share of winners in country gross income quintiles by scenario
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5.4.3 Political feasibility
The introduction of a common tax and transfer system in Europe would be a major
reform, particularly in terms of generating political support for such a project.
While decisions about more fiscal integration would require unanimity among the
member states under current voting rules, this section analyzes the implications
considering different voting mechanisms for the Council of the European Union
that might be applied to fiscal issues in the future. In order to do so, we make the
following assumptions. Firstly, if a majority of taxpayers in a country benefits from
a reform in terms of changes in disposable income, we assume that the government
of this country will support the reform in terms of voting at the European level,
independent of the extent of gains and losses. Note, that we also do not take
countries’ benefits or losses into account in terms of automatic fiscal stabilization,
which are discussed in the next subsection. Even if automatic stabilization is of key
importance with respect to the benefits of deeper fiscal integration, we argue that
significant changes in disposable income will already largely determine countries
willingness whether to vote in favor of the reform or not. Therefore, and with view
to the substantial redistributive effects of the reform found in the previous section,
we base our analysis in this section on changes in disposable income only. Secondly,
we assume that decisions at the European level will require qualified majorities.
Currently, decisions of the Council of the European Union regarding tax matters
would usually require unanimity, which implies that none of the reforms considered
here will be implemented unless side payments are possible. The reason is that
by construction of the average system, there will be always some countries that
benefit from the reform and others that lose, independent of the specific scenario.
However, as political integration in Europe proceeds, it may well be that the role
of decisions by qualified majority increases. Moreover, deeper fiscal integration
might also be possible within the framework of ‘enhanced cooperation’, where a
minimum of nine EU member states is allowed to establish advanced cooperation
in a certain area without the other members being involved. This is currently in
preparation for a European financial transaction tax.20
20See ‘Statement by Commissioner Sˇemeta on an EU Financial Transactions Tax – ECOFIN
Council’, 9 October 2012, European Commission, MEMO/12/762.
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We consider two voting rules for Council decisions that can currently be found
in the EU treaties. The first, referred to as the ‘double majority rule’, was estab-
lished with the Lisbon Treaty and is supposed to be enacted from 2014 onwards.
This rule states that a qualified majority decision requires support of at least 55
per cent of the member states and a positive vote of member states representing
at least 65 per cent of the population. The second rule is stipulated in the Treaty
of Nice and is currently in force, containing three elements. First, it requires a
simple majority of the member states. Second, this rule uses weighted votes given
to countries to reflect population differences. Here, the required quorum is 74 per
cent. In addition, the support of member states representing at least 62 per cent
of the population might be required (on the demand of one member state). Table
5.4 illustrates this for two groups of countries, the group of 11 countries as before
and a smaller ‘core union’ consisting of 6 countries.21
We focus on scenarios EUavg – Sc.1 and EUavg-p – Sc.1. In sum, we find
that it would be difficult to generate the required political support for the two
reforms under consideration. In the case of the first scenario, we observe a narrow
majority of countries in favor of the reform, i.e. 6 versus 5 votes, a simple majority
representing 67 per cent of the population. Thus, the reform would pass under the
double majority rule of the Treaty of Lisbon, yet be rejected with the Treaty of
Nice, failing to achieve the required majority under weighted voting (116 versus
139 votes). Surprisingly, the reform would fail for the smaller ‘core union’ under
both rules, reflecting the tax structure and political weight of France. The same
holds true for both groups of countries for the second scenario with increased
progressivity.
These results suggest that a move towards a common tax and transfer system
would be unlikely to happen even if qualified majority rules were applied to reforms
as fundamental as the introduction of a common tax and transfer system. Clearly,
from a political economy perspective, the resistance of those who would lose from
moving to a fiscal union can only be overcome if something can be offered to
21Here, we re-estimate the EU average system for the proposed ‘core union’. Detailed results
are available in an earlier version of this chapter (CBT Working Paper WP12/22). A general
pattern that will be consistent across different combinations of countries is that, as long as the
reform is revenue neutral by construction of an average system, there will always be winner
and loser countries.
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Table 5.4: Political feasibility of reform scenarios using different voting rules
EUavg - Sc. 1 EUavg-p - Sc. 1
Eurozone Core union Eurozone Core union
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
AT - 0.03 10 - 0.04 10 - 0.03 10 - 0.04 10
BE - 0.04 12 + 0.05 12 - 0.04 12 + 0.05 12
FI + 0.02 7 + 0.03 7 - 0.02 7 + 0.03 7
FR - 0.21 29 - 0.31 29 - 0.32 29 - 0.31 29
GE + 0.32 29 + 0.48 29 + 0.32 29 + 0.48 29
GR + 0.03 12 . . . + 0.03 12 . . .
IR - 0.01 7 . . . - 0.01 7 . . .
IT + 0.17 29 . . . + 0.17 29 . . .
NL - 0.06 13 - 0.09 13 - 0.06 13 - 0.09 13
PT + 0.03 12 . . . + 0.03 12 . . .
SP + 0.10 27 . . . + 0.10 27 . . .
SUM 11 1.00 187 6 1.00 100 11 1.00 187 6 1.00 100
Lisbon 6 0.65 . 4 0.65 . 6 0.65 . 4 0.65 .
Nice 6 0.62 139 4 0.62 74 6 0.62 139 4 0.62 74
SUM+ 6 0.67 116 3 0.56 48 5 0.65 109 3 0.56 48
Note: (1) Yes (+) or no (-) vote as defined in the text; (2) percentage of the population; (3)
weighted votes. SUM: total sum across countries; SUM+: sum across countries voting ’yes’ in
(1). Lisbon/Nice indicate the following regulations: A qualified majority according to the Treaty
of Nice requires a simple majority of member states plus 74 per cent of the weighted votes plus
62 per cent of the population (on demand of one member country); the Treaty of Lisbon requires
55 per cent of the member states plus 65 per cent of the population being represented. Source:
Own calculations based on EUROMOD.
compensate the losers. To make this possible, the reform would either have to
be linked to other issues, or it would have to generate significant benefits beyond
those considered so far in the analysis. One possible source of benefits would be an
improvement in income stability through automatic fiscal stabilizers. This issue
will be analyzed in the next section.
5.4.4 Automatic fiscal stabilization
A key expected benefit from a common European tax-transfer system is an increase
in macroeconomic stability, both of the individual countries and the eurozone as
a whole. Automatic fiscal stabilization is associated with the ability of taxes and
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transfers to automatically stabilize disposable income and consequently consump-
tion in the face of economic shocks. This relies on a simple mechanism: in the
presence of a given negative shock to gross income, taxes decline and transfers in-
crease, with the decline in disposable income being smaller than the shock to gross
income. Several components of government budgets are affected by the macroeco-
nomic situation in ways that operate to smooth the business cycle, with progressive
income taxes and unemployment benefits being the most prominent example. Au-
tomatic stabilization might not only have effects on disposable income but also on
GDP itself. If fewer taxes are collected and more transfers are paid in a recession,
this should support private incomes and dampen adverse movements in aggregate
demand.
Naturally, cushioning shocks through taxes and transfers comes at the cost of
an increase in the government budget deficit. The usual assumption is for this gap
to be closed through debt financing. However, in the current eurozone debt crisis,
some countries have lost access to private capital markets and thus need outside
help to close this gap. We will return to this issue further below.
The extent to which automatic stabilizers mitigate the impact of income shocks
on household demand essentially depends on the tax and transfer system, deter-
mining the way in which a given shock to gross income translates into a change
in disposable income. For instance, in the presence of a proportional income tax
with a tax rate of 40%, a shock on gross income of 100 Euros leads to a decline in
disposable income of 60 Euros. In this case, the tax absorbs 40% of the shock to
gross income. In turn, a progressive tax would have a stronger stabilizing effect
(van den Noord (2000); Girouard and Andre´ (2005)).
A common measure for estimating automatic stabilization is the “normalized
tax change” used by Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) which can be interpreted as
“the tax system’s built-in flexibility” (Pechman, 1973, 1987). Based on this idea,
Dolls et al. (2012) define the “income stabilization coefficient”, τ , that shows how
changes in market income X (defined as the sum of all incomes from market ac-
tivities such as (self)-employment, business and property income) translate into
changes in disposable income Y (market income minus taxes plus benefits) through
changes in net tax payments T . They extend the concept of normalized tax change
to include other taxes as well as SIC and transfers such as e.g. unemployment ben-
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efits. We follow their approach, taking into account personal income taxes (at all
government levels), SIC as well as payroll taxes and transfers to private households,
such as unemployment benefits. τ is computed using arithmetic changes in total
disposable income (
∑
i
∆Yi) and market income (
∑
i
∆Xi) based on household
micro level information:
τ = 1−
∑
i
∆Yi∑
i
∆Xi
=
∑
i
(∆Xi −∆Yi)∑
i
∆Xi
. (5.12)
In order to compute this income stabilization coefficient, we simulate country-
specific shocks to gross income of 5% for all households. Note that automatic
stabilization is a static concept and does not imply any (macro- or microeconomic)
feedback mechanism. Importantly, we therefore do not incorporate potential labor
supply reactions to the simulated shock at this stage of the analysis. Results
are presented in Table 5.5, with the levels and differences across countries in the
baseline scenario in line with the calculations in Dolls et al. (2012).
Table 5.5: Income stabilization coefficients (for 5% gross income shock)
EUavg EUavg-p
Baseline (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
EU 0.40 0.40 0.13 0.40 0.41 0.15 0.45
AT 0.43 0.43 0.14 0.42 0.44 0.15 0.45
BE 0.51 0.45 0.11 0.34 0.46 0.12 0.37
FI 0.42 0.42 0.14 0.42 0.44 0.16 0.47
FR 0.36 0.38 0.14 0.41 0.39 0.15 0.45
GE 0.49 0.47 0.15 0.44 0.48 0.16 0.48
GR 0.29 0.30 0.11 0.34 0.31 0.12 0.36
IR 0.38 0.36 0.10 0.31 0.38 0.13 0.38
IT 0.34 0.35 0.12 0.37 0.38 0.15 0.46
NL 0.40 0.41 0.14 0.43 0.42 0.15 0.46
PT 0.30 0.31 0.11 0.32 0.31 0.11 0.34
SP 0.30 0.32 0.12 0.36 0.33 0.13 0.39
Note: (1) Scenario 1 (partial integration); (2) scenario 1 with credit constraints for countries;
(3) scenario 2 (full integration). Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD.
How does an EU tax-benefit system cushion asymmetric shocks in individ-
ual countries? In case of partially introducing the EU tax-benefit system, most
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countries gain in terms of automatic stabilization – except Belgium and Germany,
with the highest automatic stabilizers in their national tax and transfer systems
(column “Baseline”), as well as Ireland (column 1). Furthermore, these patterns
are re-enforced in the case of a fully integrated system (column 3). Here, the
cushioning effect is evidently independent of a single country’s access to credit
markets. However, in the case of partial integration, the stabilization coefficient is
a combination of the national and European system. Hence, assuming free access
to the credit market or not plays a role. That is, if individual countries are credit
constrained, they cannot let the national stabilizers work and would have to ad-
just taxes or expenditures to keep the budget balanced. In this case, automatic
stabilization can only come from the European tax and transfer system with the
assumption that the EU budget deficit can be financed by issuing debt. Hence,
we re-compute the stabilization coefficient for this case (column 2), with values
for the income stabilization coefficients ranging between 0.10 for Ireland and 0.15
for Germany, representing a share of approximately one third of the stabilization
provided by the fully integrated EU average system.
In the case of the more progressive EU system, the qualitative results are rather
similar, however with the Southern European countries having even higher, and
Belgium and Germany even lower stabilizers (column 1). This shows that a more
progressive EU tax system does not necessarily increase automatic stabilizers for
all countries. In the case of national credit constraints (column 2), the automatic
stabilizers slightly increase for all countries, absorbing an average of approximately
15 per cent of an income shock.
In sum, the results illustrate that even a quite radical reform such as replacing
one third of the national tax and transfer systems by a supranational system
would only have moderate fiscal stabilization effects in the event of country specific
shocks.
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5.5 Economic effects of a European fiscal equal-
ization mechanism
In this section, we analyze a system of fiscal equalization based on differences
in taxing capacity across countries, calculating transfers between countries that
would be generated by this mechanism and considering two variants of a negative
macroeconomic shock. We first calculate the extent to which a fiscal equalization
mechanism would provide insurance against a shock specific to a subset of countries
(the ‘GIIPS’ group), and second, a shock comparable to the 2008-09 recession.
More precisely, the simulation experiment is set up as follows. The fiscal equal-
ization system we consider leaves the national tax and transfer systems in place
yet redistributes tax revenue across countries. This redistribution is based on
the hypothetical ability of a country to generate tax revenue and its expenditure
needs, which we refer to in the following as its (net) taxing capacity. Basing fis-
cal equalization on indicators of tax revenue and expenditure needs is a common
approach in existing federations (see e.g. Boadway (2004); Bu¨ttner (2006)). We
define the taxing capacity of a country as the net tax revenue the country would
raise from its households if fully applying the EU average tax and transfer system
used in Section 5.4 (compare Table 5.1, column 8). This taxing capacity can be
interpreted as an indicator of the amount of net tax revenue raised by a country
if tax rates and transfers were set as in other countries, and serves as the basis for
equalization payments: countries above (below) the average taxable capacity will
pay (receive) transfers to (from) the equalization mechanism.
This setup can be interpreted as a simple version of a European ‘transfer union’.
Note that the mechanism considered here is quite ambitious, with the fiscal equal-
ization system fully compensating for differences in taxing capacity. In practice,
one might expect a more moderate system that would only compensate a share
of the differences in taxing capacity. Either way, it is clear that in such a sys-
tem, a country as a whole either gains or loses – depending on whether it is a net
contributor or a net recipient of fiscal equalization payments.
However, how these payments affect the distribution of taxes and transfers
within a country is less straightforward. For simplicity we assume that the equal-
ization payments are shared equally among households, i.e. households receive a
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(positive or negative) lump-sum transfer. Note that his assumption is not cru-
cial for the stabilization effects we focus on. The question here is only whether a
country as a whole receives more or less money from the equalization system after
being hit by a shock. If it receives more, it can let its own automatic stabilizers
work.22
Table 5.6 shows the average household net tax payments by country in the
baseline as well as for the EU average system, which serves as our measure of
taxing capacity. The resulting fiscal equalization payments are reported in column
3 (a positive (negative) value indicates a net contributing (receiving) country),
while column 4 includes the new distribution of net taxes.
Table 5.6: 5% asymmetric shock to ’GIIPS’ countries with fiscal equalization mechanism
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
EU 24.7 24.7 0.0 24.7 2 22.1 22.1 0.0 22.1 7
AT 4.5 42.2 17.5 22.0 0 4.5 42.2 20.1 24.6 0
BE 45.0 52.7 28.0 73.0 0 45.0 52.7 30.6 75.6 0
FI 43.5 45.5 20.8 64.3 0 43.5 45.5 23.3 66.9 0
FR -23.6 16.2 -8.5 -32.1 0 -23.6 16.2 -5.9 -29.5 0
GE 62.1 48.3 23.6 85.7 0 62.1 48.3 26.2 88.3 0
GR 5.1 -59.4 -84.1 -79.1 5 1.1 -61.9 -84.0 -82.9 -1
IR 37.8 91.4 66.7 104.5 5 23.3 77.4 55.3 78.6 33
IT 13.4 2.3 -22.4 -9.0 5 4.5 -7.0 -29.1 -24.6 27
NL 77.6 83.3 58.6 136.2 0 77.6 83.3 61.2 138.8 0
PT 5.4 -36.4 -61.1 -55.7 5 0.4 -40.2 -62.3 -61.8 8
SP -3.5 -13.8 -38.5 -42.0 5 -9.8 -21.1 -43.2 -53.1 22
Note: Monetary values are in weekly 2001 EUR. (1) Net taxes baseline; (2) net taxes EUavg; (3)
fiscal equalization (FE); (4) FE taxes; (5) gross income shock in %; (6) net taxes national system
after shock; (7) net taxes EUavg after shock; (8) FE after shock; (9) FE taxes after shock; (10)
change in automatic stabilization in %. (3) = (2)-24.7; (4) = (1)+(3); (8) = (7)-22.1; (9) =
(6)+(8). Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD.
Consider first the direct cross country distributional effect of the fiscal equal-
ization system. As expected, the high income countries are net contributors to the
system with average contributions per household and week ranging from 66.7 Eu-
22Note also, that we do not consider any behavioral effects for the simulation of this second
reform in our study, be it by households (e.g. labor supply) or governments (e.g. adjustment
of tax-benefit structure and composition of revenues).
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ros in the case of Ireland to 17.5 Euros in Austria. These are huge contributions,
equivalent to 10.0 per cent and 3.2 per cent of disposable income, respectively
(compare this to column (2) of Table 5.2 where for the first scenario of the com-
mon tax-benefit system (negative) changes in disposable income for contributing
countries range from 0.3 to 2.8 per cent of disposable income). Clearly, these un-
realistically large contributions reflect that the degree of fiscal equalization is 100
per cent. Accordingly, the countries with below average taxing capacity receive
huge transfers including Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy and France. In Greece, the
fiscal equalization payment is equal to 84 Euros, an implausible 33 per cent of
average disposable income. France receives the lowest payment per household, at
just 8.5 Euros, which equals 1.7 per cent of average disposable income.
What are the implications of this system for automatic stabilizers? Consider
an asymmetric shock in the form of a decline in gross incomes by 5% hitting the
periphery of the eurozone, i.e. the ‘GIIPS’ countries, which corresponds to a 2%
shock at the aggregate EU level (column 5). The shock leads to a reduction in
the net tax payments collected in the affected countries (column 6), as well as a
reduction in their taxing capacity (column 7). Consequently, the fiscal equaliza-
tion payments have to be adjusted for all countries (column 8), resulting in a new
distribution of net taxes (column 9). Finally, column 10 reports the automatic
stabilization effect of the fiscal equalization scheme in the affected countries mea-
suring the change in fiscal equalization payments as a percentage of the change
in income caused by the shock: negative values imply that payments received
from the fiscal equalization scheme decline in response to the negative shock or in-
creased contributions made to the scheme by a country, with a destabilizing effect
occurring.
That the fiscal equalization system may have a destabilizing, rather than stabi-
lizing, impact on some of the countries hit by the shock is the most striking result.
In our specification this applies to Greece, the country most favored by the initial
fiscal equalization system. Despite its fiscal capacity declining as a consequence
of the shock, the payment received from the fiscal equalization system slightly
declines. The payment received by Portugal is almost unchanged. Only the coun-
tries closer to average taxing capacity experience a stabilizing effect in the form of
higher fiscal equalization payments. The reason is that the shock has two effects.
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Firstly, the taxing capacity of the countries affected by the shock declines, which
with all other things being equal, increases equalization payments. Secondly, since
other countries are also affected by the shock, the overall taxing capacity within
the union declines as well. The combination of these two effects may result in
individual countries hit by the shock receiving lower payments than before, and
thus the fiscal equalization scheme having a destabilizing, rather than stabilizing,
effect for them.
This issue becomes even more relevant when considering an extreme shock sce-
nario, such as the recent economic crisis. To illustrate this, we take the observed
reduction in GDP for all 11 countries under analysis from 2008 to 2009 (4 per cent
on average) in order to adjust gross incomes. All countries experienced a substan-
tial reduction in GDP during that period, ranging from 3 to 8 per cent. In such a
situation, the average taxing capacity substantially declines at the EU level, from
24.7 Euros per household before to 15 Euros per household after the shock and
fiscal equalization payments substantially decrease for Greece, France, Spain and
Portugal. Consequently, all of these countries experience a significant destabilizing
effect (with the exception of Italy, where fiscal equalization payments once again
increase). This effect is most striking for Greece, where payments received from
the scheme fall by more than 100 per cent of the income shock. However, one
of the donor countries now also faces a destabilizing effect. While Ireland, as the
only donor country hit by a shock in the former scenario, yet had to contribute less
to the equalization system and thus experienced a stabilizing effect, Belgium has
to contribute more to the system after the crisis in the current scenario. Clearly,
the effects reported seem unrealistically large (and by construction, are more pro-
nounced for recipient countries facing a smaller reduction in GDP). Again, this is
due to the assumption that the mechanism fully equalizes taxing capacities across
countries. Furthermore, in the 2008-09 crisis scenario all countries experience a
large shock to gross income at the same time, which necessarily undermines the
overall redistributive capacity of the mechanism. Nevertheless, such a scenario
emphasizes the finding from the previous analysis, namely that once introduced,
a fiscal equalization mechanism can have a destabilizing effect.
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Table 5.7: 2008-09 shock to all countries with fiscal equalization mechanism
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
EU 24.7 24.7 0.0 24.7 4 15.0 15.0 0.0 15.0 -8
AT 4.5 42.2 17.5 22.0 4 -5.0 32.0 17.0 12.0 2
BE 45.0 52.7 28.0 73.0 3 36.0 46.1 31.0 67.0 -18
FI 43.5 45.5 20.8 64.3 8 24.4 26.3 11.2 35.7 23
FR -23.6 16.2 -8.5 -32.1 3 -28.1 10.2 -4.8 -33.0 -26
GE 62.1 48.3 23.6 85.7 5 47.8 35.5 20.5 68.3 12
GR 5.1 -59.4 -84.1 -79.1 3 2.7 -60.9 -76.0 -73.2 -105
IR 37.8 91.4 66.7 104.5 7 17.6 71.8 56.7 74.3 20
IT 13.4 2.3 -22.4 -9.0 6 2.7 -8.9 -23.9 -21.2 5
NL 77.6 83.3 58.6 136.2 4 65.9 70.8 55.8 121.7 11
PT 5.4 -36.4 -61.1 -55.7 3 2.4 -38.6 -53.7 -51.3 -78
SP -3.5 -13.8 -38.5 -42.0 4 -8.6 -19.7 -34.7 -43.3 -22
Note: See Table 5.6. (8) = (7)-15.0. Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD. Changes
in GDP (column 5) from OECD.
5.6 Discussion
Our results should be interpreted in the light of the limitations of our analysis, and
also the simplifying assumptions made. Most importantly, we should emphasize
that our simulations focus on particular scenarios, and despite having considered
different variants of the reforms to explore robustness, the results depend on the
specific properties of the reform scenarios under consideration. This also applies to
the variants of macroeconomic shocks analyzed. We have focused on proportional
income shocks (within a country) that affect all households equally. As shown
in Dolls et al. (2012), the impact of automatic fiscal stabilizers may be rather
different for shocks which affect households asymmetrically. We have also neglected
the impact of reforms on indirect taxes and government expenditure other than
monetary transfers.
Note also that our analysis abstracts from a number of behavioral effects, apart
from potential labor supply reactions that were taken into account for the first
general reform scenario, i.e. the common tax-transfer system. In particular, we
do not account for tax evasion and avoidance or income shifting. If one assumes
that tax evasion is higher in countries with lower incomes, our simulations would
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underscore the degree of redistribution from high to low income countries caused by
the introduction of a common tax system. In addition, we have abstracted from
potential effects of fiscal integration on cross country migration. For instance,
more generous transfers to households in poor countries or countries affected by
macroeconomic shocks could prevent their migration to other countries if they are
unemployed. Among other things, this would make adjustments to asymmetric
shocks more difficult.
These caveats point to various opportunities for future research. Firstly, it
would be interesting to extend the analysis to all current 17 eurozone members,
or even the EU27. However, as long as the reform will be revenue neutral at
the EU level, there will generally always be winner and loser countries. Which
countries win and lose will depend, among other things, on where the households
are situated in the European income distribution and how the (progressivity of
the) EU system is designed. Secondly, it would be interesting to study particular
aspects of a common tax and transfer system, such as a common unemployment
insurance system, as recently suggested by EU Commissioner Andor. Thirdly,
our finding that a fiscal stabilization mechanism may have destabilizing effects in
the event of an asymmetric shock suggests that other designs for a ‘fiscal capacity’
that provide such insurance are needed and should be studied. One possible design
would be a system where grants are only provided to countries if they are actually
hit by a shock, i.e. such a system would only grant transfers to countries in times
of crisis. Fourthly, it would be desirable to quantify the potential welfare benefits
of improved insurance and stabilization through fiscal integration compared to its
redistributive effects. This would require the introduction of some notion of risk
aversion into the analysis, which raises a number of interesting challenges. Finally,
our analysis has taken the policies of the member states as given. However, one
can expect the member states to adjust their fiscal policies as a reaction to fiscal
integration, which is important to take into account from a political economy
perspective on deeper integration in Europe.
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5.7 Conclusion
The current debt crisis in the eurozone has brought the idea of deeper fiscal in-
tegration to the top of the European policy agenda. In this chapter, we have
analyzed the economic effects of two main options for fiscal integration: i) the
introduction of an EU-wide integrated tax and transfer system that partly or fully
replaces the existing national systems; and ii) the introduction of a fiscal equal-
ization mechanism.
With respect to redistributive concerns, our analysis shows that introducing
an EU tax and transfer system would increase the disposable income of a small
majority of households in Europe and would simultaneously lead to significant re-
distribution between countries. Choosing a more progressive variant of the EU tax
system would change the magnitudes of gains and losses, yet the patterns would
be similar. Given that only a small majority of 6 out of the 11 countries under
analysis would gain from the reform in terms of income redistribution, generat-
ing political support for such a reform may be difficult with view to current or
prospective voting rules of the Council of the European Union.
A key motivation of introducing an EU tax-benefit system could be an increase
in automatic fiscal stabilization in the different member countries. In the reform
scenario where our EU tax and transfer system replaces one third of the national
systems, we find that the EU system would absorb between 10 per cent (Ireland)
and 15 per cent (Germany) of a shock to gross income. Given that replacing one
third of the existing national tax and transfer systems by an EU system seems
rather ambitious, these stabilization effects are not very large.23
Regarding the system of fiscal equalization, our findings are even less appeal-
ing. We consider a system of strong fiscal equalization, where differences between
the taxing capacity of individual countries and average EU taxing capacity are
fully neutralized. Unsurprisingly, this system leads to a massive transfer of tax
revenue from high to low income countries. These redistributive effects are much
larger than those of introducing the common tax and transfer system. However,
the achievements are disappointing in terms of income stabilization in the presence
23In the US the income stabilization through the federal budget is approximately 25 per cent,
see Dolls et al. (2012) and the literature cited there.
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of asymmetric shocks with the fiscal equalization mechanism even having a desta-
bilizing effect for some countries. An important policy implication of this analysis
is the necessity of distinguishing between the redistributive effects of fiscal integra-
tion and its stabilization effects in the presence of an asymmetric macroeconomic
shock.
To summarize, our analysis highlights that further fiscal integration could in-
deed improve fiscal stabilizers in the eurozone and reduce the vulnerability of
individual member states to income shocks somewhat. But in the scenarios we
consider, a limited improvement in fiscal stabilizers goes along with considerable
income redistribution across countries. Thus, it seems unlikely that such reforms
will find political support, suggesting that fiscal institutions of existing federations,
which typically combine redistributive and stabilizing effects, may not be the way
forward for Europe. Instead, it may be necessary to explore ways of improving
macroeconomic stability ideally without redistributing income ex ante. Rather
than copying fiscal institutions of existing federations, Europe seems to need new
concepts to make deeper fiscal integration politically feasible.
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5.8 Appendix
5.8.1 Descriptive data
Table 5.8: Main taxes captured by EUROMOD as % of total taxation in 2001
Taxes captured Taxes not captured
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
AT 23.9 32.9 56.8 33.8 6.9 40.7 0.0 66.8
BE 30.1 31.4 61.5 29.2 7.2 36.4 0.4 106.5
FI 31.5 26.9 58.4 30.0 9.4 39.4 5.1 42.5
FR 18.8 36.8 55.6 35.1 7.0 42.1 -1.5 56.9
GE 23.2 42.8 66.0 28.2 4.3 32.5 -3.1 59.1
GR 13.6 31.9 45.5 41.5 10.1 51.6 -4.5 103.7
IR 29.3 15.2 44.5 41.9 12.1 54.0 0.9 35.1
IT 26.7 28.6 55.3 35.5 7.8 43.3 -3.1 108.2
NL 16.1 35.7 51.8 33.7 11.0 44.7 -0.2 50.7
PT 17.4 26.7 44.1 43.6 10.6 54.2 -4.8 53.5
SP 20.2 36.1 56.3 34.4 8.5 42.9 -0.5 55.6
Note: (1) Income tax; (2) SIC; (3) = (1)+(2); (4) VAT; (5) corporate taxes; (6) = (4)+(5); (7)
deficit as % of GDP; (8) debt as % of GDP. Taxes do not add up to 100% as specific taxes (e.g.
environmental taxes, other indirect taxes) are not captured in the table. Source: OECD. Deficit
and debt shares from Eurostat.
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Table 5.9: Data sources used by EUROMOD
Dataset Years Observations
(1) (2) (3)
AT European Community Household Panel 1999 1998 2001 7,386
BE Panel Survey on Belgian Households 2002 2001 2001 7,335
FI Income Distribution Survey 2001 2001 2001 25,010
FR Household Budget Survey 2000 2000 2001 25,803
GE German Socio-Economic Panel 2001 2000 2001 16,874
GR Household Budget Survey 1995 1994 2001 15,062
IR Living in Ireland Survey 2000 2000 2001 11,436
IT Survey of Households Income and Wealth 1996 1995 2001 23,924
NL Sociaal-Economisch Panelonderzoek 2000 1999 2001 10,344
PT European Community Household Panel 2001 2000 2001 13,092
SP European Community Household Panel 2000 1999 2001 14,787
Note: (1) Data collection; (2) incomes; (3) simulated policy. Source: EUROMOD.
Table 5.10: Cross-country heterogeneity in main characteristics for tax functions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
EU 2.5 0.5 0.4 50.5 23.8 30.4 16.1 1.8 5.2
AT 2.5 0.5 0.4 49.8 23.1 8.5 17.8 1.4 5.7
BE 2.4 0.6 0.4 52.3 25.7 11.7 16.8 2.6 6.0
FI 2.2 0.5 0.3 48.5 22.5 20.6 17.1 4.9 6.0
FR 2.4 0.6 0.4 50.0 25.1 33.6 15.0 1.9 2.9
GE 2.1 0.4 0.3 51.0 24.3 39.9 16.9 2.7 4.2
GR 2.8 0.6 0.5 52.3 25.1 7.8 16.0 1.0 10.4
IR 3.0 0.8 0.3 46.2 19.8 14.1 11.4 3.4 6.2
IT 2.9 0.5 0.4 51.2 23.9 32.0 17.9 0.4 6.9
NL 2.3 0.5 0.3 48.8 27.3 25.1 14.1 0.9 2.7
PT 3.2 0.7 0.5 48.4 22.1 4.5 14.0 1.1 8.2
SP 3.2 0.6 0.5 50.0 19.7 30.8 14.3 1.7 6.3
Note: (1) Average number of household members; (2) average number of household members
between 0-17 years old; (3) average number of household members > 65 years old; (4) Average
age of household head; (5) share of couple households; (6) share of households with property
income; share of households where at least one member is (7) eligible for pensions, (8) eligible
for unemployment benefits, (9) self-employed. Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD.
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5.8.2 Income changes without behavioral adjustments
Table 5.11: Gains and losses in disposable income - for baseline labor supply
A-Sc.1 A-Sc.2 B-Sc.1 B-Sc.2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
EU 54 -0.1 20 -24 54 -0.1 60 -71 52 -0.1 21 -24 52 -0.3 63 -72
AT 34 -2.3 17 -28 34 -6.8 52 -85 31 -2.4 19 -28 31 -7.2 57 -83
BE 48 -0.4 19 -22 48 -1.2 58 -67 43 -0.6 19 -20 43 -1.8 57 -60
FI 50 -0.1 19 -20 50 -0.2 57 -59 48 -0.3 19 -20 48 -0.7 56 -59
FR 30 -2.8 15 -27 30 -8.5 44 -80 29 -2.8 18 -27 29 -8.5 53 -81
GE 65 0.9 20 -25 65 2.8 60 -74 63 0.7 19 -23 63 2.2 58 -70
GR 79 8.4 31 -13 79 25.2 92 -38 79 9.2 34 -13 79 27.6 102 -40
IR 28 -2.8 21 -34 28 -8.4 64 -103 28 -3.1 26 -39 28 -9.2 77 -116
IT 63 0.8 20 -22 63 2.5 59 -65 61 1.0 22 -22 61 2.8 65 -66
NL 40 -0.6 17 -17 40 -1.9 51 -51 38 -1.0 20 -21 38 -3.0 60 -63
PT 68 4.5 29 -18 68 13.4 88 -54 66 4.9 33 -19 66 14.8 99 -56
SP 59 0.8 20 -20 59 2.3 60 -61 58 1.0 23 -21 58 2.9 70 -64
Note: See Table 5.2. Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD.
5.8.3 Behavioral adjustment
As Bargain et al. (2012), we follow van Soest (1995) or Hoynes (1996) in the
choice of a structural discrete choice labor supply model to be separately estimated
for all countries under analysis. In this framework, labor supply decisions are
reduced to choosing among a discrete set of possibilities, e.g. inactivity, part-time
and full-time. This modeling includes non-participation as one of the options,
in order that both the extensive (participation) and intensive margin (working
hours) are directly estimated. We assume that there are K = 7 discrete hour
possibilities for each potential worker (0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 hours per week), and
specify consumption-leisure preferences in a very flexible way (without imposing
separability between consumption and leisure) using a quadratic utility function
as in Blundell et al. (2000). That is, the deterministic utility of a couple i at each
discrete choice j = 1, . . . , J can be written as:
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with household consumption Cij and spouses’ work hours H
f
ij and H
m
ij . The J
choices for a couple correspond to all combinations of the spouses’ discrete hours,
that is, J = 7 ∗ 7 = 49. For singles, the model above is simplified to only one hour
term Hij, and J is simply the number of discrete hour choices K = 7. Coefficients
on consumption and work hours are specified as:
βci = β
0
c + z
c
iβc + ui (5.14)
βhf i = β
0
hf
+ zfi βhf (5.15)
βhmi = β
0
hm + z
m
i βhm (5.16)
i.e. they vary linearly with several taste-shifters zi (including polynomial form
of age, presence of children or dependent elders and region). The term βci also
incorporates unobserved heterogeneity, in the form of a normally-distributed term
ui, for the model to allow random taste variation and unrestricted substitution
patterns between alternatives. The fit of the model is improved by the introduction
of fixed costs of work, estimated as model parameters. Fixed costs explain that
there are very few observations with a small positive number of worked hours.
These costs, denoted ηkj for k = f,m, are non-zero for positive hour choices and
depend on observed characteristics (e.g. the presence of young children).
For each labor supply choice j, disposable income (equivalent to consumption in
the present static framework) is calculated as function Cij = d(w
f
iH
f
ij, w
m
i H
m
ij , yi, Zi)
of female and male earnings, non-labor income yi and household characteristics Zi.
The tax-benefit function d is simulated using EUROMOD. In the discrete choice
approach, disposable income only needs to be assessed at certain points of the
budget curve, in order that nonlinear budget constraints resulting from nonlinear
taxes, joint filing and unemployment benefits can be easily taken into account.
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Male and female wage rates wfi and w
m
i for each household i are calculated by
dividing earnings by standardized working hours. We assume that hourly wages
are constant across the working hour categories and do not depend on the actual
working time, which is standard within the literature. For unemployed people, we
estimate their (potential) hourly wages using the Heckman correction for sample
selection. The stochastic specification of the labor supply model is completed by
i.i.d. error terms ij for each choice j = 1, . . . , J . Accordingly, total utility at each
alternative is written
Vij = Uij + ij (5.17)
with Uij as previously defined. Error terms are assumed to represent possi-
ble observational errors, optimization errors or transitory situations. Under the
assumption that they follow an extreme value type I (EV-I) distribution, the (con-
ditional) probability for each household i of choosing a given alternative j has an
explicit analytical solution:
Pij = exp(Uij)/
∑J
k=1
exp(Uik) (5.18)
The unconditional probability is obtained by integrating out the disturbance
terms (unobserved heterogeneity in preferences) in the likelihood. In practice,
this is achieved by averaging the conditional probability Pij over a large number of
draws (here 100) for these terms, with the parameters being estimated by simulated
maximum likelihood.
The model is estimated separately for each country, ensuring that estimated
parameters are country-specific. These estimates are used to calculate the proba-
bilities of changing working time categories due to a marginal change in wage rates
or non-labor incomes, with resulting elasticities reported in Table 5.12. We note
that elasticities are relatively small and similar across countries. Nonetheless, some
country differences can be observed, largely respecting differences in preferences
and childcare institutions, as shown in Bargain et al. (2012).
The model is used to predict a change in disposable income induced by the EU
tax reform, with the expected working hours calculated after the implementation
of the reform and reported in Table 5.13 for the whole population and Table 5.14
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for subgroups. The first row shows results at the EU level, while figures at the
national level are subsequently presented.
Table 5.12: Estimated labor supply elasticities by subgroups
AT BE FI FR GE GR IR IT NL PT SP
Married women
(A1) 0.34 0.31 0.13 0.13 0.31 0.62 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.14 0.51
(A2) 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.05 0.08
(A3) 0.27 0.23 0.12 0.10 0.22 0.57 0.27 0.28 0.20 0.11 0.43
(B1) -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 -0.006 -0.004 -0.007 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
(B3) -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.007 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
Married men
(A1) 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.06 0.14 0.11 0.15 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.08
(A2) 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.07
(A3) 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.04 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.07
(B1) 0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.017 -0.002 0.000 -0.002
(B3) 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.013 -0.001 0.000 -0.002
Single women
(A1) 0.14 0.59 0.21 0.12 0.18 0.41 0.37 0.67 0.16 0.08 0.20
(A2) 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.04
(A3) 0.13 0.41 0.20 0.09 0.17 0.43 0.24 0.58 0.11 0.05 0.19
(B1) -0.001 -0.004 0.029 0.001 -0.006 -0.010 -0.003 0.019 -0.003 0.000 -0.007
(B3) 0.000 -0.002 0.028 0.002 -0.003 -0.009 -0.001 0.019 -0.002 0.000 -0.005
Single men
(A1) 0.14 0.28 0.33 0.14 0.20 0.19 0.67 0.22 0.08 0.03 0.57
(A2) 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.09
(A3) 0.08 0.27 0.34 0.12 0.21 0.15 0.62 0.22 0.08 0.04 0.47
(B1) 0.000 -0.008 0.112 -0.002 -0.007 0.000 -0.028 -0.003 -0.003 0.000 -0.012
(B3) 0.000 -0.005 0.104 0.000 -0.003 0.000 -0.021 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.012
Note: (A) Wage elasticities; (B) income elasticities; (1) total hours; (2) intensive margin (hours);
(3) extensive margin (participation). Wage (income) elasticities are computed numerically as
the responses to a 1% uniform increase in wage rates (unearned income). The intensive margin
corresponds to the response in hours among workers; the extensive margin to the participation
response (measured as a % change in the participation rate). Source: Bargain et al. (2012).
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Table 5.13: Hours worked and (changes in) fulltime equivalents
Baseline EUavg EUavg-p
(1) (2) (3) (4) (3) (4)
EU 29.9 71.1 -0.1 -1.0 -0.6 -2.6
AT 32.0 2.1 -0.1 -0.9 -0.6 -2.2
BE 32.7 2.6 2.5 5.6 1.8 3.7
FI 33.2 1.7 2.0 4.6 1.6 3.6
FR 30.8 17.3 0.5 1.3 0.3 0.6
GE 30.0 23.5 0.4 0.0 -0.3 -2.3
GR 25.3 1.3 -3.1 -10.2 -3.7 -12.1
IR 28.1 0.7 -1.3 -4.7 -1.8 -6.6
IT 26.7 8.4 -1.4 -4.9 -1.9 -6.6
NL 31.3 5.2 0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -1.7
PT 34.5 2.0 -0.3 -1.2 -0.5 -2.0
SP 27.7 6.4 -2.4 -8.0 -2.9 -9.9
Net tax base %-change net taxes
EU 26.3 1.8 -2.4 0.5 -2.6
Note: (1) Mean hours worked per week; (2) fulltime equivalents (FTE) in millions; (3) change
FTE scenario 1 in %; (4) change FTE scenario 2 in %. Number of observations: 30382. Source:
Own calculations based on EUROMOD.
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Table 5.14: Labour supply effects by subgroups
Baseline EUavg EUavg-p Baseline EUavg EUavg-p
(1) (2) (3) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (2) (3)
Single men Single women
EU 7.8 0.3 -1.3 -0.4 -3.7 8.1 0.5 0.4 -0.3 -2.2
AT 0.3 0.8 1.8 0.5 0.9 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.1 -0.9
BE 0.2 6.0 9.6 5.3 7.9 0.2 7.7 17.5 6.2 14.1
FI 0.2 5.3 13.5 4.5 11.4 0.2 3.0 7.7 2.5 6.5
FR 1.6 2.6 6.1 2.2 5.0 2.0 2.5 7.6 2.2 6.7
GE 3.5 -0.4 -3.4 -1.3 -6.6 3.2 0.4 -0.3 -0.7 -3.8
GR 0.1 -1.4 -4.8 -1.7 -5.8 0.1 -9.7 -27.9 -11.0 -31.5
IR 0.1 -1.7 -8.0 -3.1 -12.4 0.1 -1.3 -5.1 -2.1 -7.8
IT 0.6 -1.1 -3.6 -1.7 -5.6 0.7 -3.9 -13.4 -5.2 -18.0
NL 0.5 1.3 2.6 1.0 1.8 0.5 2.5 6.1 2.0 4.6
PT 0.1 -0.1 -1.4 -0.4 -2.3 0.2 -1.6 -5.3 -2.1 -7.0
SP 0.6 -4.9 -18.9 -6.3 -23.9 0.6 -3.2 -11.4 -3.8 -13.7
Married men Married women
EU 37.4 0.0 -0.8 -0.4 -1.9 17.8 -0.5 -1.9 -1.1 -3.7
AT 1.1 0.2 0.2 -0.2 -0.8 0.5 -1.9 -6.0 -2.7 -8.4
BE 1.4 1.6 3.8 1.0 2.3 0.8 1.6 4.1 0.8 1.7
FI 0.7 1.7 3.8 1.3 2.7 0.5 0.8 1.1 0.6 0.6
FR 8.7 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.6 5.0 -0.1 -0.5 -0.4 -1.2
GE 11.2 0.6 0.9 0.1 -0.8 5.5 0.5 0.5 -0.2 -1.6
GR 0.9 -1.8 -6.7 -2.2 -8.2 0.3 -5.3 -15.8 -6.3 -18.7
IR 0.4 -0.6 -2.4 -0.9 -3.6 0.2 -2.7 -8.8 -3.2 -10.8
IT 5.1 -1.1 -4.1 -1.4 -5.1 2.0 -1.4 -4.5 -2.1 -6.7
NL 2.9 0.0 -0.6 -0.4 -1.9 1.3 -0.8 -2.9 -1.7 -5.5
PT 1.1 -0.1 -0.6 -0.3 -1.2 0.7 -0.4 -1.3 -0.6 -2.1
SP 4.0 -1.2 -4.3 -1.5 -5.3 1.2 -4.5 -13.5 -5.6 -16.5
Note: (1) FTE baseline; (2) change FTE scenario 1 in %; (3) change FTE scenario 2 in %.
Source: Own calculations based on EUROMOD.
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Chapter 6
Benefiting from a European fiscal
union? Redistribution vs.
stabilization
6.1 Introduction
With the current debt crisis, a debate concerning deeper fiscal integration in Eu-
rope emerged. Options discussed range from the introduction of balanced budget
rules to the more ambitious project of developing a ‘fiscal capacity’ for the Euro-
pean Union (EU) or at least the European Monetary Union (EMU). The latter
“could take several forms” with “various options” to be explored, as recently sug-
gested by the President of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy.1 More
precisely, EU Commissioner La´szlo´ Andor made a proposal for a European unem-
ployment insurance scheme that could act as an automatic stabilizer in presence of
macroeconomic shocks complementary to national insurance mechanisms.2 This
is an issue especially important for the EMU, where contrary to monetary policy,
fiscal policy remained the responsibility of the individual member states after its
1‘Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union’, Interim Report, The President of the
European Council, Brussels, 12 October 2012, p. 4.
2La´szlo´ Andor: ‘A strong employment agenda – the pathway to economic recovery’, dinner
speech at the Conference ”Jobs for Europe: The Employment Policy Conference“, Brussels, 6
September 2012, European Commission, SPEECH/12/588.
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introduction, which had two implications. First, a joint monetary and exchange
rate policy can be too restrictive to cushion asymmetric shocks in single countries.
Second, especially the experiences in the recent economic crisis of 2008-09 have
shown that national fiscal policy is also insufficient or even unable (when coun-
tries are credit constrained) to fulfill this function.3 Thus, the view is widespread
that moving towards a ‘fiscal union’ complementing the monetary union would
have stabilizing effects in case of macroeconomic shocks. Cross-regional trans-
fers within an accordant mechanism are then supposed to balance out asymmetric
shocks but usually not to induce redistributive effects across countries. Rather,
the latter are considered a concern in the debate. However, one should note that
a certain harmonization of living standards across the European member states is
a general goal of the EU (Art. 158 on ‘economic and social cohesion’ of the Treaty
establishing the European Community) and could also be a political aim as such
within more fiscal integration.
Proposals as those of van Rompuy and Andor indicate an even more intense
debate about these issues which could imply that fiscal institutions in the EU
become more similar to those of existing federations like the US, including elements
of a joint tax and transfer system. Although a renewed interest in the topic can be
observed in (theoretical) research (e.g. Evers (2012), Werning and Farhi (2012),
Engler and Voigts (2013)) and policy advice (e.g. Enderlein, Bofinger, Boone,
de Grauwe and et al. (2012); Bernoth and Engler (2013), Dullien and Fichtner
(2013), HWWI-PWC (2013)) there is no clear consensus yet about the design of a
‘fiscal union’ for Europe and little is known about its general economic implications
from an empirical viewpoint. In this chapter, we study the economic effects for
the benchmark case of introducing an EU-wide tax and transfer system and allow
for redistributive as well as stabilizing effects. Our study is closely related to
Bargain et al. (2013b) who firstly addressed this specific issue using household
micro data. For 11 founding members of the eurozone and 2001 data, they analyzed
the economic implications of i) an EU-wide integrated tax and transfer system and
ii) a fiscal equalization mechanism. However, they assessed redistributive effects
3According to the theory of optimal currency areas (Mundell (1961)), asymmetric economic
shocks could be also counterbalanced by open international labor markets and flexible wages.
Though, labor mobility in Europe is known to be rather low.
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(at the micro level) separately from stabilizing effects (at the macro level). In
this chapter, we extend their analysis and use an explicit theoretical framework
to assess both elements at the individual level in an integrated way. Precisely, we
apply an expected utility approach and calculate individual equivalent variations
of an EU-wide tax and transfer system relative to the baseline with the national
systems. Additionally, we provide a decomposition into a “redistributive” and a
“stabilization” component.4
We employ the most recent version of the European tax-benefit calculator EU-
ROMOD, which uses harmonized and representative household micro data and
allows calculating taxes, transfers and disposable incomes for each household in
the sample. On this basis, we construct a European tax and transfer system using
data and systems from 2007 for all current 27 EU member states. As in Bargain
et al. (2013b), our design of a fiscal union can be interpreted as an average of the
national tax-transfer systems. Most importantly, on the one hand, this leads to
revenue neutrality of the reform at the EU level, while necessarily implying redis-
tributive effects across countries, on the other hand. With respect to the latter, we
argue that an average mechanism including countries’ tax-transfer systems with
respective population weights could be the most natural first step for a transfer
mechanism that also implies redistributive effects.
Our main results go as follows. We find that a majority of countries, repre-
sented by their median voters, would gain from fiscal integration with equivalent
variations ranging from a huge contribution of −530 EUR per month in Ireland
to 188 EUR per month in Hungary, and being mainly driven by the redistribu-
tive component. Effects across gross income deciles within countries differ greatly
and depend on income levels and the structures of existing national systems. We
show and explain that countries which benefit (lose) in terms of the redistributive
component, generally tend to show relatively low (high) benefits in terms of the sta-
bilizing component. Subsequently, we additionally consider smaller fiscal unions,
namely for the current 17 members of the euro area, its 12 founding members,
as well as two further subgroups as sometimes discussed in the political debate
under the label of a “North” and a “South” euro area. Moving to such groups of
4Though, we are not able to take into account any behavioral adjustments to the reform (see
Section 6.6).
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more similar countries generally reduces redistributive and increases the stabiliz-
ing effects. However, Pareto improving reforms where at least one country gains
while no one loses seem to be possible only for rather severe crisis scenarios with
substantial shocks to gross income or for high levels of individual risk aversion.
The reforms we simulate are very prospective from a political viewpoint and
rather meant as a conceptual experiment to clarify the impact of the general design
as well as the influence of redistributive versus stabilizing effects at the individual
level using a consistent framework. However, common tax-transfer policies are a
key element of existing fiscal unions and will certainly be introduced in the EU as
well in the medium or long term, and in the one form or the other. While always
depending on the specific aim and design of the system, we consider our results
as kind of a benchmark computation that provides insights in general issues of
setting up a European fiscal union.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 6.2, we review the
most important related literature. Section 6.3 introduces the concept and design
of a fiscal union and develops the framework for an economic evaluation. The
microdata and the tax-transfer calculator EUROMOD are presented in Section 6.4,
together with first descriptive information. The presentation of the key findings
follows in Section 6.5. Section 6.6 discusses the results and limitations of our
analysis and concludes.
6.2 Related literature
The related literature addressing issues on the integration of fiscal policies in Eu-
rope is vast and we restrict our review to work that specifically studies potential
redistributive and/or stabilizing effects of fiscal policy integration in the EU/EMU.
We refer to Bargain et al. (2013b) for a broader covering.
An important early discussion of the key issues can be found in the MacDougall
(1977) Report, which argues that EMU would be impracticable due to the absence
of a common fiscal policy which plays a major role in existing economic unions
to cushion asymmetric fluctuations. Besides, the report also argued explicitly in
favor of a transfer union harmonizing living standards in Europe. Arguments for
equalizing welfare of European citizens through economic and fiscal integration
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can also be found in Wildasin (1991), Casella (2005) or Atkinson (2002a, 2013).
However, most of the literature focuses on the specific implications of EMU for
fiscal policy in Europe, stressing one main issue. Along the lines of Mundell (1961)
and Kenen (1969), many economists argued that the Euro area is far from being
an optimum currency area and thus, needs to be complemented by a European
fiscal federation to counterbalance asymmetric fluctuations (the former President
of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, emphasized this already 24 years
ago, see Delors (1989)). On the one hand, the reason is that a joint monetary policy
might be too restrictive when countries are very heterogeneous which could even
reinforce economic fluctuations and the divergence of member state economies.
On the other hand, the effectiveness of national fiscal policy in a monetary union
to cushion asymmetric shocks seems to be limited (e.g. due to time lags or lack
of fiscal discipline); see e.g. Eichengreen (1990), Sachs and Sala-i Mart´ın (1992),
Me´litz and Vori (1993), Bayoumi and Masson (1995), Asdrubali, Sorensen and
Yosha (1996), Masson (1996), Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998), Engwerda et al.
(2002), Gal´ı and Perotti (2003), Uhlig (2003) and, for a detailed overview, von
Hagen and Wyplosz (2008).
In contrast, Fata´s (1998) shows that the cross-regional insurance potential of
a European fiscal federation would be limited (around 10% of an income shock).
His main objection to some of the other empirical studies is that they fail to
distinguish properly between intertemporal transfers on the one hand, and inter-
regional insurance on the other hand. He argues that intertemporal transfers are
essentially self-insurance against shocks that can be provided by national govern-
ments through debt financing. However, this debt has to be counterbalanced in
the future. The same effect has to be taken into account for transfers at a federal
level and only the remaining component can be considered as true interregional
insurance (risk-sharing). As a response to Fata´s (1998), Forni and Reichlin (1999)
focus on the latter, too, but find that 40% of long-run income volatility of the
EU15 are potentially insurable through a pure joint insurance device, i.e. with-
out generating (ex-ante) redistributive effects. In addition, both studies stress
the general difficulty of avoiding (ex-post) redistribution within such an insurance
mechanism, namely the additional effect on income levels in the long-run rather
than on income volatility only (basically due to time lags or mistargeting). This
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might cause problems for political implementability (on this, see also von Hagen
(1992), Goodhart and Smith (1993), Obstfeld and Peri (1998)).
Two remarks have to be made with view to the present chapter. First, we
are not able to properly distinguish between intertemporal stabilization and cross-
regional insurance. The main reason is data limitation, i.e. we can only use cross-
sections for all countries under analysis in a comparable way and are thus not able
to provide empirical estimates for intertemporal stabilization at a national level or
the amount of insurable risk at a common level (based on country-specific income
volatility). We therefore rely on a counterfactual approach using tax-transfer cal-
culators and derive stabilization measures assuming hypothetical shocks to gross
income. The advantage of the counterfactual approach is the clear identification
of the simulated effect (Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006)) and given that we are
interested in hypothetical effects of European fiscal integration (simulated on basis
of the same methodology) this seems to be an appropriate strategy. Furthermore,
as traditional in public finance, the concept of stabilization we consider is a static
one. That is, we consider ‘contemporaneous’ automatic stabilization of dispos-
able income through the immediate impact of the tax-transfer system following a
shock to gross income, without implying any (macro- or microeconomic) feedback
mechanism (cf. Dolls et al. (2012)).
Second, given our simulation experiment, we have to consider a relevant case
when studying stabilizing effects of fiscal integration. Based on his distinction
between intertemporal stabilization and cross-regional insurance, Fata´s (1998) ar-
gues that only the latter would justify a European fiscal federation. However, this
is only true when countries have free access to capital markets in order to finance
debt. That this access in fact can be lost was exactly one of the experiences in
the 2008-09 crisis which led to destabilizing effects particularly in some South-
ern European countries (see e.g. Bertola (2013)). Thus, one main argument for
European fiscal integration is the provision of stabilization from a federal budget
when individual countries are credit constrained but the union is not.5 Therefore,
assuming credit constraints at the country level is of key importance to our study.
5This of course requires that participating countries are sufficiently heterogeneous in the sense
that income volatilities are not perfectly correlated such that the fiscal union can be assumed
to stay solvent.
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6.3 Methodology
In this section, we provide the theoretical framework for our analysis. We first
describe how a fiscal union is constructed and second, introduce the framework for
an economic evaluation at the individual level.
6.3.1 Concept of a ‘fiscal union’
Generally, different concepts of a ‘fiscal union’ are possible and the political debate
in Europe covers options ranging from fiscal rules for the member states for policy
coordination and supervision, over crisis resolution mechanisms (as the European
Stabilization Mechanism ESM or the ECB Outright Monetary Transactions) up
to a European fiscal capacity in form of an EU level unemployment insurance, for
instance (see e.g. Bordo et al. (2011), Fuest and Peichl (2012)). The latter element
would be a clear step towards an integration (of elements) of the member states’
tax and transfers systems. Even if not at the top of the agenda in the current
political debate, a EU fiscal union complementing the currency union can be seen
as a final step of European economic integration and its analysis will therefore
provide interesting and important results. This is the aim of the present chapter.
We thus define a fiscal union as a (complete) integration of its member states tax
and transfer systems.
Net taxes within a single country. Consider first how ‘net taxes’ at the
national level are derived. Gross market income Xi of household i is defined as
the sum of all incomes from market activities:
Xi = Ei +Qi + Ii + Pi +Oi + SICERi, (6.1)
where Ei is labor, Qi business, Ii capital, Pi property, and Oi other income. We
also assume that employer social insurance contributions SICERi are part of gross
market income in order to include them into the coverage of the tax and transfer
system. Disposable income Yi is defined as market income minus net government
intervention Ti = TAXi + SICi −BENi:
Yi = Xi − Ti = Xi − (TAXi + SICi −BENi), (6.2)
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where TAXi are income taxes, SICi = SICEEi + SICERi the sum of em-
ployee (SICEEi) and employer social insurance contributions, and BENi cash
benefits (i.e. negative taxes). In the following, we refer to the difference between
taxes and social insurance contributions paid and transfers received, Ti, as ‘net
taxes’. Assuming that individuals i might reside in different countries k = 1, ..., K,
disposable income will be determined by country-specific net tax schedules
Tik = fk(Xi, zi), (6.3)
where zi is a vector of all demographic characteristics relevant for taxation,
like marriage status, age or number of children and fk(Xi, zi) is a function that
transforms market income Xi into disposable income Yik (which might be non-
linear as usually observed in reality).
Construction of a fiscal union. Now, countries k = 1, ..., K define a com-
mon tax and transfer system denoted TiEU = fEU(Xi, zi). An important pre-
condition for its implementation is that the reform will be performed in a rev-
enue neutral way at the overall level. Thus, we assume that this tax system
is constructed such that, for the union as a whole and given market incomes,
it generates the same net tax revenue as the national tax systems in sum do:∑N1
i=1 Ti1 + ...+
∑NK
i=1 TiK =
∑K
k=1
∑Nk
i=1 TiEU . The easiest way to introduce a rev-
enue neutral common tax system by construction is to use the “average” system
over all participating countries,
TiEU = fEU(Xi, zi) =
1
K
K∑
k=1
fk(Xi, zi). (6.4)
Taking the average of the national system is certainly a specific assumption
in constructing a fiscal union and can be debated. However, we argue that as a
first step, it appears to be a very natural approach since the national tax systems
enter the joint system with the weight of its respective population. Then, the
more similar (different) the national tax systems are, the less (more) pronounced
will be the “averaging” effect. As shown by Bargain et al. (2013b), it is then
very straightforward to alter the design of the common system by, for instance,
changing its progressivity into the direction of a certain group of countries while
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compromising on the tax-transfer design of the remaining member states. In the
present chapter, we do not alter the average system but rather consider various
compositions of a fiscal union. We thus provide a first point of reference without
entering the debate about generally increasing or decreasing the size of the gov-
ernment nor the debate about which specific tax-transfer design among different
countries should be favored.
Effects on overall tax revenue and national budgets. As mentioned
above, we assume that the fiscal union will be introduced in a revenue neutral
way at the overall level. However, this generally implies non-revenue neutrality
at the national level. The reason is that the integrated system collects revenue
from all citizens in the participating countries and we assume that this revenue
goes to a common budget. Thus, the national countries lose their tax revenue.
We therefore have to make an important further assumption, which is, that the
net revenue now available at the union level is redistributed to the member states
after the implementation of the reform such that each national government is
fully compensated for the loss in its initial net revenue. The main reason for
this assumption is that national expenditures on public goods and services, as
well as revenue from other tax sources at the national level and national public
deficits should be unaffected by the reform. As we do not consider any behavioral
adjustments to the tax reform, the revenue collected at the union level will be
exactly sufficient to compensate the governments of the member states for their
net revenue losses. In sum, what essentially changes are the revenues from direct
taxes and the expenses for cash transfers, collected from and paid to the households
within the single countries, affecting their net tax burdens, while all revenues and
expenditures outside the direct tax and (cash) transfer system are kept constant. In
other words, redistribution is performed between households in terms of disposable
income, not between countries in terms of revenues.6
6.3.2 The value of moving to a ‘fiscal union’
Individual expected utility. We assume that individuals have rational expec-
tations and derive utility from consumption only using a constant relative risk
6This is the systematic difference to a fiscal equalization mechanism, cf. the previous chapter.
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aversion (CRRA) utility function as standard in the literature:
U(Ci) =
C1−ρi
1− ρ ; ρ > 0, ρ 6= 1, (6.5)
where i indexes individuals, and ρ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. As
we consider a single period in time, we assume that individuals do not save and
consumption Ci thus equals disposable income Yi (market income Xi minus net
taxes Ti as defined in the previous section). Individuals form expectations about
two different situations: one in which they receive the current level of consumption,
C0i = X
0
i −T 0i , and one in which the current level of consumption will be altered due
to a shock to market income that occurs with a certain probability α, C1i = X
1
i −T 1i .
Individual expected utility thus reads:
Ei[U(Ci)] = (1− α)U(C0i ) + αU(C1i ). (6.6)
The degree of risk aversion is reflected by the concavity of the utility function
and leads to the fact that U(Ei[Ci]) > Ei[U(Ci)] = U(CEi). That is, the individual
would accept a certain guaranteed level of consumption denoted CEi which is less
than the expected (but insecure) level of consumption Ei[Ci]. CEi is also called
the “certainty equivalent” and is a monetary equivalent expression of expected
utility Ei[U(Ci)]. Precisely, using (6.5) we get:
Ei[U(Ci)] = U(CEi) =
CE1−ρi
1− ρ (6.7)
⇔ CEi = {(1− ρ)Ei[U(Ci)]}
1
1−ρ . (6.8)
Equivalent variation. Assume a group of single countries k = 1, ..., K that
form a fiscal union (indexed EU as above in the following) by (completely) inte-
grating their national tax-transfer systems. Under this new tax regime, individu-
als will receive a level of consumption C0iEU = X
0
i − T 0iEU in the current situation
(C1iEU = X
1
i − T 1iEU after a shock) which might be different from their former
level of consumption C0ik = X
0
i − T 0ik (C1ik = X1i − T 1ik after a shock). We assume
that individuals form expectations after the policy switch Tk → TEU in the same
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way as they did before. We then ask for the change in individual expected utility
(in monetary terms) due to the regime change, i.e. for the equivalent variation
(EVi) of the integrated tax-transfer system relative to the baseline with the na-
tional system. Precisely, the equivalent variation is defined as the amount such
that the individual would be indifferent between (i) the situation under the given
national tax and transfer system and receiving the equivalent variation and (ii)
the situation under the integrated system. EVi will then be positive (negative) if
the regime change is welfare increasing (decreasing). Using (6.8) we get an explicit
expression for the equivalent variation in terms of the certainty equivalent CEi:
U(CEik + EVi)− U(CEiEU) = 0 (6.9)
⇔ (CEik + EVi)
1−ρ
1− ρ =
CE1−ρiEU
1− ρ (6.10)
⇔ CEiEU − CEik = EVi. (6.11)
6.3.3 Decomposition
Redistributive and stabilization value. In the given framework of expected
utility, moving to an integrated tax-transfer system will generally have two effects
on individual welfare: (i) a “redistributive” effect due to the fact that individual
net tax burdens and thus disposable income will change in the baseline situation
and (ii) a “stabilization” effect due to the fact that the adjustment of individual net
tax burdens, following a shock to market income, might differ as well under the in-
tegrated compared to the national system. It is important not to mix that up with
the redistributive and insurance capacities of a given tax-transfer system within a
single country.7 In our case, the terms of “redistribution” and “stabilization” only
refer to the policy switch, i.e. to the extent to which changes in initial net tax
burdens across countries and households on the one hand and the differences in
the insurance capacity across the regimes on the other hand affect individual ex-
pected utility. In order to express both effects separately, we decompose the total
value of the individual equivalent variation EVi (indexed T in the following and
7See Hoynes and Luttmer (2011) who develop a framework to separately identify both effects
using US data.
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suppressing index i for notational simplicity) accordingly. To perform this, con-
sider first the following decomposition of individual expected utility (independent
of the tax regime) adding and subtracting the counterfactual value of consumption
where market income is shock adjusted but net taxes are not modified, X1 − T 0
(such that overall expected utility does not change):
E[U(C)] = (1− α)U(X0 − T 0) + αU(X1 − T 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected utility when X1−X0=∆X=∆C, i.e.: ∆T=0
(6.12a)
+αU(X1 − T 1)− αU(X1 − T 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
change in expected utility due to ∆T 6=0
. (6.12b)
We denote the first term of the decomposition E∗[U(C)] and the accordant
certainty equivalent CE∗ which can be derived from E∗[U(C)] = U(CE∗). When
X0 > X1 and T 0 > T 1, we have E∗[U(C)] < E[U(C)] and (6.12b) will be positive.
Using (6.12a) and (6.12b) to derive the change in individual expected utility for
the regime switch, we get:
E[U(CEU)]− E[U(Ck)] = (1− α)U(X0 − T 0EU) + αU(X1 − T 0EU)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=E∗[U(CEU )]
(6.13a)
− (1− α)U(X0 − T 0k ) + αU(X1 − T 0k )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=E∗[U(Ck)]
(6.13b)
+αU(X1 − T 1EU)− αU(X1 − T 0EU) (6.13c)
−[αU(X1 − T 1k )− αU(X1 − T 0k )]. (6.13d)
We interpret E∗[U(CEU)] − E∗[U(Ck)] as the “redistributive” effect of the
regime change on individual expected utility. It is that part of the overall change
in expected utility which is caused by the difference in the level of initial net tax
burdens between the national and the integrated tax regime, i.e. by T 0k 6= T 0EU , and
not by how the two regimes respond to the shock in market income in terms of net
tax adjustment. In contrast, if we had T 0k = T
0
EU , E
∗[U(CEU)]−E∗[U(Ck)] would
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be equal to zero. Using equality E∗[U(CEU)]−E∗[U(Ck)] = U(CE∗EU)−U(CE∗k),
the associated value of the equivalent variation, denoted EVR, can be derived:
U(CE∗EU + EVR)− U(CE∗k) = 0 (6.14)
⇔ EVR = CE∗EU − CE∗k . (6.15)
The remaining “stabilization” component follows from the difference of (6.13c)
and (6.13d) and captures the change in individual expected utility which is due to
the difference in the adjustment of initial net tax burdens after a shock between
the two regimes, T0 → T1 (though, differences in the levels of T0 and T1 across
systems will impact the size of the adjustment; this is further discussed in the
empirical section). Note that without any further assumption, this component
can be positive or negative and joining the fiscal union can thus increase or a
decrease the extent of automatic stabilization for a single country compared to
the initial situation under the national tax system. Formally, the corresponding
value for the equivalent variation, denoted EVS, is given by subtracting (6.15)
from (6.11):
EVT − EVR = EVS (6.16)
Credit constraint at the country level. As pointed out in Section 6.2,
one important feature of a fiscal integration of countries k = 1, ..., K will be the
provision of automatic stabilization in presence of a negative income shock when
individual countries are credit constrained but the fiscal union is not. We assume
that individuals will be informed also about this and modify their formation of ex-
pectations accordingly. A credit constraint at the country level essentially implies
that a single country k will not be able to finance the implied automatic decrease
in taxes (increase in transfers) following a negative shock to market income by
issuing debt.8 That is, in this case we have ∆Tk = 0 and theoretically, individuals
would have to bear the full shock to gross income under the national system such
that ∆X = ∆Ck. This leads exactly to the counterfactual level of consumption
8In reality, decreasing incomes in a downturn in presence of credit constraints would even imply
statutory tax increases/benefit cuts leading to destabilizing effects.
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that has been introduced above and E[U(CEU)]− E[U(Ck)] thus becomes:
E[U(CEU)]− E[U(Ck)] = (1− α)U(X0 − T 0EU) + αU(X1 − T 0EU)(6.17a)
−(1− α)U(X0 − T 0k ) + αU(X1 − T 0k ) (6.17b)
+αU(X1 − T 1EU)− αU(X1 − T 0EU) (6.17c)
−[αU(X1 − T 0k )− αU(X1 − T 0k )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
(6.17d)
= E[U(CEU)]− E∗[U(Ck)]. (6.17e)
Using equality E[U(CEU)] − E∗[U(Ck)] = U(CEEU) − U(CE∗k) and (6.8) we
get the accordant value of the total equivalent variation, denoted EVT ∗ :
U(CEEU + EVT ∗)− U(CE∗k) = 0⇔ CEEU − CE∗k = EVT ∗ . (6.18)
Note that the redistributive value of the equivalent variation is unchanged and
by substituting EVT with EVT ∗ in (6.16), the stabilization value becomes:
EVS∗ = EVT ∗ −EVR = CEEU −CE∗k − (CE∗EU −CE∗k) = CEEU −CE∗EU , (6.19)
i.e. the “stabilizing” effect on individual expected utility rests entirely on the
capacity of the fiscal union to provide insurance against a negative income shock.9
6.4 Data and empirical implementation
6.4.1 EU-SILC and EUROMOD
As in Bargain et al. (2013b), we use EUROMOD as a basis for our analysis. EU-
ROMOD is a static tax-benefit calculator for the EU countries which allows for
comparative analysis of tax-benefit systems and their impact on the income dis-
tribution in a consistent way through a common framework. However, in contrast
9Note that in this case, EVS∗ will always be positive (given that T 0EU > T
1
EU ).
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to those authors, we are able to apply the latest version of EUROMOD available
which uses input-data mainly on basis of the European Union Statistics on Income
and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) released by Eurostat, starting from 2006 up to
2008, and which allows for a simulation of policy systems up to 2010 for all current
27 EU member countries.
The simulated components include most direct taxes (especially income taxes
on all sources of income including tax credits, payroll taxes and social insurance
contributions) and benefits (e.g. welfare benefits, social assistance and partly also
transfers based on previous contributions, e.g. unemployment benefits). Infor-
mation on consumption is missing in the data; hence indirect taxes and taxes on
corporate profits are not included in the model, likewise in-kind benefits. Clearly,
these elements differ between countries and would affect the results presented.
However, with view to an integration of tax-transfer policies across EU member
states, one can argue that also existing fiscal unions do not cover all taxes and
transfers at the federal level. Also, EUROMOD assumes full benefit take-up and
tax compliance focusing on the intended effects of tax-benefit systems only.
The main stages of the simulations are as follows. First, a representative micro-
data sample of individuals in households (essentially including information on all
gross income components as well as all demographic characteristics that are rel-
evant to determine taxes and benefits) and the respective tax-benefit rules are
read into the model. Subsequently, the model constructs corresponding assess-
ment units (for instance the individual or household) for each tax and benefit
instrument, according to the underlying eligibility rules. On that basis, all taxes
and benefits are simulated, and finally, disposable income is calculated.
In this chapter, we use EU-SILC wave 2008, covering information for 2007,
i.e. income data from the year before the crisis, and apply 2007 tax-transfer
rules.10 While simulations are usually carried out for counterfactual situations,
EUROMOD also simulates various taxes and transfers for the baseline that are
not observed in the original data. For our purpose, we use the original data
provided by EUROMOD complemented by those simulated components. For more
detailed information on the current version of EUROMOD and the underlying
10For three countries, France, Malta and the UK, we use uprated incomes provided by EURO-
MOD as 2007 data is not directly available.
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input data, see Sutherland and Figari (2013). In the next section, we explain
how the EUROMOD data and model is used to construct an integrated EU-wide
tax-benefit model.
6.4.2 Tax-transfer integration
With the EUROMOD data at hand (i.e. all relevant demographic characteristics
taken from the original data source but homogeneously coded and named plus
the net income/net tax components as simulated by EUROMOD), we construct
an EU-wide tax-benefit system in two main steps. However, rather than utilizing
EUROMOD directly for this task, we opt for a regression approach which can be
seen as a “short-cut” way to design a tax-transfer calculator, being more flexible
for our purpose. Therefore, we first predict net taxes calculated by EUROMOD
as precisely as possible for each country in the sample in the following way. As
explained above, EUROMOD simulates the country specific net taxes (income
and payroll taxes minus benefits) Tik = fk(Xi, zi) as a function of gross market
income Xi and a vector of non-income factors (demographic characteristics) zi
taken from the original data, while fk(Xi, zi) covers the set of all country-specific
tax-benefit rules that are read into EUROMOD. We take the same set of charac-
teristics (Xi, zi) as our right-hand side variables and regress Tik as simulated by
EUROMOD using a very flexible OLS specification, including higher order poly-
nomials to account for non-linear effects and interaction terms of income with all
relevant characteristics observed in the data for the assignment of taxes and ben-
efits (for similar approaches, see e.g. Frenette, Green and Milligan (2007), Biewen
and Juhasz (2012), Bargain et al. (2013b)). That is, we estimate the following
function separately for each country k but using the same specification:11
Tik = f˜k(Xi, zi) + i. (6.20)
f˜k(.) denotes a transformation (Xi, zi) → Tik which now is (technically) dif-
11Note that even if our analysis below is entirely performed at the individual level, the tax
functions are estimated and validated at the household level. The main reason is that most of
the taxes and transfers across countries are assigned to the household as the assessment unit,
rather than to the individual. Thus, a regression of household net taxes on household income
and characteristics turned out to be the superior approach.
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ferent from fk(.) and i is the OLS residual. Subsequently, Tˆik is predicted and
validated against Tik. Tables 6.8 and 6.9 in the appendix summarize this informa-
tion and show the mean values for disposable income as simulated by EUROMOD
and predicted with our tax function across gross income deciles, together with the
average percentage error in the prediction as indicated in the note to the tables.
With errors of usually around 0 − 1% and almost always below 5% (the same is
true for the overall Gini coefficient and the decile ratio), we can conclude that our
estimated net tax functions do a pretty good job in predicting EUROMOD net
taxes for the single countries.
For consistency reasons, predicted net taxes Tˆik are then used in the second
main step (i.e. rather than taking Tik) to estimate the integrated net tax function
on the pooled sample in the same way over all countries (i.e. single-country systems
in the baseline and the counterfactual EU tax function are based on exactly the
same specification):
Tˆik = ωif˜EU(Xi, zi) + i. (6.21)
Note that by construction, this is the “average” approach to the design of an
integrated tax-transfer system as defined in the previous section, capturing the
cross-country differences in Tˆik. Accordingly, f˜EU(.) denotes the “average” trans-
formation (Xi, zi) → Tˆik and ωi is the household sample weight. In Section 6.5
below, five different fiscal unions with altering number and composition of partic-
ipating countries are analyzed, namely the EU27 (27 current member countries of
the EU), EA17 (17 current member countries of the euro area), EA12 (12 founding
members of the euro area) and a hypothetical “North” and “South” euro area with
each five member countries. For all five unions, we use the same specification but
separately estimate the average function in order to predict a unique system. The
main estimation output is summarized in Table 6.10 in the appendix, showing the
most important single coefficients such as all gross income components, number
and age of children or age, hours worked and marital status of the different adult
household members. Most coefficients turn out to be significant and show signs as
expected. In all five cases, the fit of the regression in terms of the R2-measure is
around 0.98. In the last step, the average function is then used to predict net taxes
CHAPTER 6. BENEFITING FROM A EUROPEAN FISCAL UNION? 176
TˆiEU , i.e. the net taxes that households would have to pay if they were entirely
taxed under the integrated system. In the following, Tˆik and TˆiEU (and accordant
predictions for simulated shocks to gross income Xi) are the key ingredients to our
analysis.
6.4.3 Descriptive information
In this section, we provide descriptive information on the most important variables
used as well as on the estimated EU tax system. Table 6.1 reports values of these
variables for the overall EU level and all 27 EU member countries. With view to the
individual-level concept of expected utility, our unit of observation throughout the
analysis is the individual aged 18-59. However, we account for differences in family
size and composition using equivalized income.12 After the population shares in
column 1, columns 2 and 3 report means of gross and disposable income per
month and columns 4-7 of gross taxes, (employer plus employee) social insurance
contributions (SIC), gross benefits and net taxes.
[Table 6.1 about here.]
The member countries from Eastern Europe make up the lower end of the over-
all income distribution (with 205 EUR of disposable income in Romania which is
only 15% of the EU average) while Luxembourg is the richest country with 2905
EUR (207% of the EU average), followed by Ireland. Note however, that income
levels are not adjusted for differences in purchasing power.13 Scandinavian coun-
tries show the highest levels of gross taxes, followed by Belgium, the UK and
the Continental European countries. They are particularly low for most Southern
and Eastern European countries. SIC are especially important in France. Benefit
levels are most generous in Ireland and Luxembourg and lowest in the Eastern Eu-
ropean countries, with more than 100 EUR per month in Slovenia only. Resulting
net taxes in column 7 are highest for the scandinavian and most of the Continental
12We adjust all income variables using the OECD modified equivalence scale. That is, for each
person, the equivalized (per-capita) income is its household income divided by the household
specific equivalence scale which is a sum of weights equal 1.0 for the household head plus 0.5
for every additional adult member and 0.3 for each child aged less than 14.
13The main reason is that also existing fiscal unions are not based on purchasing power adjusted
income. Also, Bargain et al. (2013b) re-calculated their key findings using purchasing power
parities and did not get significant differences.
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European countries, while especially low for Ireland compared to its level of gross
income.
Finally, column 8 shows how net taxes would look like under the EU average
system, revealing considerable differences to the initial situation. Unsurprisingly,
the member countries from Eastern Europe benefit the most with net taxes less
than 10 EUR for Bulgaria and Hungary and being even negative in Romania (-63
EUR). Ireland and Luxembourg are the largest contributors to the system. Sur-
prising at first glance, most of the Southern European countries would have to
contribute as well, especially Cyprus, Greece and Malta. The reason is, that com-
pared to the other countries, they show quite low levels of taxes and SIC relative
to their gross income (as Ireland and Luxembourg) as well as relative to the level
of benefits they grant. This becomes more obvious with Figures 6.8 and 6.9 in the
appendix which plot net taxes corresponding to columns 7 and 8 in Table 6.1 for
the gross income distribution in each country. High income households in all three
countries mentioned pay much lower net taxes compared to similar households in
the EU while especially low income households in Malta also receive less bene-
fits. On the contrary, a further inspection reveals that high income households in
Belgium, Finland and Sweden will benefit from the reform due to high initial pro-
gression under their national systems (while the average system apparently would
be quite close to existing tax systems in Austria, Germany and the Netherlands).
In Eastern European countries, almost all households across the income distribu-
tion gain from the reform due to very low income levels compared to the rest of
Europe while in Ireland and Luxembourg, it is the other way round. The fact that
different parts of the income distribution within countries are often affected differ-
ently raises the question about incerasing/decreasing income inequality. Table 6.6
in the appendix reports Gini coefficients and Musgrave-Thin indices (as a measure
of redistribution/effective progression), as well as Generalized Entropy indices, and
shows that inequality between countries is declining through the reform but also
raising within a couple of member states.
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6.5 Results
In this section, we present the key results of our analysis in three subsections. All
subsections focus on equivalent variations of an integrated EU tax-transfer system
relative to the baseline with national systems for (i) the median voters of the
countries and (ii) for gross income deciles within countries (first two subsections).
Section 6.5.1 considers a fiscal union for all current 27 EU member states. In
Section 6.5.2 the focus is narrowed to the 17 members of the current euro area
and three further subgroups, namely the 12 founding members of the euro area as
well as a hypothetical “North” and “South” euro area. A sensitivity analysis with
respect to the model parameters is provided in Section 6.5.3.
6.5.1 Baseline results: EU27
This section considers the economic effects when moving from the existing national
tax-transfer systems to a fully integrated system for the EU27 member states,
utilizing the framework developed in Section 6.3. Even if unrealistic in terms
of political feasibility (in the short run), we focus on this case as a benchmark.
Bargain et al. (2013b) have shown that altering the degree of integration for such a
system in terms of the weight of the supranational regime does change quantitative
magnitudes but not qualitative findings. The authors also considered various rules
for political implementability, including the voting rules of the Treaty of Nice
(currently in force) and the Lisbon Treaty (supposed to be enacted from 2014
onwards). However, decisions of the Council of the European Union in tax matters
so far require unanimity. As explained above, by construction, our approach is very
likely to produce “winner” and “loser” countries in terms of equivalent variations.
We therefore do not focus on different scenarios for political feasibility but stick
to the unanimity rule when discussing the possibility of Pareto improving reforms
in Section 6.5.3.
In the baseline, the parameter values for computing equivalent variations are
set as follows. For the coefficient of relative risk aversion, we assume a value of
three (ρ = 3), which appears to be standard in the literature (see e.g. Hoynes and
Luttmer (2011)). With view to the working age population, the probability that
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an income shock occurs is set to 0.08, the mean unemployment rate in the EU in
2007. As in Dolls et al. (2012), the shock itself is assumed to be a 5% reduction
in market income, proportional across all countries and households. One might
argue that a 5% decrease in market income is quite low with view to an income
shock following unemployment. However, we start with rather modest parameters
to identify the implications of our framework sequentially and introduce a more
substantial shock in Section 6.5.3. There, we also alter the baseline values of the
other parameters.14
Table 6.2 presents median values for five different equivalent variations as de-
fined in Section 6.3. For the initial case when countries are not assumed to be
credit constrained, column 1 presents the total value of EV (EVT ) and columns
2-3 present its components, the redistributive (EVR) and stabilizing value (EVS).
Immediately obvious, the total EV is driven by the redistributive component and
the stabilization value remains marginal with more (less) than 1 EUR only in two
cases. This is due to the relatively modest assumptions for the shock parameters
in the baseline. Overall, 17 out of 27 countries would benefit from the regime
change. EVT ranges between 186 EUR per month for Hungary and -535 EUR
for Ireland as well as -489 EUR for Luxembourg. The latter are huge contribu-
tions and reflect the implications of a full implementation of the average system
in terms of redistribution. Generally, all Eastern European countries would gain
from the introduction of the EU system, with EVs of less than 100 EUR only for
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia. Consistent with the findings
for disposable income above, many Southern European countries would also lose
in terms of EVT , while some Northern and Continental European countries as
Finland, Sweden, Belgium or France would gain. This becomes explainable again
when considering Figures 6.8 and 6.9 together with Figures 6.1 and 6.2, which
plot the mean total EV across gross income deciles within countries. In these
countries, especially the higher income deciles also gain in terms of EVT while the
lower deciles sometimes even lose. In the Southern European countries however,
14Also, introducing heterogeneity for the parameters across countries or even households could
be a reasonable objection. Yet, at least for the coefficient of relative risk aversion, one would
need a good theory and reliable empirical estimates for country specific parameters. Since we
consider our exercise as a first step, we assume homogeneous values across countries in order
to ease comparability and focus on general implications.
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it is rather the other way round.
[Table 6.2 about here.]
With view to column 3, one important issue needs to be stressed. As explained
above, without any further assumption, moving from the national to an integrated
tax-transfer system can increase or decrease the extent of automatic fiscal sta-
bilization. First of all, the countries that pay much higher net taxes under the
EU compared to their national system benefit in terms of EVS, as e.g. Ireland,
Luxembourg or the UK, but also Cyprus, Greece, Spain or Malta. This is due to
a well-known feature of the concept of automatic stabilization, namely that the
extent of income stabilization will be higher for higher tax rates. For example, in
the presence of a proportional income tax with a tax rate of 30% versus a tax rate
of 40%, a shock to gross income of 100 EUR (given the same level of gross income
for both tax rates) leads to a decline in disposable income of 70 EUR in the first
and 60 EUR in the second case, i.e. the tax absorbs 30% versus 40% of the shock to
gross income. The same would be true for a negative tax rate (a benefit), i.e. the
more negative a tax rate is, the higher would be the extent of income stabilization.
Table 6.7 in the appendix provides a more detailed analysis. First, for comparison,
income stabilization coefficients at the aggregated level (as defined by Dolls et al.
(2012)) are calculated for the national as well as the integrated system in columns
1 and 2. Differences between both levels of the income stabilization coefficient are
qualitatively in line with the EV-based findings in this section. Also, all coun-
tries which have very low (high) initial stabilization coefficients, i.e. clearly below
(above) the EU average of 0.49, benefit (lose) in terms of stabilization. Second, to
better understand the differences in automatic stabilization across the regimes, we
calculate average effective tax rates (AETR) under both systems before and after
the shock in columns 3-6.15 Finally, we compare the magnitudes of income stabi-
lization in columns 7 and 8. One main lesson can be drawn: generally, the higher
(lower) effective taxation is under one of the two regimes compared to the other,
the lower (higher) is also the reduction in disposable income after a negative shock.
This leads to the observation that countries which especially benefit (lose) in terms
15If we use these AETRs to calculate average effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) we get
exactly the same values as for the income stabilization coefficients, which we did as a check.
That means, income stabilization coefficients can be interpreted as EMTR at the aggregated
level (for details see e.g. Immervoll (2004); OECD (2013)).
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of redistribution under the EU compared to the national system, lose (benefit) in
terms of stabilization. This is especially true for the Eastern European countries,
simply because their initial level of effective net tax rates decreases dramatically
under the EU system.16 However, average effective tax rates can only be a first
indicator for the extent of income stabilization, which is not only determined by
the size of the government but also depends on the structure of the tax-transfer
system and the design of the different components (i.e. taxes and benefits are
usually not designed as a proportional rate), which explains exceptions from this
observation.
Yet, one main argument for a European fiscal union is the provision of sta-
bilization from a federal budget when individual countries are credit constrained
but the union is not. Thus, assuming credit constraints at the country level is
of key importance. Otherwise, changes in stabilization would entirely depend on
differences in the levels of net taxes and the structure of the national versus the
EU system. In other words, there is no guarantee that an integrated tax-transfer
system would do a better job in stabilizing income than the countries would them-
selves do when they have free access to credit markets. For simplicity and reasons
of comparability we therefore assume that countries are fully credit constrained
when computing EVT ∗ and EVS∗ in columns 4 and 5 of Table 6.2 as defined above.
By definition, all countries show positive values of EVS∗ now. However, they are
still too low in order to significantly increase EVT ∗ . EVS∗ values are relatively
higher for those countries that still pay higher net taxes in absolute terms due
to higher income levels. Note the difference to the situation without credit con-
straints: now, the tax system that determines EVS∗ is the same for all countries
and different levels of EVS∗ are only due to different levels in income or differences
in demographic composition. This becomes also obvious with view to Figures 6.3
16Interestingly, this is also true for Romania where AETRs seem to be “not negative enough”
yet to invert that finding. Compare this to the results in Bargain et al. (2013b), where Greece
and Spain gain most in terms of redistribution for a similar fiscal integration of the founding
members of the eurozone (except Luxembourg and using 2001 data), but show also substantial
increases in automatic stabilization. The reason is that both countries receive huge negative
net taxes under the EU average system (-59 and -36 EUR per week, respectively, versus -63
EUR per month for Romania in this analysis). Besides, one should bear in mind that we use
data from 2007 versus 2001 in the previous chapter. Further differences are the focus on the
working age population, the individual as the unit of analysis and the inclusion of employer
SIC in this chapter.
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and 6.4, which plot mean values of EVS and EVS∗ across gross income deciles
within countries. Furthermore, due to the same effect, always the highest income
deciles within a country gain most in terms of EVS∗ .
[Figures 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 about here.]
In the next section, we analyze if fiscal integration for different subgroups of
the EU27 leads to different results.
6.5.2 Results for the euro area
The first subgroup for which we analyze the introduction of an EU average tax
system is the euro area with its current 17 member states (EA17). For this group,
political steps towards a fiscal union are probably more important and especially
more likely in the nearer future. The parameter assumptions are the same as in
the previous section. Table 6.3 presents equivalent variations for median voters,
focusing on the most relevant cases of EVT ∗ and EVS∗ . The first two columns
reveal a pattern for the EA17 which is pretty similar to that of the EU27, i.e. all
countries that would benefit (lose) from an average tax system of the EU27 would
also benefit (lose) now, such that a slight majority of nine countries would favor
the integrated system. For some countries, EVT ∗ values are even more pronounced.
Estonia and Slovakia would gain more than 200 EUR each, while both Ireland and
Luxembourg would lose more than 500 EUR. Greece and Spain would still have
to contribute as well, yet, substantially less compared to the EU27 system.
[Table 6.3 about here.]
How does the situation change when moving to a union for the founding mem-
bers of the euro area (EA12) in columns 3-4? At first glance, fiscal integration
would become even more unlikely as half of the participating countries gains while
the other half loses. The signs of EVT ∗ for the countries are the same as in case
of the EA17 system, however, magnitudes increase. The reason is that the EA12
countries are more similar in terms of income levels and the structure of tax-benefit
systems compared to the EA17. This reduces the redistributive effect. In contrast,
the benefits in terms of stabilization increase substantially.
This picture prevails when further narrowing down the scope of a fiscal union,
looking at two subgroups of even more similar countries, as sometimes labeled in
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the political debate as a “North” and “South” euro area (columns 5-8). In the
“North” euro area (EA-N), we include Austria, Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands,
and Germany as the “leading” country in terms of population weight. The “South”
euro area (EA-S) would be dominated by France and Italy and further includes
Greece, Spain and Portugal.17 In both unions, the median voter in three out of
five countries would favor fiscal integration while the contributions for the other
four countries in terms of EVT ∗ are above 50 EUR only for the Netherlands. The
stabilization gains are even higher for EA-N while more moderate for EA-S, given
the lower income levels. Interestingly, the two countries that would not favor a
“South” euro area are still Greece and Spain, which means that more households
in these two countries still pay less net taxes under the national system compared
to similar households in France, Italy and Portugal. This becomes obvious when
looking at mean EVs for gross income deciles in Figure 6.7b). For Greece and
Spain, EVT ∗ values decrease over the income distribution and sharply for the
highest deciles while in France and Italy, especially those deciles show up with
high values of EVT ∗ . For the “North” euro area in Figure 6.7a), this is true for
Belgium and Finland. Generally, the adverse effect that high income deciles benefit
at the expense of the lower ones within some countries is one of the questionable
features of the averaging approach (EVT ∗ across income deciles for EA17 and EA12
in Figures 6.5 and 6.6, respectively).
[Figures 6.5, 6.6, 6.7a) and 6.7b) about here.]
In sum, even narrowing down fiscal integration to more similar groups of coun-
tries does not lead to a fiscal union that would be favored by all participating
countries, i.e. that would be Pareto improving. In the last step of our analysis we
check the influence of the parameter assumptions for this result.
6.5.3 Sensitivity analyses
In the last two sections, the redistributive value of the equivalent variation clearly
dominated the stabilizing value. In consequence, Pareto improving reforms where
17France could also be considered as a rather Continental European country that better fits
the other group. However, for reasons of comparability we aimed at building two groups of
countries that are sufficiently “strong” in terms of economic conditions as well as population
weight such that they would able to form a viable fiscal union.
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at least one country gains (in terms of the median voter) while no one loses seem
to be very unlikely for our design of a fiscal union. However, this might change for
different parameter assumptions in the underlying model. In the following, we pro-
vide accordant robustness checks, focusing on increasing parameters. Reconsider
the decomposition of the overall change in expected utility in Section 6.3.3, i.e.
(6.17a) to (6.17e). For an increasing shock probability α, the change in expected
utility due to the after-shock net tax adjustment under the EU regime, (6.17c),
will be increasing as well (given that T0 > T1), while the effect on the rest of the
overall change in expected utility is twofold. In consequence, EVS∗ also increases
and might turn a negative value of EVT ∗ at some point into a positive one. The
same is equivalently true for more negative shocks to gross income ∆X, where
(6.17c) will be increasing due to ∆T1 < 0 compared to the baseline, and a higher
coefficient of relative risk aversion, in which U(C) is increasing.
In a first step, we set α = 0.1, ∆X = −10% and ρ = 5, in a second step
α = 0.15, ∆X = −15% and ρ = 10. Clearly, a value of ρ = 10 might seem
unrealistically high. However, we have sequentially tested the impact of further
values between ρ = 5 and ρ = 10 with almost no significant impact.18 The same is
true when separately changing one of the other parameters while taking baseline
values for the remaining two. In Table 6.4, we therefore only present two sets
of results where all parameters are altered at the same time. For the first set of
parameters, values for EVS∗ increase substantially in all scenarios of a fiscal union
(from EU27 down to EA-N and EA-S). However, they are still not high enough to
let those median voters benefit who lose in the baseline. The picture changes for
the second set of parameters. Now, single countries in all unions start to benefit
from fiscal integration due to high gains in terms of stabilization. Moving to a
“North” and “South” euro area would be even Pareto improving as each single
country reaches a positive value of EVT ∗ .
[Table 6.4 about here.]
18There is a literature on empirical estimates of relative risk aversion. Depending on the context,
findings differ greatly. For instance, Chetty (2006) provides estimates for an upper bound of
ρ < 2 in a labor supply context using elasticity estimates of more than thirty studies. In
contrast, in the finance literature, much higher values for constant relative risk aversion seem
to be common, up to ρ = 30 (see e.g. Mehra and Prescott (1985) or Kandel and Stambaugh
(1991)).
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Finally, we analyze the influence of a more dramatic shock to gross income,
closer to one that could be expected if individuals really got unemployed. There-
fore, we calculate the mean replacement rate for the EU27 in 2007, r = 0.65, and
set ∆X = −(1− r) ∗ 100 = −35%.19 Again for reasons of comparability and since
we consider illustrative calculations, we take the same value ∆X = −35% for all
fiscal federation scenarios in Table 6.5. The coefficient of relative risk aversion and
the shock probability are specified as in the baseline (i.e. ρ = 3 and α = 0.08). The
influence of a 35%-shock to gross income is pretty similar to that of the second sce-
nario in Table 6.4, though, EV values even increase to some extent. In the EU27,
Spain and Denmark gain additionally now, i.e. a negative redistributive value of
EV is more than counterbalanced through substantial gains in stabilization. The
same is true for Greece in the EA17. Again, installing fiscal unions for EA-N and
EA-S would be Pareto improving.
In sum, these results show that Pareto improving reforms - if taken as a criteria
for political feasibility based on unanimity - seem to be possible only for smaller
groups of more similar countries, and when expecting rather severe crisis scenarios
or high levels of individual risk aversion.20
[Table 6.5 about here.]
6.6 Concluding discussion
The current debt crisis in the euro area has initiated an ongoing debate concerning
deeper fiscal integration in Europe. In this chapter we analyzed the economic im-
plications for a benchmark case of fiscal integration, the introduction of a common
EU tax and transfer system. Based on the tax-transfer calculator EUROMOD and
household microdata for all current 27 EU member states, we applied an expected
utility approach and calculated individual equivalent variations of an EU-wide tax
and transfer system relative to the baseline with the national systems. Addition-
ally, we provided a decomposition into a “redistributive” and a “stabilization”
19Precisely, r is calculated as an average over (i) all relevant family types as specified in the
OECD database on Benefits and Wages and (ii) all countries (except Bulgaria and Romania
for which data is not available).
20A straightforward extension of the analysis in this section would be to numerically search for the
country-specific minimal parameters that would let a country benefit from a fiscal federation.
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component.
Our results show that 17 out of 27 countries, represented by their median vot-
ers, would benefit from fiscal integration in the EU27 in the baseline scenario,
mainly driven by the redistributive component. The Eastern European countries
would gain most with an top equivalent variation of 188 EUR per month in Hun-
gary. Ireland and Luxembourg would be the largest contributors. Surprisingly at
first glance, also many Southern European countries would lose. Generally, coun-
tries which benefit (lose) in terms of the redistributive component, tend to show
relatively low (high) benefits in terms of the stabilizing component. Effects across
gross income deciles within countries differ greatly and depend on income levels
and the structures of existing national systems. We additionally considered smaller
fiscal unions, namely for the current 17 members of the euro area, its 12 founding
members as well as two further subgroups as sometimes discussed in the political
debate under the label of a “North” and a “South” euro area. Moving to such
groups of more similar countries generally reduces redistributive and increases the
stabilizing effects. However, Pareto improving reforms where at least one country
gains while no one loses seem to be possible only for rather severe crisis scenar-
ios with substantial shocks to gross income and for high levels of individual risk
aversion.
Our results should be interpreted taking into account the specific framework
constructed and the simplifying assumptions made. Most importantly, this applies
to the average design of the common tax system. Despite its appeal, results depend
on this specific property and a design closer to political implementability should
at least correct for ‘adverse’ redistributive effects within single countries, as they
can occur here, i.e. that high income deciles gain at the expense of lower ones.
One step further, a very interesting exercise would be to use a precise objective
function and to calculate an optimal EU redistribution scheme (see e.g. Kopczuk,
Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2005) for an approach to world redistribution). However,
if political desirability of any (ex-ante) redistributive effects across countries is
generally questioned, the setup of a pure insurance mechanism would be required.
With respect to the shock scenarios, we have focused on shocks that affect coun-
tries and households proportionally and with the same probability for reasons of
comparability. However, introducing heterogeneity across countries, households or
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even further subgroups, as for instance high and low educated individuals, would
be a reasonable next step. Also, the expected utility framework that we used
remained very simplified given that expectations are formed over two different sit-
uations only. To bring this closer to reality, one could at least think of simulating
different counterfactual situations using existing empirical estimates for country
specific shock probabilities and/or income volatility over time.
Also, our study abstracts from any behavioral effects and focuses on direct
impacts of the simulated reforms only. However, one can immediately think of a
range of behavioral margins that would be affected. This certainly includes labor
supply, but also tax evasion behavior, cross-country migration or the adjustment
of remaining national fiscal policies through the governments as a reaction to fiscal
integration. For a discussion of these issues, we refer to Bargain et al. (2013b), who
did account for the first aspect in their analysis. Additionally, we have assumed
away any administration costs of installing a European fiscal federation, basically
presuming that administrations work equally efficient in every country after the
regime change and that there are no costs of adaption to the new tax-transfer
regulations.
These caveats point to the fact that the reforms we simulate are rather meant
as a conceptual experiment to clarify the impact of the general design of a fiscal
union and to propose a consistent framework for an analysis at the individual level.
However, common tax-transfer policies are a key element of existing fiscal unions
and will certainly be introduced in the EU or EMU as well in the medium or long
term. The political main motivation at this time is to provide insurance against
asymmetric shocks. Yet, while always depending on the specific aim and design of
the system, this might also include - intentionally or not - redistributive effects. In
light of this, our results can be considered as providing insights in general issues
of setting up a European fiscal union and might also apply.to forms and options
of common fiscal policies that are different from a full integration of European
tax-transfer systems.
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6.7 Tables and figures
Table 6.1: Individual average monthly income and taxes (2007 EUR)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
EU 1.000 2,046 1,402 318 536 210 644 644
AT 0.017 2,662 1,819 359 791 307 843 880
BE 0.021 2,621 1,680 528 692 280 941 862
BG 0.016 310 230 29 79 28 80 6
CY 0.002 1,847 1,661 122 250 186 187 550
CZ 0.022 837 578 68 275 85 259 150
DE 0.167 2,671 1,735 443 737 245 935 935
DK 0.011 3,189 2,298 1,032 274 415 892 1,037
EE 0.003 863 582 110 224 53 281 138
GR 0.022 1,455 1,138 158 317 158 317 435
ES 0.095 1,765 1,274 169 463 141 492 570
FI 0.010 2,797 1,841 612 658 314 956 899
FR 0.117 2,453 1,569 252 898 266 884 816
HU 0.021 598 386 88 226 102 212 1
IE 0.009 2,637 2,351 395 348 457 286 815
IT 0.117 2,270 1,521 376 650 277 748 695
LT 0.007 632 414 104 159 46 217 58
LU 0.001 3,749 2,905 458 827 440 844 1,408
LV 0.005 730 481 116 185 52 249 77
MT 0.001 1,140 965 100 174 98 176 223
NL 0.033 2,930 1,942 395 809 217 987 1,021
PL 0.082 636 455 85 187 90 182 98
PT 0.022 1,246 934 127 320 134 312 314
RO 0.046 278 205 40 73 39 74 -63
SE 0.017 2,960 1,848 609 843 339 1,112 996
SI 0.004 1,335 976 135 407 183 359 285
SK 0.012 637 456 35 216 70 180 61
UK 0.120 2,917 2,174 583 428 269 743 944
Note: (1) Population share; (2) gross income; (3) disposable income; (4) taxes; (5) SIC; (6)
benefits; (7)=(4)+(5)-(6) net taxes; (8) net tax that the individual would have to pay under the
estimated EU average tax system. Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC and EUROMOD.
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Table 6.2: Equivalent variations of median voters for EU27
EVT EVR EVS EVT ∗ EVS∗
EU 14.9 14.9 -0.0 18.8 3.5
AT -27.4 -26.7 -0.5 -19.3 5.5
BE 44.6 45.5 -1.4 50.6 5.9
BG 58.8 58.9 -0.1 59.3 0.4
CY -310.5 -311.6 1.7 -308.7 3.7
CZ 88.8 88.9 -0.1 90.7 1.6
DE 38.2 38.3 -0.2 43.8 5.2
DK -131.7 -132.2 0.1 -122.6 7.3
EE 129.1 129.2 0.0 130.9 1.5
GR -109.9 -110.6 0.5 -107.5 2.6
ES -85.6 -86.0 0.5 -82.0 3.4
FI 40.6 40.7 -0.3 46.9 6.1
FR 82.0 82.3 -0.2 87.8 5.3
HU 186.2 186.8 -0.4 188.1 0.9
IE -535.3 -535.5 0.6 -530.0 5.1
IT 54.2 54.6 -0.2 59.1 3.7
LT 138.6 138.9 -0.1 140.0 0.9
LU -489.1 -490.4 0.8 -481.9 7.3
LV 154.3 154.0 -0.1 155.6 1.1
MT -62.5 -63.3 0.8 -61.1 2.1
NL -35.6 -35.8 0.1 -30.1 6.1
PL 54.1 54.1 -0.0 55.4 0.9
PT 0.4 0.5 0.2 3.7 1.9
RO 120.6 120.8 -0.1 121.6 0.4
SE 98.2 98.5 -0.3 105.5 6.6
SI 64.5 64.4 0.2 66.9 2.7
SK 105.7 106.0 -0.1 107.4 1.1
UK -209.8 -210.6 0.7 -204.8 5.4
Note: (EVT ) Total value of EV; (EVR) redistributive value of EV; (EVS) stabilization value
of EV; (EVT∗) total value of EV under credit constraint; (EVS∗) stabilization value of EV
under credit constraint; all in monthly EUR. Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC and
EUROMOD.
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Table 6.3: Equivalent variations of median voters for different euro areas
EA17 EA12 EA-N EA-S
EVT ∗ EVS∗ EVT ∗ EVS∗ EVT ∗ EVS∗ EVT ∗ EVS∗
AT -90 6 -77 19 -10 20 . .
BE 53 6 75 20 127 20 . .
CY -281 4 . . . . . .
DE 33 5 54 17 33 18 . .
EE 223 1 . . . . . .
GR -44 2 -24 8 . . -17 7
ES -51 3 -35 11 . . -30 10
FI 9 6 28 21 37 22 . .
FR 62 5 80 18 . . 37 18
IE -533 5 -511 17 . . . .
IT 49 4 66 12 . . 47 12
LU -568 8 -557 26 . . . .
MT -54 2 . . . . . .
NL -98 6 -90 21 -53 21 . .
PT 19 2 37 6 . . 6 5
SI 136 3 . . . . . .
SK 231 1 . . . . . .
Note: (EVT∗) Total value of EV under credit constraint; (EVS∗) stabilization value of EV under
credit constraint; both in monthly EUR. Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC and
EUROMOD.
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Table 6.5: Equivalent variations of median voters for 35% income shock
ρ = 3, α = 0.08, ∆X = −35%
EU27 EA17 EA12 EA-N EA-S
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
AT 105 127 49 138 44 138 119 133 . .
BE 202 160 201 163 214 162 295 151 . .
BG 80 5 . . . . . . . .
CY -251 81 -227 79 . . . . . .
CZ 138 30 . . . . . . . .
DE 176 137 174 139 182 138 151 142 . .
DK 41 173 . . . . . . . .
EE 179 28 268 20 . . . . . .
GR -47 57 11 50 23 48 . . 26 45
ES 6 77 23 73 32 72 . . 32 67
FI 191 139 162 149 168 149 183 152 . .
FR 236 125 206 130 211 131 . . 168 136
HU 224 14 . . . . . . . .
IE -446 112 -450 112 -440 110 . . . .
IT 147 66 137 66 143 66 . . 117 66
LT 178 17 . . . . . . . .
LU -343 197 -408 219 -414 220 . . . .
LV 202 19 . . . . . . . .
MT -27 41 -19 39 . . . . . .
NL 117 151 54 166 50 167 78 160 . .
PL 95 16 . . . . . . . .
PT 50 38 64 34 83 33 . . 47 33
RO 142 5 . . . . . . . .
SE 283 157 . . . . . . . .
SI 132 50 203 45 . . . . . .
SK 142 20 264 12 . . . . . .
UK -72 136 . . . . . . . .
Note: (1) EVT∗ , total value of EV under credit constraint; (2) EVS∗ , stabilization value of EV
under credit constraint; both in monthly EUR. Switch from negative to positive EV compared
to baseline for single countries in italics, Pareto improving move to an EU system in bold-faced
italics. Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC and EUROMOD.
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Figure 6.1: Equivalent variations across income deciles when moving to an EU27 average
tax system
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Figure 6.2: Equivalent variations across income deciles when moving to an EU27 average
tax system (ctd.)
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under credit constraint
Figure 6.3: Equivalent variations across income deciles when moving to an EU27 average
tax system: stabilization value
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Figure 6.4: Equivalent variations across income deciles when moving to an EU27 average
tax system: stabilization value (ctd.)
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Figure 6.5: Equivalent variations across income deciles when moving to an EA17 average
tax system
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Figure 6.6: Equivalent variations across income deciles when moving to an EA12 average
tax system
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Figure 6.7: Equivalent variations across income deciles when moving to a “North” and
a “South” EA average tax system
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6.8 Appendix
On the following pages we first provide some additional results referred to in the
chapter (net tax plots; detailed inequality and progression indices; income stabi-
lization coefficients and average effective tax rates), and second, statistics on the
validation of the estimated net tax functions (predictions with estimated national
tax functions; main estimation output for estimated average tax functions).
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Figure 6.8: Plots for estimated net tax function: national vs. EU27 average
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Figure 6.9: Plots for estimated net tax function: national vs. EU27 average (ctd.)
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Table 6.6: Inequality and effective progression: national vs. EU average system
(a) Gini coefficients and Musgrave-Thin indices
Gini(X) Gini(Yk) Gini(YEU ) MT ∆MT
EU 0.475 0.381 0.368 1.179 2.1
AT 0.376 0.253 0.274 1.197 -2.8
BE 0.379 0.226 0.275 1.247 -6.3
BG 0.400 0.316 0.301 1.140 2.2
CY 0.303 0.247 0.220 1.081 3.5
CZ 0.341 0.233 0.211 1.164 2.9
DE 0.395 0.265 0.282 1.215 -2.4
DK 0.337 0.241 0.269 1.146 -3.7
EE 0.354 0.293 0.226 1.094 9.5
GR 0.410 0.322 0.311 1.149 1.6
ES 0.359 0.276 0.275 1.128 0.2
FI 0.373 0.244 0.273 1.206 -3.8
FR 0.355 0.244 0.255 1.171 -1.4
HU 0.417 0.239 0.228 1.306 1.5
IE 0.437 0.265 0.321 1.306 -7.7
IT 0.371 0.284 0.293 1.139 -1.3
LT 0.396 0.325 0.264 1.118 9.1
LU 0.364 0.247 0.292 1.184 -6.0
LV 0.410 0.356 0.274 1.093 12.6
MT 0.336 0.264 0.225 1.109 5.2
NL 0.357 0.264 0.269 1.146 -0.7
PL 0.420 0.305 0.299 1.200 0.7
PT 0.427 0.327 0.307 1.176 3.0
RO 0.455 0.343 0.291 1.206 7.9
SE 0.341 0.219 0.251 1.185 -4.1
SI 0.345 0.226 0.226 1.182 0.1
SK 0.314 0.219 0.192 1.138 3.5
UK 0.472 0.339 0.356 1.253 -2.7
(b) Generalized entropy indices
GE(0) GE(0)w GE(0)b GE(1) GE(1)w GE(1)b
National 0.304 0.143 0.160 0.278 0.164 0.113
EU average 0.255 0.145 0.110 0.258 0.173 0.085
Note: Gini(X) refers to inequality in gross market, Gini(Yk) to inequality in disposable income under national
systems, Gini(YEU ) to inequality in disposable income under EU system. The MT index (Musgrave and Thin
(1948)) is defined as MT=(1−Gini(Y ))/(1−Gini(X)) and is a measure of redistribution/effective progression.
∆MT indicates the %-change in the MT index when moving from the national to the EU average system. By
construction, a positive (negative) ∆MT coincides with a decrease (increase) in the Gini index. GE(0) and GE(1)
are measures from the Generalized Entropy (GE) class of inequality indices (Shorrocks (1980)), denoted GE(α),
with α being a parameter indicating more sensitivity towards changes at the top (bottom) of the income distribu-
tion the more positive (negative) α is. GE(0) is also known as mean log deviation and GE(1) as the Theil index
(Theil (1967)). Both measures are decomposable into a weighted average of inequality within subgroups of a given
population, plus inequality among those subgroups. Here, GE(α)w (GE(α)b) is the within- (between-) country
inequality and GE(α)w +GE(α)b = GE(α). Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC and EUROMOD.
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Table 6.7: Income stabilization coefficients and AETRs
τk τEU AETR
0
k AETR
1
k AETR
0
EU AETR
1
EU ∆Ck ∆CEU
EU 0.49 0.49 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 -49.8 -49.9
AT 0.57 0.51 0.32 0.30 0.33 0.32 -56.2 -63.8
BE 0.63 0.49 0.36 0.34 0.33 0.32 -50.6 -68.6
BG 0.39 0.33 0.26 0.25 0.02 0.00 -9.3 -10.3
CY 0.28 0.49 0.10 0.09 0.30 0.29 -65.8 -46.7
CZ 0.48 0.47 0.31 0.30 0.18 0.16 -21.8 -22.2
DE 0.51 0.50 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.34 -61.3 -63.0
DK 0.52 0.50 0.28 0.27 0.33 0.32 -76.5 -78.7
EE 0.42 0.45 0.33 0.32 0.16 0.14 -25.0 -23.7
GR 0.38 0.47 0.22 0.21 0.30 0.29 -44.3 -38.4
ES 0.42 0.48 0.28 0.27 0.32 0.31 -49.5 -44.8
FI 0.55 0.51 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.31 -63.1 -68.8
FR 0.53 0.51 0.36 0.35 0.33 0.32 -58.0 -60.0
HU 0.63 0.45 0.35 0.34 0.00 -0.02 -10.9 -16.2
IE 0.46 0.49 0.11 0.09 0.31 0.30 -71.6 -67.0
IT 0.54 0.51 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.30 -42.1 -45.2
LT 0.44 0.42 0.34 0.34 0.09 0.07 -17.6 -18.4
LU 0.46 0.49 0.23 0.21 0.38 0.37 -101.1 -94.0
LV 0.43 0.43 0.34 0.34 0.11 0.09 -20.6 -20.5
MT 0.30 0.46 0.15 0.15 0.20 0.18 -38.5 -30.0
NL 0.48 0.49 0.34 0.33 0.35 0.34 -73.8 -72.4
PL 0.46 0.46 0.29 0.28 0.15 0.14 -15.2 -15.3
PT 0.44 0.47 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.24 -34.9 -33.0
RO 0.44 0.39 0.26 0.26 -0.22 -0.26 -7.8 -8.4
SE 0.55 0.51 0.38 0.37 0.34 0.33 -66.4 -72.6
SI 0.48 0.50 0.27 0.26 0.21 0.20 -34.8 -33.2
SK 0.44 0.44 0.28 0.27 0.10 0.08 -17.5 -17.6
UK 0.42 0.47 0.25 0.25 0.32 0.32 -85.9 -78.4
Note: Results for a negative 5%-shock to gross income Xi. τ =
∑
i
(∆Xi − ∆Yi)/
∑
i
∆Yi
with disposable income Yi. AETR =
∑
i
(Xi − Yi)/
∑
i
Xi. (τk) Income stabilization coeffi-
cient of national tax systems; (τEU ) income stabilization coefficient under EU average system;
(AETR0k) national average effective tax rate before shock; (AETR
1
k) national AETR after shock;
(AETR0EU ) AETR under EU average system before shock; (AETR
1
EU ) AETR under EU average
system after shock; (∆Ck) change in disposable income under national system; (∆CEU ) change
in disposable income under EU average system; ∆Ck and ∆CEU in monthly EUR. Source: Own
calculations based on EU-SILC and EUROMOD.
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Table 6.8: Validation of estimated net tax functions
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Table 6.9: Validation of estimated net tax functions (ctd.)
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Table 6.10: Main estimation output for European average tax functions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES EU27 EA17 EA12 EA-N EA-S
Employment income 0.462*** 0.590*** 0.579*** 0.617*** 0.402***
(0.0166) (0.0208) (0.0222) (0.0280) (0.0301)
(Employment income)2 2.551** -6.370*** -7.048*** -15.52*** 10.93***
(1.172) (1.553) (1.653) (2.186) (2.813)
Capital income -0.140 -0.251 -0.110 -0.787** 1.902***
(0.175) (0.207) (0.217) (0.309) (0.349)
(Capital income)2 123.1*** 329.4*** 312.2*** 413.4*** -419.7**
(27.78) (44.74) (46.98) (102.4) (174.1)
Priv. pension income 0.426 0.466 0.136 -1.529*** 2.059***
(0.260) (0.366) (0.385) (0.492) (0.657)
(Priv. pension income)2 35.18 -111.9 87.08 1,873*** -2,869***
(130.8) (264.5) (279.6) (435.4) (675.3)
Maint. costs 0.0193 0.741 0.892 2.244** 1.010
(0.539) (0.598) (0.624) (1.022) (0.774)
(Maint. costs)2 2,164*** 2,964*** 3,045*** 1,765 4,772***
(539.9) (711.8) (741.4) (1,378) (1,092)
N childr. age 0-2 -171.4*** -277.6*** -364.5*** -377.0*** -501.8***
(20.44) (31.30) (34.51) (54.31) (38.31)
N childr. age 3-6 -139.3*** -247.8*** -361.1*** -322.2*** -506.4***
(17.70) (26.51) (29.48) (46.86) (33.01)
N childr. age 7-12 20.05 -83.40*** -219.2*** -280.9*** -269.0***
(14.83) (24.07) (26.94) (41.61) (29.81)
N childr. age 13-17 76.11*** -40.67* -121.9*** -342.7*** -177.1***
(14.50) (23.22) (26.27) (42.59) (29.62)
N childr. age 18+ 68.01*** 54.70** -12.01 -411.6*** -1.273
(13.33) (22.24) (25.35) (44.09) (27.75)
(N childr. age 0-2)2 -64.48*** 16.28 30.02** 78.27*** -11.89
(10.29) (14.29) (15.29) (22.82) (16.74)
(N childr. age 3-6)2 -8.043 50.58*** 60.83*** 47.79*** 46.75***
(7.522) (10.02) (10.62) (13.61) (12.42)
(N childr. age 7-12)2 -17.00*** -4.518 5.990 -4.323 -38.91***
(4.411) (6.805) (7.426) (10.48) (8.478)
(N childr. age 13-17)2 -35.71*** -2.341 -0.905 34.08*** -9.212
(5.056) (7.398) (8.467) (12.51) (9.206)
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(N childr. age 18+)2 5.123 11.92* 12.28* 117.6*** -53.57***
(3.578) (6.246) (6.973) (13.89) (7.115)
N adults age 16-25 312.1*** 230.1*** 135.0*** -33.36 -121.0***
(15.93) (26.39) (29.90) (48.34) (33.47)
N adults age 26-35 173.0*** 117.0*** 33.61 -187.2*** -93.47***
(14.39) (23.85) (26.84) (47.12) (28.63)
N adults age 36-45 114.3*** 124.1*** 52.70* -142.4*** -118.0***
(15.24) (24.63) (27.85) (48.42) (29.78)
N adults age 46-55 198.9*** 148.5*** 54.55* -113.6** -166.4***
(16.77) (26.90) (30.38) (50.72) (33.05)
N adults age 56-65 185.4*** 86.00*** -19.85 -177.6*** -160.7***
(19.46) (30.03) (33.72) (54.48) (36.46)
N adults age 66-75 217.4*** 136.1*** 64.78 -279.8*** -193.0***
(30.85) (44.90) (49.31) (83.33) (49.52)
N adults age 76+ 303.0*** 221.1*** 137.6** -11.97 -143.0**
(38.59) (54.19) (59.67) (118.9) (59.72)
(N adults age 16-25)2 -53.68*** -48.66*** -44.33*** -63.97*** 40.06***
(5.570) (9.496) (10.11) (13.41) (12.07)
(N adults age 26-35)2 20.98*** 22.62*** 12.02 39.11*** 15.47*
(4.234) (6.977) (7.559) (10.45) (8.176)
(N adults age 36-45)2 38.23*** 30.45*** 18.14*** 29.85*** 37.56***
(4.609) (5.965) (6.378) (8.764) (7.395)
(N adults age 46-55)2 -0.990 -0.718 -5.303 14.32* 16.11**
(4.768) (6.237) (6.692) (8.566) (7.610)
(N adults age 56-65)2 -26.02*** -7.151 -7.121 5.142 -42.65***
(6.353) (7.890) (8.438) (11.48) (9.152)
(N adults age 66-75)2 -30.39* 29.99 40.99* 237.5*** 52.68***
(16.01) (21.27) (22.88) (45.12) (20.44)
(N adults age 76+)2 -58.49** -28.54 -2.931 128.7* 34.29
(22.81) (29.78) (32.13) (69.84) (28.84)
N civil servants in hh 26.74*** -21.52*** -76.17*** -338.7*** -106.1***
(5.055) (6.924) (7.623) (17.46) (7.335)
N disabled in hh -78.69*** -343.9*** -341.8*** -395.0*** -265.6***
(6.114) (10.10) (10.74) (12.66) (12.14)
N months in unempl. in hh -4.351*** -19.75*** -19.54*** -13.69*** -15.04***
(0.436) (0.573) (0.613) (0.713) (0.751)
N immigrants in hh -40.55*** -2.518 -4.190 -45.08*** -0.344
(3.820) (4.688) (4.967) (8.379) (5.001)
N women in hh 22.15*** 14.82*** 7.409* -12.05** -10.95**
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(2.981) (3.813) (4.067) (5.133) (4.601)
Hours worked hh-head 17.68*** 7.852*** 6.639*** 10.05*** 0.638
(0.319) (0.402) (0.424) (0.549) (0.460)
Hours worked hh-head’s partn. 4.471*** -4.605*** -7.082*** -11.62*** -4.367***
(0.414) (0.549) (0.594) (0.928) (0.627)
Hh-head married 133.6*** 80.65*** 60.17*** 4.085 17.34*
(7.248) (9.169) (9.726) (13.22) (10.40)
Hh-head sep./divorced 14.55** -8.382 -16.97** -45.55*** 47.47***
(5.929) (7.306) (7.750) (8.137) (9.997)
Hh-head early ret. -158.2*** -327.1*** -334.1*** -95.11*** -521.2***
(11.85) (13.93) (14.77) (18.30) (16.17)
Hh-head inactive/unemp. 15.30** 13.18 24.85** 60.51*** -36.26***
(7.764) (9.375) (9.858) (11.88) (10.87)
Hh-head student/other 55.58*** 0.693 22.99* 99.64*** -26.88*
(10.09) (11.50) (12.06) (14.01) (14.68)
Hh-head’s partn. early ret. -27.36*** 78.02*** 59.11*** 48.77*** 23.79*
(9.287) (11.62) (12.38) (17.27) (14.02)
Hh-head’s partn. inactive/unemp. -267.5*** -393.8*** -455.4*** -530.3*** -408.5***
(13.61) (17.19) (18.45) (27.66) (18.62)
Hh-head’s partn. student/other -57.14*** 61.99*** 45.02*** -126.0*** 93.67***
(8.230) (10.36) (11.61) (15.71) (13.13)
Hh is homeowner 146.5*** 106.5*** 70.60*** 104.3*** 36.78***
(4.253) (5.387) (5.746) (7.333) (6.770)
Hours worked 1st add. hh-mem. 0.999*** 1.682*** 0.527* 3.486*** -0.868***
(0.207) (0.269) (0.307) (0.589) (0.289)
1st add. hh-mem. married -85.93*** 17.41 41.19 -110.7*** 124.4***
(17.25) (24.01) (26.22) (42.16) (26.98)
1st add. hh-mem. sep./divorced -128.4*** -19.45 76.58*** 194.8*** 16.08
(15.74) (22.60) (24.71) (64.73) (23.63)
1st add. hh-mem. early ret. -111.4*** -376.3*** -436.0*** -106.9 -456.4***
(31.63) (45.79) (50.22) (84.09) (53.16)
1st add. hh-mem. inactive/unemp. -111.9*** -256.2*** -212.4*** 143.8* -300.4***
(30.18) (43.47) (47.72) (75.11) (51.04)
1st add. hh-mem. student/other -170.3*** -369.7*** -301.1*** 143.3** -324.5***
(28.21) (40.98) (45.09) (70.87) (48.93)
...
+ up to 4th additional household member
+ all demographic variables interacted with all income variables
...
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Constant -886.2*** -477.5*** -248.6*** -46.84 95.72
(40.72) (54.43) (58.97) (76.65) (67.34)
Obs. 155,842 93,477 74,407 31,880 36,735
R2 0.981 0.965 0.970 0.987 0.979
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. EU27 indicates the
estimated model for the current 27 member states of the EU; EA17 for the current 17 member
states of the euro area; EA12 for the 12 founding members of the euro area and EA-N (EA-S)
for a hypothetical “North” (“South”) euro area as defined in the text. Source: Own calculations
based on EU-SILC and EUROMOD.
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Chapter 7
Concluding remarks
The aim of this thesis was to enrich the knowledge about European tax-transfer
systems while also providing analyses that point into possible directions of fu-
ture developments or that shed light on aspects which might become increasingly
important for future policy design. All classical functions of state tax-transfer
policies – providing redistribution that is also efficient, and stabilization – were
captured. After a brief introduction into the method of counterfactual simulations
including labor supply estimations, we started by assessing the redistributive pref-
erences that are implicit in European tax and transfer systems when accounting
for actual efficiency constraints in form of labor supply responses to taxation. Sub-
sequently, Chapter 3 was concerned with the eventual objective of redistributive
systems, namely individual well-being, and considered how the assessment of indi-
vidual welfare in Europe might change when allowing for individual heterogeneity
in consumption-leisure preferences. Chapter 4 analyzed to what extent European
tax-transfer systems reduce inequality in opportunities, a concept that is increas-
ingly considered to be more important than classical income inequality. In Chapter
5, the focus shifted to the stabilizing function of tax-transfer systems. Motivated
by the experiences from the recent economic crisis, a prospective scenario of a
European ‘fiscal union’ was analyzed, focussing on its stabilizing properties but
also considering redistributive effects. Chapter 6 extended this analysis in a di-
rect way and brought redistributive and stabilizing effects together in a consistent
evaluation framework based on individual expected utility. This allows to pose
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the interesting question under which constellations a European fiscal federation
could be beneficial for all member countries. The main results and resulting pol-
icy implications and/or possible directions for future research can be summarized
as follows.
“To what extent do redistributive preferences – revealed through the tax-transfer
system – differ across countries when accounting for actual differences in labor
supply responses to taxation?”
We find relatively small differences in labor supply elasticities across countries,
yet resulting redistributive views are significantly different between three groups of
nations. Social inequality aversion is highest in Nordic and some Continental Eu-
ropean countries, pointing to Rawlsian preferences, while Southern Europe reflect
a very low inequality aversion close to utilitarian views (similar to the US). Fur-
thermore, countries with Rawlsian preferences only appear so because responses
at the extensive margin – the dominant margin – are taken into account. If we
impose zero labor supply responses, reflecting the possibility that policymakers
ignored efficiency constraints at the time traditional social transfers were put in
place, revealed redistributive tastes become less pronounced and much more sim-
ilar. This highlights the importance of accounting for efficiency constraints when
assessing social inequality aversion.
“To what extent do cross-country comparisons of individual welfare differ when
accounting for possible heterogeneity in consumption-leisure preferences?”
Our results suggest that differences in consumption-leisure preferences – and
their normative treatment – might matter substantially when interpersonally eval-
uating welfare in a European context. Precisely, under criteria that tend to eval-
uate agents with a relatively higher (lower) willingness-to-work to be better off
compared to agents with a lower (higher) willingness-to-work, households from
apparently “work-loving (work-averse) countries” rank higher on average. The re-
ranking of households between nations when moving from the former to the latter
types of welfare criteria is substantial and a decomposition analysis shows that
cross-country differences in estimated consumption-leisure preferences are indeed
driving this result. This might suggest that the respect for preference heterogene-
ity should precede any attempts to compare individual well-being across countries
on the basis of a SWF, as e.g. used in optimal taxation analyses, or other forms of
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aggregated indices. Yet, our calculations should be considered as illustrative since
we kept the empirical framework of this chapter simple.
”Are tax-transfer systems in Europe reducing inequality of opportunity and, if
yes, how does its extent compare to the reduction in income inequality?”
Differences in opportunities are still widespread in Europe both within and
across countries. Europe seems to be divided between the Continental and the
Nordic countries on the one hand, where equality of opportunity is relatively high,
and the Anglo-Saxon and Eastern European countries on the other hand, where the
degree of equality of opportunity is relatively low. The tax and transfer schemes,
however, reduce inequality in opportunities, with social benefits typically playing
the key role. The full tax-benefit schemes are generally more successful at equaliz-
ing opportunities rather than outcomes while greater differences can be observed
when looking at the tax-benefit instruments separately.
“What would have been the economic effects in terms of income redistribution
and macroeconomic stabilization, if i) a European tax-transfer system or ii) a
European fiscal equalization mechanism would have been introduced together with
the monetary union?”
Depending on the specific scenario analyzed, the introduction of an EU tax-
transfer system would have increased the disposable income of a small majority of
households in Europe and simultaneously would have led to significant redistribu-
tion between countries. The stabilizing effects of an EU tax-transfer system would
have been rather moderate. Regarding the system of fiscal equalization, where dif-
ferences between the taxing capacity of individual countries and the average EU
taxing capacity are fully neutralized, we would have observed massive transfers of
tax revenue from high to low income countries. However, the fiscal equalization
mechanism could have had a destabilizing effect for some countries.
“What would be the integrated individual value in terms of redistributive and
stabilizing effects when introducing a European tax-transfer system and what are
the preconditions for a Pareto improving introduction?”
Using recent data before the crisis, we find that 17 out of the 27 current EU
member countries, represented by their median voters, would benefit from an EU
tax-transfer system in terms of equivalent variations which is mainly driven by
its redistributive component. The Eastern European countries would gain most,
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Ireland and Luxembourg would be the largest contributors. Surprisingly at first
glance, also many Southern European countries would lose. Generally, countries
which benefit (lose) in terms of the redistributive component, tend to show rela-
tively low (high) benefits in terms of the stabilizing component. Moving to smaller
groups of more similar countries, as e.g. the current eurozone members, generally
reduces redistributive and increases the stabilizing effects. However, Pareto im-
proving reforms where at least one country gains while no one loses seem to be
possible only for rather severe crisis scenarios with substantial shocks to gross
income, or for high levels of individual risk aversion.
To sum up the main findings of this thesis, we first conclude that it is important
to account for efficiency constraints when assessing the inequality aversion implicit
in European tax-benefit systems. With view to the limitations in our analysis,
future research should focus on including other policies (non-cash benefits, public
goods), further behavioral margins (migration, tax evasion, educational choices)
as well as political economy aspects. Second, respecting individual preferences
might be of increasing relevance in welfare evaluation, and hence, also for policy
design. Yet, various data needs to be explored and further empirical research
to be carried out in order to properly identify individual tastes over the various
dimensions of life. Third, while tax-transfer systems generally reduce inequality
of opportunity, differences in opportunities are still widespread in Europe. The
issue of equal opportunities might become even more important for policy design
in view of the ongoing European integration. Further research should focus on
the causal mechanisms behind observed family background and, with view to the
assessment of redistributive policies, especially on the long-run impact over the life
cycle. Fourth, the stabilizing effects of introducing a European ‘fiscal union’ could
be too small to “counterbalance” its redistributive consequences and a Pareto
improving reform might be possible only in rather severe crisis scenarios. This
suggests that generating political support for deeper fiscal integration may be
difficult with view to current or prospective voting rules of the Council of the
European Union. However this result partly depends on the specific design of the
system under analysis. If political desirability of any (ex-ante) redistributive effects
across countries is generally questioned, the setup of a pure insurance mechanism
would be required and could be an interesting topic to study for future research.
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